

B821  
.M54









SCIENCE AND CULTURE SERIES  
JOSEPH HUSSLEIN, S.J., PH.D., GENERAL EDITOR



AMERICAN  
HUMANISM  
AND THE  
NEW AGE

By the Author

*Le Mouvement Humaniste aux Etats-Unis*

*The Challenge of Humanism*

*Humanism and Sanctity*

*Our Lady of the Birds*

*Faneuil Hall Independence Day Oration*


*The Cambridge Centenary Ode*

*Junior French*

*College French*



# AMERICAN HUMANISM AND THE NEW AGE



By LOUIS J. A. MERCIER

A.M., Litt.D., L.H.D., D.S.Ed., LL.D., K.L.H.

Lauréat de l'Académie Française

Docteur ès Lettres

Emeritus, Harvard University

Professor of Comparative Philosophy and Literature  
Georgetown University

THE BRUCE PUBLISHING COMPANY  
MILWAUKEE

Copyright, 1948, Louis J. A. Mercier  
Made in the United States of America



## FOREWORD

THIS book is a sequel to *The Challenge of Humanism*, published in 1933 by the Oxford Press. Irving Babbitt died that year, Paul Elmer More four years later, but the humanist discussion went on.

In France, in England, and widely in the United States, philosophical thought came to center more and more about the content of humanism.

The word is ambiguous. The scholars of the Renaissance came to be called humanists because they studied in particular human culture, the *litterae humaniores* of antiquity, in contrast to the Sacred Scriptures, the *litterae divinae*. Nineteenth century writers began to speak of the humanism of the Renaissance. Was this humanism a doctrine, and, if so, what did it stand for? Certainly for the human. But what was the human? What was the nature of man? In answering this question it came to be the tendency of the 19th century to say that man was the highest product of the evolution of a self-existing universe, and that personal and social betterment was his highest end. Thus God and man were, by these thinkers, merged in nature. This should be called naturalism, but the naturalists re-vindicated the word humanism and called themselves humanists. Hence the ambiguity.

It should be evident, however, that if the humanists of the Renaissance, as opposed to the theologians, did not deal with the supernatural, they did believe with Cicero that man was unique in nature because he was a rational being. For them, humanism meant the distinctly human. They were not naturalists. They did not merge man in nature.

What Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More represented in the 1900's was the attempt to restore to the word humanism its meaning of the distinctly human.

By American humanism is then meant the efforts made in the

United States to restore the conception that man is unique in nature, that he is both spirit and matter, so that he cannot be the product of a purely material evolution. As this implies in him the existence of two distinct elements it further implies an opposition to all idealistic doctrines that would make man and nature, together with what is still called God, aspects of one substance only. American humanism thus stands opposed to every form of monistic naturalism, including pantheism. It is a dualistic doctrine.

Much might have been said in this book about like endeavors on the part of American writers brought up in the dualistic tradition, or by Europeans now living in the United States. Purposely all such possible studies were eliminated so that consideration might here be confined to men who come from the very center of the American scene and who were brought up in circles within which naturalism prevailed.

For the startling fact about American thought is that, although American institutions are based on the conception of man as unique in nature, and as possessing inalienable rights because he was created by God, yet this point of view has been largely displaced in American academic circles.

A dramatic interest can therefore be found in the studies chosen, because a Hutchins, a Lippmann, and a Foerster, as well as a Babbitt and a More, had to extricate themselves from the current of thought in which they were reared. We have thus two generations of American rebels against naturalism who are genuine radicals because they want to go back to the roots of all problems.

That American thinkers have thus grappled radically with the problems of our day is a proof that American thought is now not only ready for international co-operation, but sufficiently critical to contribute to the reorientation of Western thought.

The further basic challenge, issued by the second generation of American humanists whom this book studies, is that the 19th century was in the main a naturalistic age; and moreover, that if it ended in catastrophe, it did so logically because of its naturalistic principles; and finally, that if we are to have a new age, we must go back to the humanistic conception of man unique in nature.

To the subhuman aspect of naturalism, the representative American humanists studied here are not only ready to oppose the classical humanism, so far as it goes, but to consider seriously a distinctly theistic humanism which makes possible a still further progress: the



acceptance of a traditional Christian outlook, which we may call Supernaturalized Humanism.

Although I am a believer in Supernaturalized Humanism, I am no less strongly impressed by the fact that ultimately we must face the same possible fundamental alternatives of thought which, except for the Christian concept, were all canvassed at the very beginning of Greek speculation.

I therefore believe that, no matter what alternative of thought we personally accept, we should be able to study them all with equal objectivity; and that in no way is an opposition to doctrine meant to imply the disparaging of persons.

This approach I would call comparative criticism.

I have failed of my purpose, if, in the analysis of naturalists as well as of humanists, I have fallen short of the objective method of this comparative criticism.

Grateful acknowledgment is due to President Hutchins, Dean Hough, President Barr, Dean Buchanan, Norman Foerster, and Walter Lippmann, all of whom helped me in various ways to make sure of their thought; to Professor Werner Jaeger of Harvard University, and to Rev. Leonard Feeney, S.J., who read most of the manuscript; and to Rev. Joseph Husslein, S.J., who scrutinized critically the many places where theological doctrines were involved. Moreover, as Editor of the Science and Culture Series, Father Husslein checked up the whole text and prepared it for the press.

LOUIS J. A. MERCIER

Washington, D. C.





## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

THE courtesy of the following firms for permission to quote from their copyrighted publications is gratefully acknowledged as follows:

Abington-Cokesbury Press, *The Christian Criticism of Life* (copyrighted in 1941 by Whitman and Sons), by Lynn Harold Hough; The Catholic Association for International Peace, *The Pattern for Peace and the Papal Peace Program* (1946), by Rev. J. C. Murray; D. Appleton-Century Co., *The Future of the Liberal College* (1938), by Norman Foerster; Farrar and Rinehart, Inc.: *Toward Standards* (1928, 1929, 1930), by Norman Foerster; *Humanism and America* (1930), edited by Norman Foerster; *The Higher Learning in a Democracy: A Reply to President Hutchins' Critique of the American University* (1937), by Harry D. Gideonse; G. P. Putnam's Sons, *Irving Babbitt*, *Man and Teacher* (1941), by F. A. Manchester and O. Shepard; Henry Holt and Co., *A History of German Literature* (1896, 1901), by Kuno Francke; Houghton Mifflin Co., *Literature and the American College* (1908), *Masters of French Criticism* (1912), *Democracy and Leadership* (1924), *On Being Creative* (1932), by Irving Babbitt; Little, Brown, and Co., and Atlantic Monthly Press, *The Good Society* (1937), by Walter Lippmann; The Louisiana State University Press, *Education for Freedom* (1943), by R. Maynard Hutchins; The Macmillan Company, *Preface to Morals* (1929), by Walter Lippmann; Marquette University Press, *Humanism and Theology*, "Aquinas Lecture" (1943), by Werner Jaeger; Oxford University Press (London), *What the Churches Stand for, A Symposium* (c. 1940), edited by Ord; Oxford University Press (New York), *The Dhammapada* (1936), by Irving Babbitt, and *The Challenge of Humanism* (1933), by Louis J. A. Mercier; Princeton University Press: *The Humanities After the War, A Symposium* (1944), edited by Norman Foerster; *The Intent of the Critic* (1941), by D. A. Stauffer; and *The Christ of the New Testa-*

ment (1924), by Paul Elmer More; Scribner's Sons, *History of Philosophy* (1896), by Alfred Weber; University of Chicago Press, *No Friendly Voice* (1936), by R. Maynard Hutchins; University of Iowa Press, *The Baconian Lectures* (1943); University of North Carolina Press: *The American Scholar* (1929), by Norman Foerster; *The American State University* (1937), by Norman Foerster; *Literary Scholarship, Its Aims and Methods* (1941), by Norman Foerster, John C. McGalliard, René Wellek, Austin Warren, Wilbur L. Schramm.

## CONTENTS

Foreword	v
Acknowledgments	ix
1. American Humanism and the Perspective of Western Thought	1
2. The Legacy of Irving Babbitt	9
3. Hutchins' Recovery of the Need of Metaphysics	34
4. Lippmann's Recovery of the Need of Theism	52
5. Theistic Integral Humanism	67
6. Lynn Harold Hough: From Theistic Humanism to Christian Evangelism	88
7. Supernaturalized Humanism	112
8. The Alternatives of Thought	130
9. Humanistic Education I: The St. John's College Experiment	144
10. Humanistic Education II: The Critique of Norman Foerster	165
11. Theistic Humanism and Inter-Faith Cooperation	189
Epilogue	215
References and Notes	219
Index	225





# 1

## AMERICAN HUMANISM AND THE PERSPECTIVE OF WESTERN THOUGHT

WHAT is man? To this, the most important question that any one may ask, contradictory answers are given today.

The average American student may enter college still thinking that he is distinct in nature from other animals; but he is likely to come out convinced that he is not, or else completely befuddled as to which is the true alternative of thought.

This is a very recent phenomenon. In the Greece of Aristotle, in the Rome of Cicero, in Europe clear down to the end of the 18th century, in the America of the founders of this nation, man was considered to have a distinct essence.

Cicero may be quoted as summing up that belief for the ancient world: "The natural constitution of the human mind is twofold. One part consists of appetite, by the Greeks called impulse, which hurries a man hither and thither; the other is reason, which instructs and makes clear to him what is to be done or avoided; thus it follows that reason fittingly commands and appetite obeys."

This definition clearly establishes the dualistic distinction of man unique in nature through the possession of reason which can furnish him norms for curbing appetite. Cicero, as the heir of Greek philosophy, believed that man was unique because he could conceive principles, and hence could choose his behavior by inhibiting some impulses and canalizing others in the light of those principles.

So there were studies particularly worthy of such free men, the studies which revealed what man could and should do with his freedom: the literatures, the principles of the arts and sciences, ethics or the principles of conduct; in short, the humanities. Such was the point of view of classical humanism.

Then came Christianity, the culmination of the Jewish tradition.

N.B.: For References and Notes, see page 219.



It confirmed humanism and made it much clearer because it presented it as part of the revelations of a personal God. It stated with authority that man was distinct in nature because God had created and endowed him with a spiritual, immortal soul; two doctrines which classic antiquity had never completely worked out.

But Christianity asserted a great deal more. Its distinctive message was that man could be more than was due merely to his human nature; that he was called even in this life to become "partaker of the divine nature" (1 Peter 2:4) through the infusion of "grace"; that he should constantly act according to the will of God with the help of the grace of God; that his whole life should thus be a co-operation with God; and that because he would thus have acted and treasured the supernatural life in him, he would, through a new gift, the "light of glory," be capable in the next life of the direct vision of God. Man, then, was called on to lead not only a distinctly human life, as opposed to an animal life; but to supernaturalize his human life through co-operation with God's grace merited for him through Jesus Christ. Christianity taught a supernaturalized humanism.

Was there a conflict between the supernaturalism of Christ and the purely rational humanism of Cicero? Not necessarily, because even if the natural man was supernaturalized, he remained a man with distinctly human capacities and needs. If revelation gave him data about the supernatural life, it was not made to give him data about the natural. He still had to learn to sustain and protect himself and his own, and make his way in the world of nature. He was still called on to develop his human talents. He still needed to cultivate the sciences and the arts. He had proximate ends, as well as an ultimate end, even though he should not pursue those proximate ends in contradiction to his ultimate end.

During the Middle Ages the intellectual life was led mostly by churchmen or clerics. It was therefore natural that theology and philosophy should have been the chief subjects studied. By the 14th century the Italian townsmen in particular had developed enough wealth to think of the ornamentation of life. Hence the growing interest in secular pursuits. This culminated in the accusation that medieval thought had sacrificed man's proximate ends to his ultimate end. Here Montaigne is most significant in that he exhibits unreconciled the confronted medieval and Renaissance thought. He still understands what the supernatural life calls for;

but, subservient to his readings, he oscillates between Christianity, stoicism, and indulgent epicureanism, and skepticism.

Today the opposites discussed are very different. With the Renaissance, humanism reasserted the naturally human as distinct from the supernatural. Today the supernatural is frequently denied, and with it even the distinctly human. The opposition is now between both religion and humanism on one side, which recognize that man is unique in nature, and naturalism on the other, which merges both God and man in nature.

What happened is that after the Protestant Revolt had initiated divergent theses about grace and challenged the function of the Church in the dispensation of the means of grace, a desire arose to drop the issue in favor of a purely natural religion. Christianity was denounced and Deism extolled; Voltaire, who owed much to English Deism, became its European representative.

Seventeen centuries of Christian civilization were thus repudiated at one stroke. To the endless bitter denunciations of Rome in Protestant literature, were now added the no less bitter denunciations of Christianity and of all churches, including the Protestant, by "the philosophers" of "the Enlightenment."

Still, the complete repudiation of the whole of Western thought had not yet come. Voltaire was at most back to Aristotle. The general philosophical outlook was still dualistic; and, on this dualism, Christianity could still be reasserted. Chateaubriand, after the French Revolution, could hope to reconvert Voltairians to Catholicism with his *Génie du Christianisme*.

Then came the radical and total philosophical shift. This time, not only the traditional religion of the modern world was to be disowned, but the whole Aristotelian tradition. The dualistic outlook was to yield to the monistic.

The beginning of this shift may be traced to Descartes, although he remained a dualist. What Descartes did was to break asunder the integrated soul-body dualism of Aristotle — the soul the form of the body — and to separate them into independent entities. But once spirit and matter were thus dissociated, what could be easier than to deny them in turn?

The development of materialistic monism, encouraged by Bacon's call to the study of nature, ran its course through the sensism of Hobbes and Locke, and became fully formulated with some of the later French philosophers of the eighteenth century. Encouraged,

in the nineteenth, by the English associationists, the positivism of Comte, the wholly materialistic interpretations of evolution after Darwin, and the development of a purely experimental study of psychology, it constituted an atmosphere hostile to every type of spirituality.

But the more precise idealistic monism, eventually thoroughly organized by Hegel, was to be much more potent in the dislocation of Western thought. The pantheism of Spinoza had made mind and matter but different expressions of the same divine substance. Leibniz helped toward and Berkeley thought he had achieved the reduction of matter to mind. Hume sought to reduce both to appearances, and awoke Kant to restate the problem; but though Kant reasserted dualism, his apriorism, and even his moralism, only opened the door wider to skepticism and subjectivism.

After him, idealistic monism won the day with the henceforth all-influential German philosophers. Subjective with Fichte, clearly pantheistic with Schelling, it received from Hegel its final expression by making the indifferent absolute of Schelling an immanent activity, a becoming, a constantly changing *absolute*. All reality is now conceived as the process, spirit, or idea, realizing itself. There is no longer any abiding, any antecedently real, or the possibility of an eternal righteousness, but only the flux of change. God, man, and nature are merged in an all-embracing, monistic, evolving reality.

It is this assertion of change as the very heart of reality which constitutes the radical shift from the dualistic philosophy which had triumphed out of the early search for truth, and had molded the Western World. This philosophy of total change was developed during the whole of the nineteenth century. Mingling finally with materialistic monism, it gave us the humanitarian naturalism of our day.

Such a radical shift of thought could not but affect all domains. In literature, it meant the abandonment of all idealizing and of all value-judgments in favor of the description of the material environment and of its impact upon the nervous system of personages who were considered as determined also by their heredity; in education it implied the disparagement of the humanities and the utilitarian stressing of techniques; in religion it led to the elimination of the supernatural and even of the thought of a personal God and of personal immortality for man; in ethics, it caused the dropping of all notions about a universal and abiding moral order, for which



was substituted the personally satisfactory and socially useful as the only criterion of values; in economics and politics, as we shall see, it introduced a logical trend toward totalitarianism.

In 1930, with the publication of the symposium *Humanism and America*, a sequel to the work of Irving Babbitt and of Paul Elmer More, naturalism, of which John Dewey was then the most prominent exponent, was challenged in the United States, and again, in 1933, by the publication of *The Challenge of Humanism*. But that very year, the American naturalists, including John Dewey, published a manifesto which they called "The Religious Humanist Manifesto." The issue was joined, and in a most confusing way, since both camps called themselves humanists.

"Religious humanists," we were told, "regard the universe as self-existing and not created." They believe "that man is a part of nature and that he has emerged as a result of a continuous process." They reject "the traditional dualism of mind and body." They consider "man's religious culture and civilization, as clearly depicted by anthropology and history, the products of a gradual development due to his interaction with his natural environment and with his social heritage."

For them, "the nature of the universe depicted by modern science makes unacceptable any supernatural or cosmic guarantees of human values, and the way to determine the existence and value of any and all realities is by an intelligent inquiry and by the assessment of their relation to human needs."

Then come the great repudiations: "We are convinced that the time has passed for theism, deism, and modernism. Religion consists of those actions, purposes, and experiences which are humanly significant. . . . The distinction between the sacred and the secular can no longer be maintained."

So man has become the highest end of man: "The complete realization of human personality is the end of man's life. Its development and fulfillment is to be sought in the here and now. In place of the old attitudes involved in worship and prayer, the humanist finds his religious emotions expressed in a heightened sense of personal life and in a co-operative effort to promote social well-being."

What then becomes of the churches? "It follows that there will be no uniquely religious emotions and attitudes of the kind hitherto associated with belief in the supernatural. . . . Religious institutions,

their ritualistic forms, ecclesiastical methods, and communal activities must be reconstituted as rapidly as experience allows, in order to function effectively in the modern world."

And, after a statement of aims to exchange "the existing acquisitive and profit-motivated society" for a socialized and voluntary co-operative economic order, the manifesto concludes: "So stand the theses of religious humanism. Though we consider the religious forms and ideas of our fathers no longer adequate, the quest for the good life is still the central task of mankind. Man is at last becoming aware that he alone is responsible for the realization of the world of his dreams, and that he has within himself the power for its achievement. He must set intelligence and will to the task."

It should be evident that this is a most valuable, even if misleading document. It is misleading, first, because the signers call themselves humanists. It is true that the word humanist has traditionally designated those who put the emphasis on the human as contrasted with the superhuman, on this life as contrasted with another, on the natural order as contrasted with the supernatural. But the humanists of the Renaissance did not necessarily deny the superhuman or supernatural. And, especially, they believed in the distinctly human, in man's uniqueness in nature. The signers of the manifesto, on the contrary, assert that man is wholly continuous with the rest of nature.

The "religious humanists" are further radically misleading because they call themselves religious. Religion has always meant a relation between man and a being distinct from him; but they hold that there is no such being, that man is part of a continuous evolution in a self-existing universe. What they call religion is only the sum of aspiration and effort toward the betterment of man through the betterment of the social order. They could therefore be taxed with the same kind of intellectual dishonesty of which they accuse the modernists, because these continue to use Christian terms in a sense opposed to their original meaning.

They were also unfair in their writings when they labeled the humanists of the Babbitt school "literary humanists," under the pretense that they were merely concerned with a classical type of education as opposed to vocational education. They should have recognized that Babbitt's humanism is necessarily philosophical, since it asserts a dualism in opposition to their own monism.

The so-called religious humanists' manifesto, however, is a most

valuable document because it is at least thoroughly intellectually honest and clear in its statement of doctrine. The creed of the idealistic monist is often hard to delimit, and the mixture of the residue of both idealistic monism and materialistic monism had also long remained hard to define except in the general terms of ultimate reality as total becoming. But in the manifesto we have clear-cut pronouncements: "The universe is self-existing and not created. The traditional dualism of mind and body must be rejected. Man is a part of nature. The time has passed for Deism and Theism."

With such statements there can be no further doubt as to the issues. The manifesto is the clearest possible expression of the culmination of the whole monistic thought, idealistic and materialistic, of the 19th century. The cleavage is finally made wholly clear between those who believe in only one order of existence (an evolving universe in constant process of change, including man) and those who believe in two orders of existence (the abiding and the changing, the permanent and the impermanent), even though they may remain short of calling them God and the universe.

All then would be clear in regard to their attitude if the signers of the manifesto were to stop calling themselves "religious humanists." According to standard definitions, they should be called humanitarian naturalists; naturalists, because they hold that there is only evolving nature; humanitarian because humanitarianism is defined as the worship of humanity.

Humanitarian naturalism is the philosophy of total change, the philosophy of becoming, with man as the highest end of man. Humanism, on the other hand, is the philosophy of that which abides in and above the changing, the philosophy of being and becoming, with man having proximate ends in the changing and an ultimate end in the abiding.

As the signers of the manifesto will, no doubt, continue to use the word humanist, because of its prestige, they should at least always be distinguished as monistic or pseudo-humanists, as opposed to all genuine or dualistic humanists. For the sake of clearness, we shall always call them "the humanitarian naturalists."

Irving Babbitt died in 1933; Paul Elmer More in 1937. If most of the contributors to *Humanism and America* were not further heard from as often as might have been expected, Editor Norman Foerster not only completed the critique of American education which Babbitt had begun, but initiated a complete program of



reform in higher studies. Much additional light, too, was shed on Babbitt's philosophy by several posthumous publications. Moreover, most interestingly, a humanist reaction against the humanitarian naturalism of the manifesto sprang up spontaneously in various other quarters, and even led to the founding of a strictly humanistic college. There has thus been so much progress in the humanist movement in the United States since 1933 that a new survey is now required. In fact, both the progress outside the circle of the original American humanists, and the comparative failure of these to make the most of their doctrine in its original form, permit and call for a restatement of dualistic humanism.

But, especially, the world-shaking events of the past few years have made imperative a re-examination of the controversy between naturalism and humanism. World War II, in particular, and its utter dislocation of the Western civilization which had shaped the world's development since the days of humanistic Greece and Rome, calls for a revaluation and scrutiny of the soundness of the philosophies which developed in the 19th century and culminated in humanitarian naturalism.

For ideas shape civilizations. If the civilization of the West has broken down; if, while we thought that we were progressing toward such a glorious age as humanity had never seen, we were actually speeding toward the most complete breakdown of all civilized ways, we must have taken a wrong turn; in fact we must truly have gone wrong on first principles, as Irving Babbitt told us. If so, we must get right about face. We must get right again on first principles. This is really the issue between the humanists and the humanitarian naturalists. In trying to divinize man, the naturalists have dehumanized him. If we are to have a new age, it must be a new age of humanism, and of a thoroughly sound humanism.

It is a credit to American thought that the issue has been clearly visioned in America. It is hoped that in summarizing and discussing the progress during the past ten years of the American humanistic reaction against humanitarian naturalism, we may get a clearer idea of what must be done if we are to escape from our present cycle of dislocation, and usher in a new era — new because we shall build anew on sound foundations.

## 2

### THE LEGACY OF IRVING BABBITT

WHEN the humanitarian naturalists published their manifesto in 1933, they wrote as if they were giving us a new message. In reality, if they were able so easily to reduce their creed to simple formulas, it was because that creed had been threshed over in Europe for more than a hundred years. Indeed, in France, where the threshing had been most extensively done, through the humanitarian positivism of Comte, the Hegelianism of Renan, and the materialistic determinism of Taine, a humanistic reaction had set in as early as 1890. This means that American specialists in French thought could, when they looked on the American scene, witness the acceleration toward humanitarian naturalism in our midst; and at the same time could see it put on the defensive, and finally very generally disowned in French intellectual circles.

The turning point came with the *Essais de Psychologie Contemporaine* of Paul Bourget, first published in 1883-1885. Bourget, long a disciple of Taine, began to question his naturalism; and Taine himself recognized, after the publication of Bourget's novel *Le Disciple*, that the tide of thought was turning against him.

Paul Claudel left us a vivid picture of intellectual conditions in France when Comte, Taine, and Renan dominated French thought: "Recall those sad years of the eighties, the era of the full blossoming of naturalistic literature. Never did the yoke of the material seem more assured. All the famous men in art, in science, in literature were irreligious. Renan was reigning. I therefore believed what the so-called cultured people of the day believed. I accepted the monistic and mechanistic hypothesis religiously. I believed that all reality was ruled by the laws of matter, and that the world was a rigid linking of material causes and effects which, presently, science was going to describe perfectly."

Claudel himself reacted and became the greatest spiritual poet of France. In 1897, Rostand, with his *Cyrano de Bergerac*, whipped

Paris to a frenzy with the spectacle of a hero who fought out his destiny; he stated that his play was to be taken as a sign of the returning tide of the ideal, as opposed to the materialistic determinism of the naturalists. The reaction was becoming general. It was to reach a second, and even a third, generation. Witness the works, avowedly religious, of Bourget, Brunetière, Bloy, Bazin, Baumann, Bordeaux, Jules-Bois, Baudrillart, Bertrand, Bremond, Claudel, Lionnét, Giraud, Goyau, Ghéon, Le Cardonnell, Huysmans, Jammes, Péguy, de Mun, Mauriac, Massis, Max Jacob, Rod, Strowski, de Voguë, Rivière, Psichari, Gilson, Maritain, Rops, and the more exclusively humanistic, critiques of Barrès, Lasserre, Benda Lemaître, Doumic, and Faguet. Many others might be mentioned: Ernest Seillière, for instance, whose output mounts to more than seventy volumes and offers the most minute study of the European, especially German and French, thought of the past one hundred and fifty years, and of the dissolving effects of monism. In fact a catalogue of over three thousand volumes could be drawn up on this French humanistic and religious renaissance.

Before such an array of names and before such numerous and many-sided works the claim of John Dewey, that "faith in the divine author and authority in which Western civilization confided . . . has been made impossible for the cultivated mind of the Western world," sounds preposterous, while the humanitarian naturalists' call to the churches to surrender to naturalism if they do not want to lag behind can only appear distressingly ill-informed. This is especially true since all these French writers came from the most varied quarters: positivism, symbolism, socialism, Bergsonism, and, in general, from the academic circles which Claudel described.

In 1892, just as this whole movement was getting under way, Irving Babbitt, who had been graduated from Harvard in 1889, was studying in Paris. Aspiring to be a literary critic, he could not help being strongly impressed with the current evolution, and in particular, with that of Ferdinand Brunetière. Brunetière had begun his critical career in the 80's as a disciple of Comte, and had studied Buddhism. Editor of the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, and professor at the *Ecole Normale Supérieure*, he became, as a literary critic and lecturer, even more of a national figure than John Dewey here at the height of his influence. When, in 1895, he lectured on "The Bankruptcy of Science," attacking not science but scientism, or the pretensions of scientists to solve philosophical and religious



problems, the then reigning dictators of scientism organized public protestations. In 1894 he called on Leo XIII at the Vatican; and, after several lectures which attracted national attention, he announced, in 1900, his conversion to Catholicism.

It should not be surprising that not only he, but many of the intellectual leaders in France who reacted against naturalism, went all the way to the Catholic Church. It is striking that our American naturalists, in general, reacted against Christianity in the only form with which they were personally acquainted, the harsh Calvinistic doctrine. They were not likely to be reattracted by it. But in France the situation was different. Though France had its Taine, Renan, Zola, and their disciples, it had never lost its understanding of the Greco-Roman humanistic tradition, if only because that tradition had blossomed anew in its great seventeenth-century literature. Moreover, France's surviving Christian tradition was not Calvinistic but Catholic. Catholicism, unlike Calvinism, did not hold that human nature was wholly corrupt; and, unlike Protestant fundamentalism, it left to science its own domain, including the possible proof of the material evolution of the human body from lower forms. The Catholic Church's supernatural creed was therefore not in opposition to the Aristotelian conception of man distinct in nature — in fact both Plato and Aristotle had been utilized for its philosophical explanation. Nor was it opposed to science, or even to material progress through scientific advances; always provided that such progress was at least not made a final end. Hence it was easy for Frenchmen, dissatisfied with naturalism, to confront it with humanism, and then to go clear back to the Christian faith through Catholicism.

Irving Babbitt not only read Brunetière, but for many years gave a course and wrote a book on *The Masters of French Criticism*: Mme. de Staël, Joubert, Chateaubriand, Sainte-Beuve, Scherer, Taine, Renan, and Brunetière. He called Sainte-Beuve the victim of the gathering current of relativistic naturalism which made him "the Wandering Jew of the intellectual world"; he found in Taine "an exaggerated determinism"; and he denounced Renan for having "let loose the most subtle forms of intellectual corruption the world had yet known." But he praised Brunetière for having "wrestled manfully with what is the central problem of contemporary thought, the problem how to adjust the rival claim of 'being' and 'becoming'; how to retain the conquests of naturalism and, at the same time, as-

sert the integrity of the part of man which is above phenomenal nature."

In this last sentence is expressed all that Babbitt himself would try to do. Like Brunetière, he would try to adjust the rival claims of "being" and "becoming"; that is, he would oppose the naturalists who believed only in "becoming," and he would reassert a philosophy of "being" in and above "becoming." To a philosophy of total change he would oppose a philosophy of the abiding in the changing. When the idealistic or naturalistic monist tells us that we are living in a universe of change, and that man himself is constantly changing, they are right. They are wrong when they tell us that there is nothing but this universe of change, nothing but change in the universe, nothing in man but change. They are wrong in that they deny that there are any abiding elements in reality, because they recognize no element "above phenomenal nature."

What Brunetière had rediscovered above phenomenal nature was the soul of man and the existence of God the Creator. Moreover, Brunetière — who, incidentally, had come to his conclusions pragmatically, by studying the needs of the social in man — was willing to take the corroboration of his new belief from the Catholic Church.

Now, Babbitt was a typical secularist. He was as much in revolt against every form of church authority as any of his naturalistic colleagues. He was not willing to take the solution of the problem of being and becoming from any church. He, therefore, reproached Brunetière for having done so. So, after praising Brunetière for saying, "there is needed a principle of restraint in human nature," he blamed him for holding that "this principle cannot be evolved by the individual himself but must be 'exterior, anterior, and superior' to the individual." And Babbitt concluded: "Brunetière is instructive even in his failure to recognize that the remedy for the excesses of individualism must be a saner individualism."

Babbitt had found his life's work. He was going to take up the work of Brunetière. He, too, would seek the necessary principle of restraint needed for self-control, as opposed to mechanical and biological determinism; but he would try to find that principle in the individual himself.

It chanced that Babbitt was acquainted with the Oriental literatures. In Paris he had studied Sanskrit and Pâli two years under Sylvain Levi, and back at Harvard, in 1892, he had entered Professor

Lanman's class in those languages. It was there that he first met Paul Elmer More who was the only other student.

Curiously, both Babbitt and More, who came to represent types of scholarly Easterners, came from the Middle West. Born in Dayton, Ohio, brought up by his grandparents on a farm outside Cincinnati, working summers as a cowboy on an uncle's ranch in Wyoming, Babbitt knew the Central States and the frontier as well as Mark Twain and Walt Whitman; while More, born in St. Louis, was graduated from Washington University before coming to Harvard.

More has described those days of the nineties in Professor Lanman's class. He tells us that he was then a romantic, steeped in Heine, Novalis, and the Schlegels; and that, because of this romantic virus, he pursued his Oriental studies with a predilection for the Sanskrit literatures of the *Upanishads*, the *Bhagavad Gītā*, and the Vedantic theosophy rich in elusive mistiness; while Babbitt, already deep in Horace and other Romans, and in the Greek poets, was primarily drawn to the Buddhistic side of Hinduism, and to the Pāli in which was expressed in a clear and concrete style the ethical doctrine of Buddha.

In Buddha Babbitt was going to find the basis for the "saner individualism" which he reproached Brunetière for having failed to recognize. He was going to develop, with his friend Paul Elmer More, a theory of humanism on the Buddhistic doctrine of the *dhamma* (the law), and of *appamāda* as opposed to *paṃāda*.

Babbitt began to express his thought between 1897 and 1908 in the *Atlantic Monthly*, *The Nation*, and *The Harvard Graduates' Magazine*, contributing essays on "The National Study of the Classics," "The Humanities," "Literature and the Doctor's Degree," "Academic Leisure," "On Being Original," "Literature and the American College." During the same period, his publications show that he had been studying Taine, Renan, and Brunetière. In 1908 he collected the above essays into a small volume — *Literature and the American College* — which marks a date in the history of American thought, for he prefaced them by two others: *What is Humanism?* and *Two Types of Humanitarians: Bacon and Rousseau*.

The great debate was begun between humanitarian naturalists and humanists. Babbitt opposed the *appamāda* of Buddha to Bacon and Rousseau whom he blamed, and whom he would continue to blame all his life, for starting respectively the currents of utilitarian-



ism and of sentimentalism, or of outer working and inner *laissez-faire*, as opposed to inner control. "The greatest of vices, according to Buddha, is the lazy yielding to the impulses of temperament (*pamāda*); the greatest virtue (*appamāda*) is the opposite awakening from the sloth and lethargy of the senses, the constant exercise of the active will. The last words of the dying Buddha to his disciples were an exhortation to practice this virtue unremittingly."

"Here is the lesson," More tells us, "that Babbitt had for the world when I first knew him. It is the heart and essence of what he inculcated book after book. It is what he was hoping to confirm by a translation and exposition of the *Dhammapada* which he was still preparing when his health failed."

More was right. It is much easier to understand today this origin of Babbitt's ideas than it was in 1933, notably because his edition of the *Dhammapada*, together with a study of Buddhism on which he worked to the end of his life, is now published; but, also, because some of his earlier essays, revealing some of the prejudices he started with, have been reprinted in *Spanish Character and Other Essays* (1942). To these, for Babbitt's repeated attempts at defining his philosophy, should be added the introduction to: *On Being Creative* (1932), and his essay on "Humanism, an Essay at Definition," in *Humanism and America*.

It is still, however, not easy to understand Babbitt's criterion of criticism, precisely because it is of Buddhistic origin. This means, first of all, most importantly, that Babbitt was not a humanist in the purely classical tradition. He thoroughly understood classical humanism from the start, but it early seemed to him that it did not take all the facts of human nature into consideration. In the introduction to *On Being Creative*, he restates classical humanism in the words of Cicero already quoted. This definition of humanism, as we saw, clearly establishes the dualistic distinction of man unique in nature through the possession of reason which can furnish him norms for curbing appetite. But it did not satisfy Babbitt because it implied, as Socrates already did, that the knowledge of the right enables man to do the right, and ultimately leads to the stoic prideful trust in man's natural powers; while Babbitt, on the contrary, held that: "Man is a creature who is foredoomed to one-sidedness, yet who becomes humane only in proportion as he triumphs over this fatality of his nature."

This pessimism as to the power of natural reason and will Babbitt got from Buddha. In original Buddhism there was an extreme consciousness of the weakness of the natural man and of his immersion in the ever unsatisfying current of sensation.

How, then, can man escape from this perpetual flux and attain to a permanent element? The conception of this permanent, opposed to the flux of change, constitutes Buddhistic dualistic humanism. Man is unique in nature because he is able to rise out of the flux of the impermanent into the permanent. The Buddhistic *nirvāṇa*, or blowing-out of desire, is not, as is so often said, a nihilistic aspiration to nonexistence, but a positive aspiration to repose in a permanent element. As Babbitt sees it: "The craving for extinction in the sense of annihilation or nonexistence is expressly repudiated in the Buddhist writings. The Buddhist quest is at bottom not for mere cessation but for the eternal. Nirvāṇa is normally attained in the present life."

This quest Babbitt holds must constitute the growth in inner life. How is it to be achieved? Here is where Buddhistic humanism stands opposed to classical humanism. In classical humanism, the human energies, good in themselves, are to be canalized by reason. For Buddha, on the contrary, mind is an organ of the flux, while depth of peace is in proportion to rightness of meditation. "Meditate, therefore," says Buddha, "and be not indolent lest later ye have reason to repent." Indolence then is the opposite of action in the sense of meditation, of action in terms of the inner life, and man is naturally indolent toward this type of action. Hence *pamāda*, the lazy yielding to the impulses of temperament, is the ultimate vice; and *appamāda*, the awakening from the sloth and lethargy of the senses is the ultimate virtue. This exercise leads to love, in the religious sense, of the permanent, of the immortal element.

How then is *appamāda* to be achieved? Babbitt gives the answer in many places: "It is not something into which one slips passively and temperamentally, but is the result of the action of the higher will."

Here we get the key word in Babbitt's psychology: "the higher will." Of this higher will present in us, Babbitt holds, we may be immediately aware experientially, though this awareness exists in very different degree in different individuals. Repeatedly Babbitt insists that this noting of the higher will in us is a purely psychological experience, though it may lead to a truly religious meditation,

even if it remains short of dogmatic assertions about God and the soul.

"The manifestation of life that Buddha asks," Babbitt tells us, "is to be achieved by the exercise of a certain quality of the will that says no to the outgoing desires with a view to the substitution of the more permanent to the less permanent among these desires, and finally to the escape from impermanence altogether." And again: "By exercising the quality of will that is felt, with reference to expansive desires, as a will to refrain, man may gradually put aside what is impermanent in favor of what is more permanent and finally escape from impermanence altogether." This is spiritual strenuousness, the practice of appamāda. So, Asoka (c. 250 B.C.), "who probably did more than any other person to make Buddhism a world religion," will say: "Let all joy be in effort. Let small and great exert themselves."

The emphasis in Buddhism, then, is not on knowing, especially not on knowing ultimates, but on doing. The doctrine of Buddha is primarily "a path" of action. Speculation on "whether the world is finite or infinite, eternal or not eternal, whether soul and body are one or separate, whether the saint exists or does not exist after death do not make for edification. . . . Even prayer and belief in a personal deity are granted a secondary place or even no place at all."

Of what then does the permanent, the immortal, consist? All we can know about it experientially, we are told, is our consciousness of the presence in us of the higher will: "Remaining within immediate experience, we can at least distinguish, as one of the immediate data of consciousness, a human law, what Buddha called *dhamma*, distinct from the laws of physical nature, a will that transcends the cosmic order and may therefore be called supernatural."

So, in final analysis, the higher will is considered as really an aspect of the permanent. It is at work in us as a higher law, the law for man, and is felt as a will to refrain. And, especially let us note, it transcends the cosmic order.

That Babbitt's humanism had its roots in this whole doctrine, there is no doubt. Whenever in the course of his critical writings he begins to condemn, it is because the men or movements he studies did not recognize the distinction between the permanent and the impermanent, the need of rising above the flux of change, of recog-



nizing a human law above physical law, and of putting reason at the service of a higher will.

It is Buddhism which led him to believe that, upon looking within, we find two selves in us, or two aspects of the self: on the one hand, an element of expansive desire, a love of the impermanent, a craving for sensation, for ultimate knowledge, for power; on the other, a means of control over those desires, a higher will, an inner check, an element of vital control, a *frein vital*, as opposed to the *élan vital*.

Evidently, it is Buddhism, too, which encouraged Babbitt to give up trying to know ultimates, including the existence of a personal deity and of immortality. It furnished him a means of claiming that he met the positivists on their own ground, the experimental, or at least the experiential.

Considered individualistically, or subjectively, the higher will could appear to Babbitt as he often described it: a centripetal force pulling back the centrifugal tendencies of the natural impulses, and begetting an inner life, as opposed to a mere outer-working. This satisfied his individualism, by permitting him to say that the needed principle of restraint in human nature can be found without appealing to something "exterior, and superior" to the individual, namely without appealing to the churches; and that "the remedy for the excesses of individualism must be a saner individualism."


Yet, we must note carefully that Buddhism, as Babbitt understood it, not only recognized the permanent to be distinct from the impermanent, but considered the permanent to be supercosmic. Now, the higher will, felt to be at work in individual men, was held to be an aspect of the permanent. Therefore, the higher will was also supercosmic and there is the temptation to call it supernatural, although actually it still belonged to the natural order. This means that, though it could be considered merely subjectively, in the individual, which enabled Babbitt to remain purely experiential, it was nevertheless not a purely subjective phenomenon.

In our final estimate of Babbitt's real position, we shall have to keep most carefully in mind both this subjective and this objective aspect of the higher will. For this distinction, as we shall see, is the key to the refutation of the accusation that, after all, Babbitt's humanism was merely human.

We must admit, however, that because of its Buddhistic origin,

the psychology of Babbitt's humanism is very peculiar. Its core is to be found in its displacement of the reason from the place it occupies in classical humanism, in favor of the higher imagination and the higher will, stemming from the Buddhistic distinction between the cosmic plane of the changing, and the supercosmic plane of the permanent. Human reason is held to work only on the plane of the changing; while only the higher or ethical imagination can reach the supercosmic plane of the permanent, to which man is united by the higher or ethical will.

In *The Challenge of Humanism*, I summed up these distinctions in the following table which Babbitt approved:



It should be noted that the natural reason and will are included, along with the senses, in the lower activities of man, as working in the changing; while the higher imagination and the higher will are the higher activities of man because they deal with the permanent; the higher imagination being credited with the power of reaching the law for man, of attaining to general principles which are ethical standards because they are aspects of the permanent, felt in us as a higher will.

This may be compared with what is so often called "the voice of conscience," "the moral law inscribed by God in the heart of man,"

or what is described as the sum of the moral precepts readily apprehended by the reason. These, too, are held to be felt as a will to refrain. Babbitt, however, refers this apprehension to the higher imagination.

Does this mean that the reason plays no role in our working out of right behavior? No, answers Babbitt. Reason is not the highest power because it belongs to the natural man, to man immersed in the flux of change. But, precisely because of this, it is needed to discriminate when we come to applying to the everyday world the standards which belong to a higher world, the world of the permanent.

So again, the dualism in Babbitt's humanism is seen to be the Buddhistic opposition between the permanent and the changing. The higher imagination conceives aspects of this permanent, and the higher will works to impose them upon us. Reason receives them, as it were, at the threshold of this lower region of our actual lives, and discriminates, by a species of prudence, as to precisely how the aspects of the permanent, the standards, are to be applied.

It may be asked: how can the reason be the power which under the pressure of the higher will discriminates as to how the standards (aspects of the higher will, reached by the higher imagination) are to be applied, when reason itself is accused of having its own libidos; its desires to understand more than it can, to merge dualistic reality in monism, to conceive standards in terms of the flux.

The answer is that reason, once checked by the higher will, can in humility accept the higher imagination's glimpses of the Law, and can follow the consequent further impulses of the higher will to refrain. It can then discriminate properly how they should be applied under given circumstances.

Nor does this mean a pragmatic relativism. The permanent law admits of no change; but in different circumstances it may be followed in different ways. This even theologians grant when they teach that the virtues are to be practiced according to one's state of life.

What, then, according to Babbitt's point of view, would have to be done to lead an ordered physical life and develop an inner life is to let the higher will — which is thus made to substitute for the supernatural in us — control the natural will, and no less control the libidos of the reason and of the sensual imagination.



In Buddhistic terms this may be translated, as already quoted: "Unification of life is to be achieved by the exercise of a certain quality of the will that says 'No' to the outgoing desires, with a view to the substitution of the more permanent to the less permanent among these desires, and finally to the escape from impermanence altogether."

It should be further noted in the table that meditation on the higher will yields "individual religion." Babbitt asked me to add that he preferred the term "religious meditation." The point is most important because this "religious meditation" was the way through which he passed from humanism to religion.

On the human plane — inside the flux of change — the higher will, with the co-operation of the discriminating power of the reason, functions mostly in the achievement of that mediation between extremes to which human nature, immersed as it is in the changing, constantly tends. Recall Babbitt's saying that "man is a creature who is foredoomed to one-sidedness yet becomes humane only in proportion as he triumphs over this fatality of his nature." This ideal of mediation coincides with that of classical humanism: the Aristotelian mediation between extremes. Thus Babbitt could take over the whole of classical humanism. He nonetheless insisted on the need of transcending it.

Man, he asserts, not only needs to use the higher imagination to get into touch with the abiding before he can apply its glimpses of the eternal laws, with the discriminating help of reason, in everyday life; but he should also meditate, with the further help of the higher imagination, on this higher will in him, on this link with the realm of the permanent.

This realm of the eternal laws is essentially supercosmic, and hence is held to be truly the realm of religion. Babbitt would not anymore than Buddha seek to name the ultimates on the religious plane; but after "exercising a certain quality of the will that says 'No' to the outgoing desires with a view to the substitution of the more permanent to the less permanent" on the natural plane, he would further meditate on this higher will "to escape from impermanence altogether." He would thus consider himself as becoming truly religious.

Hence his repeated statements that humanism was not opposed to religion, that humanism could lead to religion, that the higher will was ultimately divine; and his final siding with the super-

naturalists even of the type of Pascal. This is also why he held that there could be a co-operation between humanism, as he understood it, and the churches which held to the truths of the inner life through the supernatural; especially with the Catholic Church which eminently did so, causing him to write:

"Under certain conditions that are already partly in sight, the Catholic Church may perhaps be the only institution left in the Occident that can be counted on to uphold civilized standards."

It should be easy also to see, therefore, how in the light of this doctrine Babbitt condemned all developments of Baconian utilitarianism interested only in the flux of change and fated to complete relativity; how he condemned all forms of Rousseauistic sentimentalism which proclaimed the complete goodness of man's natural instincts; and, on the other hand, how he opposed Stoicism, and in general classical humanism because they considered the natural reason and will as all-sufficient for the mastery and guidance of the natural instincts.

Hence, too, as the very essence of his literary criticism, there followed the condemnation of forms which had not been submitted to the control of the reason, and of such contents as were but the expression of the natural man, in revolt against or ignorant of the realm of permanent values above the flux of change.

And, finally, we may thus see why his critique of educational theories constantly condemned the utilitarian, in terms of the changing scene: and why he denounced political doctrines that relied on social organization for the betterment of man. On the contrary he held that the betterment of man, and of national and international order, can be achieved only by the improvement of individual men in touch with the higher will.

How, in the light of all this, would Babbitt's philosophy compare with that of the signers of the humanitarian naturalists' manifesto? Would he say with them that the time had passed for Deism and Theism? No. Babbitt did not wish to be considered an atheist or even an agnostic, though, like Buddha, he refrained from mentioning ultimates. He refrained from it, furthermore, because he wanted to meet the positivists on their own ground: on the plane of the experiential and experimental. But, taking the offensive, he challenged the soundness of their own experimentalism, because of their failure to recognize the presence of the higher will in man as

an immediate datum of consciousness. So he would accuse the signers of the manifesto of being pseudo-positivists as well as pseudo-humanists.

First of all, it cannot, of course, be proved experimentally that "the universe is self-existing and not created," nor that "supernatural guarantees of human values are unacceptable." To make such assertions is therefore not science but scientism: the assuming of philosophical positions in the name of science.

Nor, even, can it ever be proved scientifically that "man has emerged as the result of a continuous process." Granting that there may be evolution of forms, no scientists today would be prepared to say how continuous was the evolutionary process. It is now widely recognized among scientists that the only alternative to the idea of the six twenty-four-hour days of creation resulting in a static cosmos, wrongly imputed to the Bible, is not the monistic conception of a self-existing universe in process of continuous and total metamorphosis. The much more rational alternative is the dualistic conception of many present-day evolutionists, already held by St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas — namely, the concept of a universe created and sustained by, and evolving according to, an antecedently existing intelligence, will, and power. And this implies that there must be creative intervention at least at the passage between a lower and a higher order distinct in nature: between the inorganic and the organic, and between the plant, the animal, and man.

Several of the manifesto's solemn assertions such as "the individual born into a culture is largely molded by that culture," Babbitt would no doubt brand as platitudinous; others as evidently beggings of the question, since their assertions depend on what is the nature of man.

Babbitt would further deny that there is no religious level above the humanistic concern of human life in the here and now. He would protest against the statements that "man is (purely) part of nature." and that "mind must be rejected." Finally he would especially object to the lack of humility shown throughout the manifesto.

For one of Babbitt's basic assertions was the need of humility. He made it, as we saw, against the confidence of the classical humanist and Stoic in the power of reason to insure right conduct; against the confidence of Bacon that the study of the physical



sciences would insure human progress; and against the confidence of Rousseau in the goodness of human nature.

The Christian is humble, because he knows that he needs the grace of God. The Deist should be humble as he recognizes that God is his Creator, and that he should live according to the order of His creation. But, according to Babbitt, even the humanist who does not have the faith of the Christian in Revelation, who may not be an avowed Deist, or even have a very clear notion of the nature of the permanent, should also be humble; because, at least, he recognizes the distinction between the permanent and the impermanent; and it is a fact of experience that his natural reason and will are immersed in the flux of the impermanent. He should, therefore, recognize that he lives in the impermanent; that he yields easily to the impulses of his temperament; and that to lead an ordered life, and attain even the happiness the humanitarian naturalist speaks of, he must recognize these weaknesses of his lower self, and meditate upon the impulses of what, if he wishes to remain individually experiential, he may merely call his higher self.

Does this mean that humanism, as Babbitt thus worked it out on Buddhistic lines, in distinction to classical humanism, can be readily opposed to humanitarian naturalism? It must be admitted, on the basis of the record, that, though it can be of great help to those who, like Babbitt, prefer to avoid ultimate terms; to others, for that very reason, it remains too indefinite to be acceptable. To speak of the permanent as supercosmic, supernatural, ultimately divine, merely in terms of a psychological reality found at work in the individual may be a way to meet the positivists on their own ground, and, unlike Brunetière, to remain purely individualistic; but it leaves open the question of the objective nature of the permanent, and of just what is meant here by the supernatural, and the ultimately divine.

So, while the naturalists accused Babbitt of having a confused and even unintelligible psychology; the Aristotelians, the Thomists, and the modern rationalists could accuse him of having over-disparaged the powers of reason; and the theologians would more than question whether the words divine and supernatural, as he used them, could possibly be taken in their traditional meaning. Whereupon, the literary critic could step in and say: It is unfair to condemn, as Babbitt does, a writer because his philosophy and

psychology are not those of a humanism so difficult to understand. Babbitt's own disciples had to recognize that he had not succeeded in gaining a wide allegiance to his conception of humanism, even if his challenge to naturalism had been widely welcomed.

Since his death, several of his students and the few who knew him intimately contributed their reminiscences to a volume entitled: *Irving Babbitt: Man and Teacher* (1941). All paid tribute to his devotion to his students, to his call to a higher life by his own intellectual and moral strenuousness, to his wit, personal charm, and kindliness; but they also spoke of the difficulties he experienced. A final trial awaited him. Paul Elmer More, the companion of his early work in the development of his doctrine, deserted him, solemnly declaring that this doctrine was insufficient because it did not reach the supernatural.

Two questions, therefore, remain to be considered in turn: Was Paul Elmer More correct in his final critique of his lifelong friend's humanism? Can anything be done to go on from where Irving Babbitt left off, to formulate a more satisfactory because more definite humanistic doctrine?

Beginning close to Buddhism, as Babbitt had done, Paul Elmer More, published between 1904 and 1921 eleven volumes of *Shelburne Essays*. Like Babbitt he criticized books and authors because of their failure to recognize a power of control in man. Like him also he asserted that this power could be recognized as an immediate datum of consciousness, and might be called the higher will, or the inner check. But More came to feel that this Buddhistic principle, though it might be called superhuman, or even "supernatural," in the sense that it could control the human or natural instincts in man, was nevertheless itself still purely of the natural order.

What had happened was that More had caught the vision of the supernatural in the Christian sense. About 1921, he had begun a complete restudy of *The Greek Tradition* and found it to be a basis for a dualism that made the Incarnation possible. Within ten years he had concluded in his *The Christ of the New Testament* that the Catholic outlook was historically justified, and he had joined the Episcopal Church, thus repudiating much of his criticism in the *Shelburne Essays* in favor of a fully developed refutation of modernism.

This was to be Paul Elmer More's own final legacy, a legacy of the

utmost interest to the Protestant churches. It is certainly startling to note that he had finally traveled the same path as Brunetière from Buddhism to Christianity; but evidently he had parted from Irving Babbitt who had used Buddhism against Brunetière, in his endeavor to find the necessary principle of restraint for man, without recourse to any authority "exterior, anterior, and superior" to the individual.

Babbitt did not question More's conclusions. In fact he seems to have given scant attention to his arguments. But he did repeatedly bemoan the fact that More was now acceptable only to a few High Church Episcopalians; while what continued to be needed was to perfect a broad basis of agreement on which those who were unable to believe in Revelation could unite with those who did, at least to reassert the dualism of man's nature. He could have added that the restoration of a dualistic concept of man remained, in any case, the necessary first step to an acceptance of Christianity.

More published his repudiation of his friend's doctrine in *The Bookman*, in March, 1930, at the time the humanist controversy was attracting national attention through the recent publication of *Humanism and America*. As it happened, I was at that time in almost daily contact with Irving Babbitt. I had published the year before *Le Mouvement Humaniste aux Etats Unis*, and was then at work on *The Challenge of Humanism*, both of which he read and approved in manuscript. So I may, and feel in fact that I must now speak personally, for the sake of the record, on Babbitt's ultimate beliefs.

The most vivid impression my talks with Irving Babbitt left me is that he was much exercised over Mr. More's failure to recognize the religious character of his humanism, both in itself and as the reason for his sympathy with genuine religions: religions which recognize a distinction between the supernatural and the natural. Our discussions on this point began immediately after the publication of Mr. More's *Bookman* article. Mr. More had written: "Which of us is happy in this world?" This terrible ending of *Vanity Fair* is the dilemma that faces the humanist. The intuition of free will; free will exercised for a purpose; purpose directed to clothe human life with value; value measured by happiness — the chain is perfect, link by link; only, at the end, it seems to be attached to nothing." "Is not humanism," More then asked, "doomed to disappointment? Will not the humanist, unless he adds to his



creed the faith and the hope of religion, find himself at the last, despite his protests, dragged back into the camp of the naturalist? If we perish like beasts, shall we not live like beasts?"

Professor Babbitt, in calling my attention to this passage, expressed very forcefully that Mr. More was here doing him an injustice because Thackeray uses the word happiness in the hedonistic sense of physical and mental well-being, a passive enjoyment; whereas for him human happiness was to be found in the type of activity peculiar to man as such: the achieving of human order, in the sense of getting in touch with the permanent, which is the end of human nature. He recalled that Mr. More himself, as late as 1928, in *The Demon of the Absolute*, had made this distinction between the *edone* and the *eudaimonia* of the Greeks. *Edone* is mere pleasure. On the contrary *eudaimonia* can come only from the activity of the intellect and will. And far from being attached to nothing, it links with the fulfillment of a law which the Greeks referred to the divine. Mr. More, moreover, in speaking about the intuition of free will in the humanist chain, had strangely failed to mention that Babbitt's humanism went even further than the Greeks with its own characteristic insistence upon the higher will, and its linking with a law which Babbitt recognized as ultimately divine.

I worked this discussion into a page of *The Challenge of Humanism*, and Mr. Babbitt gave it his closest scrutiny, in fact, actually retouched certain parts of its phrasing. It may therefore be taken as his own studied summary of his thought. It reads as follows: "Paul Elmer More, who in his early work tended to disparage Christianity in favor of a self-sufficient individualism, now tends to look upon humanism as ineffective save in subordination to his type of Christian Theism. Babbitt, for his part, never disparaged Christianity; but, on the other hand, always insisted on keeping separate the discussion of humanism, not only from the question of revealed religion, but even from all theistic controversies. He wished from the start, and continues to wish, to meet the naturalists on their own ground. He will not go beyond asserting the higher will as an experiential fact. He admits the logic of those who would add that the presence of this higher will in man points to the existence of God as the author 'of the law for man' as well as of 'the law for thing.' He is even ready to admit that he sides with the spiritualist. He refuses to be called an atheist or even an agnostic.

But, through intellectual modesty, he stops short of affirming the existence of God and contents himself with affirming the existence of the law. To deny Theism is for him an inverted dogmatism. To affirm it is to leave the domain of experience for that of logic or of Revelation. Let us then, he would say, set up humanism clearly opposed, on the one hand, to naturalism, and clearly distinct, on the other, from theological pronouncements."

Babbitt's recognition that his conception of humanism was not anti-Theistic was likewise evidenced in our talks by his rejection of the Potter-Dewey movement (partly out of the Unitarian Church) which was then emerging and which finally issued in the "religious humanists' manifesto" which we have analyzed. Babbitt, too, considered the signers of this manifesto pseudo-humanists, and really humanitarian naturalists.

Furthermore, he resented being considered a neo-Pelagian, as was shown by his approval of my defense of him against those who accused him of being one. It was worded as follows: "Nature, according to Pelagius, retains the ability to conquer sin, and even eternal life, without the aid of grace; whereas nature, according to Babbitt, has not even the ability to conquer the excess to which the natural intellect and will of man is prone, nor to attain order and happiness in this life, without the functioning of the higher will, a supernatural principle." Babbitt approved this statement. The word "supernatural" was here taken in Babbitt's own sense as merely "supercosmic," and not as transcending the entire natural order, in the Christian sense.

The whole question was treated by me in the recapitulation I made of Babbitt's whole doctrine at the end of *The Challenge of Humanism*; this he also approved after close scrutiny. It is too long to quote here, but it ends as follows: "If only for the sake of intelligent discussion, all who in any way consider that God, man, and nature are merged should recognize that they are, according to standard definitions, naturalists or naturists. The word humanist should be reserved for those who believe that man is a being distinct from God and the rest of nature."

A last proof of Babbitt's final faith may be added. The Oxford University Press, for publicity purposes, asked for a summing up of *The Challenge of Humanism*. It was sent to Mr. Babbitt for his approval and read as follows: "Humanism, as defined by Professor Irving Babbitt, challenged national attention by asserting that in-

dividual and social sanity depend upon the conception which man has of his own nature. It stands opposed to all doctrines which would merge God, man, and the physical world; and, in particular, to pragmatism and experimentalism which would find their standards within the flux of change. It derives from Greek thought, and, far from being opposed to Christianity, it may find in it its confirmation and completion."

Irving Babbitt received this statement when already too sick to welcome visitors. He sent it back penciled in his own hand, changing only one phrase: "which would find their standards within the flux of change" to "which would base their standards on the phenomenal flux," a last testimony to his complete rejection of all forms of monism, a last and solemn proof, too, that if he certainly wished to keep humanism separated from theological pronouncements, he at least recognized that the immediate data of consciousness on which he would base this humanism permitted us to go on to the logical assumptions of an order distinct from the natural, which Christianity came to confirm.

Still Mr. More was not satisfied, and, after the death of Professor Babbitt, he published in *The University of Toronto Quarterly* (January, 1934), and in *The American Review* (April, 1934), an article in which he granted that "Babbitt admitted whole-heartedly that belief in the grace of God operated to awaken the soul from the sloth and lethargy of the senses and to produce a constant exercise of the active will profoundly akin to the *appamāda* of Buddhism." But he still rightly refused to recognize that Babbitt had thus reached the supernatural in the proper sense of the word. As he expressed it: "It seems to me worth saying for the reason that, however pungent and straightforward Babbitt's language may be in other matters, his frequent allusions to the supernatural left a good many of his readers puzzled over its exact relation to the natural. The difficulty is that in print, so far as I remember, he never distinguishes between the supernatural and the superhuman, or makes clear why he accepted the one and rejected the other. Now, Buddhism holds to the supernatural, holds to it, indeed, in the extreme form of an absolute utterly different from, and separable from, the flux and disintegration and relativity of the natural. But the supernatural so conceived is, properly speaking, not superhuman; it is within man, a part of man's being, just as the natural is; and the ultimate goal of [the Buddhistic] ethics and religion

is a state wherein, entirely by human effort, the dualism in man of the supernatural and the natural is dissolved, and all the passions and insatiate desires and all the unattainable strivings of nature are forever stilled."

It should be noted here that Babbitt had a different interpretation of Buddhism than More. Babbitt not only asserts in his study of the Dhammapada that the nirvāṇa of Buddhism far from meaning the extinction or stillness of the human, means peace won by a strenuous obedience of the human to the higher will. But he also insists on pointing out that the Buddhistic permanent is supercosmic, and therefore wholly transcending man. This is why in his essay in *Humanism and America* he says that he "ranged himself unhesitatingly on the side of supernaturalists like Pascal," though Pascal's supernaturalism is certainly not merely superhuman in any mere human sense. This can explain also how Professor Charles Cestre of the Sorbonne, who knew Babbitt personally, could write in his review of *The Challenge of Humanism*: "Babbitt's philosophical outlook, his moral didacticism, his vigorous dogmatic certitude are bathed in a religious atmosphere. This is what all of us who knew him had felt." Such, too, was the opinion of Philip S. Richards, one of the earliest English followers of Babbitt: "The time is not far distant when, as Babbitt foretold, humanism will have to choose between naturalism and supernaturalism," evidently using the terms in Babbitt's own sense.

How, then, shall we answer the first question we raised: Was Paul Elmer More justified in stating that Babbitt's conception of humanism did not reach the supernatural, that it remained merely human?

Here is where we need to use the distinctions about the higher will to which attention was specially called: Subjectively, the higher will is a datum of the individual consciousness; but, objectively, as an aspect of the permanent, it is supercosmic.

For there is no doubt whatsoever that Babbitt understood that the Buddhistic "permanent" was supercosmic; and, therefore, that the higher will, since it represented this permanent element at work in man, was linked with what he chose to call "the supernatural." As such, it cannot be merely superhuman in the sense of a higher part of the human self, as More contended; even though it manifests itself in man as a higher self, and can be studied experientially only as a higher self.



For Babbitt then, as for Buddha, there was the cosmic and the supercosmic. Therefore, their dualism referred not merely to a higher and lower in man, but to an objective higher and lower; the supercosmic and the cosmic, the permanent and the impermanent, both meeting in man.

What Babbitt pointed out is that the natural reason and will are immersed in the cosmic impermanent; and that, if man is to govern himself in terms of the supercosmic permanent, he needs to have at work in him a supercosmic principle.

Therefore, Mr. More was wrong in holding that Babbitt's humanism did not reach the superhuman in a supercosmic sense.

But is the superhuman in a supercosmic sense the supernatural in the Christian sense? That is the final and most important question.

Here we must admit that the answer is "No." Therefore, Mr. More was right in stating that Babbitt's humanism did not reach the supernatural in the Christian sense.

We may then come to our second question: Is it possible to formulate a more satisfactory, because more definite humanistic doctrine?

The answer is "Yes," provided we can distinguish more clearly between the human and the superhuman in a supercosmic sense; and between such a superhuman and the supernatural as Christianity understands it. The conclusion must then be that, before we can do so, we shall have to re-express humanism in more definite terms than those used by Irving Babbitt.

What then of his legacy? It should be clear that it is primarily philosophical, and that it forces us to face the theological. It was, as we have seen, so understood in Europe. As such, too, it attracted wide attention in Catholic circles in the United States. But all educators are concerned. As Dean Henry W. Holmes expressed it at a conference on humanism held at Harvard under the auspices of the Harvard Graduate School of Education: "Education cannot avoid problems that are essentially philosophical. The success of the scientific method in education and its consequent authority should not blind us to the fact that it does not offer final answers to the problem of freedom or the problem of value, or to the still deeper questions as to the nature of being, and that some position on those questions is a prerequisite for a consistent theory of education." As the reporter of that conference further wrote: "The

humanist movement has served to develop the contradiction between naturalism and the traditional Christian insistence upon a supernatural source of the higher human values. Two opposite schools emerge, giving us opposite philosophies of education, government, conduct, and religion."

The legacy of Irving Babbitt could not be better summed up. It has reopened discussion in all fields by setting off in sharp opposition the two fundamental alternatives of thought open to us: on the one hand naturalism or the monistic merging of God, man, and nature, and the consequent denial of a law antecedent to human experience; and on the other, humanism, the clear conception of man distinct and unique in nature, and responsible to a law superior to himself. This leaves us free to interpret this law as did Irving Babbitt, merely as a veto power which we feel within us, or to pass on, as we propose to do, to the logical assumptions of Theism.

Humanism so understood may evidently be utilized particularly, as it was by Irving Babbitt, in the interpretation of the philosophical content of literature. *The London Times Literary Supplement* pointed this out when it devoted its leading article to a discussion of *The Challenge of Humanism*, and asked in particular: "What, one wonders, would have been Emerson's view of his modern countryman's humanism?" It might well be asked also: What would the humanists of the Renaissance have said about it? What was in particular their conception of the need of a principle higher than reason to secure *eudaimonia*? How was the question handled by the Deists of the eighteenth century, as opposed to the Catholics, Puritans, and Jansenists of the seventeenth? Or again, how many transitions or hesitations of thought are recorded in the passage from the still dualistic Deism of the eighteenth century to the monistic pantheism and naturalism of the nineteenth?

Irving Babbitt's own works have touched on many of these questions. His critique of the naturalistic elements in literature, including the romantic, will remain for humanistic criticism permanent acquisitions of the greatest value. But there are many topics which he did not have the time to take up, and quite a few that might be examined anew.

Moreover, if it is true, as we are led to suspect, that periods of history are largely shaped by the prevalent conception men have of their own nature, then humanism furnishes a no less valuable ap-

proach to the study of social history, at least as a background to the study of literature. The humanistic critique should prove especially valuable in the field of sociology where it has as yet been little applied; and we shall perforce have to make an attempt at it, if we are to consider what must be the place of humanism as opposed to naturalism in the postwar era.

What the life's work of Irving Babbitt then points to for the academic world is the need of establishing departments of comparative philosophy and literature which, utilizing all contributions of literary history, would make it their special study to bring out the philosophical influence at work in the several periods, and on each of their most representative works. In fact, before such studies are made, it should be evident that the originality and importance of given works cannot be estimated. If, for instance, in Montaigne, Stoicism and Epicureanism forever contended; if in Corneille Stoicism won the day; if Voltaire's later work is wholly motivated by his Deism; if the early nineteenth century writers in all countries felt the impact of German monistic idealism; if those of the middle nineteenth century in Europe and of the early twentieth in the United States were dominated by materialism; if the late nineteenth century in Europe saw a renaissance of supercosmic aspirations, while in America, on the contrary, naturalism became more and more assertive; then, it should be clear that, without an acquaintance with the perspective of philosophical thought, we must remain helpless in our understanding of the forces at work on the content and even on the forms of the arts, and, moreover in danger of taking given authors too seriously, since their works, far from being original or objective, may merely distort objective reality in terms of their borrowed philosophical preconceptions.

This philosophical approach to the study of literature Irving Babbitt exemplified all his life. That he found the field too little organized to be able to round out his own perspective, so that in consequence his conception of humanism remained too exclusively Buddhistic, is now clearer than it was ten years ago. But, as we just saw, this only means that we must go on from where he ended, and further study the relation between the human, the superhuman, and the supernatural.

Babbitt's great contribution is that he makes it imperative to clarify those terms. To assert the distinctly human is to oppose the subhuman of the naturalists who would leave us wholly immersed

in nature. It means the recognition of rationality in possible control of animality. This is Aristotelian, Ciceronian, humanism.

Babbitt's fundamental originality is that, taking his cue from his studies of Buddhism, he challenges this purely rationalistic humanism as a complete description of man. He did it by calling our attention to the fact that the natural reason and the natural will are weak in the presence of the passions; that, in fact, they have libidos of their own: the reason, the lust of wanting to know more than it can know, and of making its capacity for knowledge the measure of reality; while the will, too, has its own lust, the lust of power. Both natural reason and will are thus immersed in the flux of the impermanent.

Irving Babbitt's basic challenge is therefore that, psychologically, we need the presence of a third element in man if his rationality is to dominate his animality. There must be a superhuman in man.

The question then remains: What is the relation of that third element, of that superhuman, to the supernatural? When we shall have the answer to that question, we shall be in possession of a sound humanism.

To examine that question further, we need to enter the domain of metaphysics which Babbitt left unexplored but to which he pointed. Moreover, when we reach metaphysics, we shall no less inevitably find ourselves facing the question of a personal God, a point which Babbitt abstained from considering. Until we have done so, we shall not be able to see exactly where Babbitt's doctrine fits in between a distinct humanism and a distinct supernaturalism.

It is most interestingly significant that, alongside of Irving Babbitt's work, others in the United States were feeling the need of re-examining the nature of man, and that they were led precisely to reassert the need of metaphysics, including an avowed Theism. Before trying to answer our own question as to the relations of the human, the superhuman, and the supernatural, we may then profitably turn to their work. It is gratifying that in so doing we shall still be following up the development of the American humanist movement.



# 3

## HUTCHINS' RECOVERY OF THE NEED OF METAPHYSICS

ONE of the effects of the naturalistic era was the change of the colleges into institutions which disparaged traditions instead of transmitting them. Fundamentally, the classical college, considered it its task to pass on the humanistic heritage; the religious college, the faith of its Church. They called themselves liberal because they would free their students from the limitations of their time and place. The naturalistic college called itself liberal because it would not teach anything as final, or even admit that truth could be known as something objective or antecedent to the knower. The mark of this new education was to refuse to be dogmatic, its boast was to be open-minded, its end was to discover ever new problems. For it truth was not static but something in the making. If then the student had come to college with some beliefs, some faith, some convictions, the college was to feel proud if he had lost them before graduation, and had learned instead to accumulate physical facts and to refrain from interpreting them according to some definite view of ultimate reality.

There was necessarily considerable inconsistency and even intellectual dishonesty in that attitude. It implied that the study of any one set of facts was just as educative as that of any other; yet even the most free electivists could not but consider as essential some aspects of their own subject, and often that subject itself. Then, too, the refusal to consider the possibility of attaining objective truth, and the pretension of being freed from final views, could not be consistently held by the naturalists; since they did accept a great deal of the past findings of the physical sciences as permanently true and thus proceeded on the assumption that the physical universe has an order antecedent to the scientist. So what really obtained in the American college where naturalistic professors prevailed was, as Foerster pointed out, an illogical indoctrination in

naturalism, a dogmatic insistence that man was merged in nature, and that there was no God above nature; or else the development of a mood of complete skepticism which could easily become cynical.

No doubt, many succumbed to such a mood, while others were saved from it by the exigencies of their everyday life. For, after all, as Babbitt put it, even if life is considered but a dream, unless it is treated realistically it may fast become a nightmare. On the other hand, many who remained unknown rebelled against the creed of naturalism; nor would it be difficult to draw up a list of prominent men in the United States, as we did for France, who reacted so far against it as to become church members.

On the American scene two young men in particular, who early achieved positions of national prominence, were to attract general attention by such a revolt. Typical products of our American colleges of the first decade of the century, they began to write in bewilderment, but they soon came to think that there must have been some mistake with the philosophy of the whole educational setup of their day. They felt that they had been betrayed, and that the nation, in fact the whole Western World, had been betrayed with them; and they proposed to do something about it. The first of these two young men was Robert Maynard Hutchins, the second Walter Lippmann.

It is the more interesting from the standpoint of the plotting out of the American humanist reaction against naturalism that neither could be called a disciple of Babbitt. It will therefore repay us to study how these younger independents during the past ten years helped the Babbitt critique to put naturalism on the defensive, thus adding a new chapter to the story of what must eventually come to be viewed as a reorientation of the thought of our times.

Robert Maynard Hutchins is a key figure in this reorientation, not merely because he was a typical product of the American college system, but because he became president of one of our greatest universities and has a fearless intellectual honesty which recalls that of Montaigne. Like him, he could preface his writings: *Lecteur, c'est ici un livre de bonne foi*. These writings include several hundred essays and addresses, but he features only three books and they are really collections of such addresses: *No Friendly Voice* (1936), *The Higher Learning in America* (1936), and *Education for Freedom* (1943). The first two reveal his bewilderment at what his edu-

cation had made of him; the last, especially, what he believed he had found out education should be after he had slowly awakened to what was the matter with his own. This discovery led him to say that when he became president he was essentially ignorant. In fact with his typical candor he prefaces his last book with *The Autobiography of an Uneducated Man*, his own life.

Hutchins is a born writer with the gift of condensed expression, and a discreet humor ever ready to light up his utter sincerity in self-analysis. What will be attempted here is to sum up President Hutchins' journey in search of an education, as an integral part of the second phase of the American humanist movement.

The son of a minister, he went to church twice on Sunday, read the Bible, a few plays of Shakespeare and, by chance, while in sophomore year at college, the Apology of Socrates and Faust. Though he liked to read, his contact with great literature was decidedly limited. No mathematics in college; for science, a course in breaking retorts; ten weeks of the history of philosophy in a green book with imaginary pictures of Socrates and Plato, and, he suspects, a no less imaginary text in relation to the doctrines studied. By eighteen, he had gone through high school in order to go to college, and through two years of college without knowing why. That was in Oberlin.

After two years "over there" as ambulanacer he went to Yale. With bad memories of "math," science, and "phil," he thought of taking up history but the department was on a sabbatical. So he drifted into law which Yale credited for the bachelor's degree, on the side dissecting quite a few frogs to satisfy a requirement in science and attending an American literature course which the professor often cut in order to lecture in New York. On graduating he taught for a year in a "prep" school, limiting the students to the most compact textbooks for fear of confusing their minds. At twenty-three he returned to Yale to complete his law course, but was made secretary to the faculty, and when a professor got appendicitis he took his place because he was already on the payroll. Finally, when a man who was teaching evidence resigned, he was given the job though he had never studied the subject. Four years later he was president of the University of Chicago.

If we are to take him literally, Mr. Hutchins thus leapt from post to post by sheer luck and without quite knowing what was happening to him. But there had been by-products. He had studied Greek

and Latin, and considerable German. Without being conscious of it, he must have secured through those studies the training in induction which language studies give; and that training in a fundamental distinctly human act must have given him the general mental discipline of which the naturalists coolly deny the possibility.

It was the study of law, however, which made him realize that there could be such a thing as formal or general education; for in studying law he had to learn to read, to write, and to speak. Even though his professors were unaware of it, they, too, gave mental discipline because they obliged their students "to read accurately and carefully, to state accurately and carefully the meaning of what is read," and in the preparation offered their students for examinations they taught them to criticize the reasoning of opposite cases with the same standards of accuracy, care, and discrimination. This actually meant the practice of grammar, rhetoric, and logic, the liberal arts of which Hutchins was to become the champion, even though the materials used were very poorly written and no intellectual history of the law was given. Moreover, Hutchins had found at Yale a half-course in jurisprudence which connects law with ethics and politics. This was what he was eventually to look for in all subjects: the ideas behind the facts.

The teaching of English composition in a preparatory school had also taught him much. He discovered as a teacher what he had been allowed to ignore as a student, that there were rules of reading, writing, and speaking. Here he glimpsed the third great idea which was to remain dominant with him: If to learn, to understand what one studies, one had to teach it, it was because teachers at least worked in an organized field; and if students went through school and college without knowing what was happening to them, as he had done, it was because the schools and the colleges were unorganized collections of courses.

So Hutchins really deserved his rapid promotions even though he may not have got them for the right reasons. He grew rapidly in stature because he was an honest and fearless thinker in an age when most accepted passively the shibboleths of the prevailing naturalistic school of thought.

That same intellectual honesty was to push him much farther when he faced the problem of teaching the law of evidence. He knew nothing of the psychology and logic on which the law of evidence is based, but his candid common sense made him realize that



he should. The psychologists and logicians he asked about it could not help him because like him they did not have enough general education to see the link between their subjects and the law. They could think of psychological problems as such, just as he could think of legal problems as such; but they could not, any more than he, work out the relations between law, psychology, and logic.

It was then that Hutchins sought out Mortimer Adler who taught at Columbia and who, he had heard, though a psychologist, was working on the seven volumes of Wigmore on evidence. Hutchins tells us that Adler had been as uneducated as he was, but that he had begun to do something about it. How he had come to do so is one of the most interesting features of the more recent development of the American humanist renaissance. He had come to do so because he had become connected with a movement which called for the reading of "the great books" of the Western World as a basis for a liberal education.

A most curious feature of the development of this movement is that it had a purely accidental origin. It goes back to an unused list tentatively drawn up in France for American soldiers, after the armistice of 1918, by John Erskine, and was brought back by him to Columbia University where it became for ten years the basis of a general honors course.

This list was also used in the New York People's Institute for adult education founded by Charles Sprague Smith, Amherst, 1894, and was published by the American Library Association. Scott Buchanan, Amherst, 1916, assistant director of the People's Institute, called Philip H. Youtz, Amherst, 1918, to organize the reading courses. Mortimer Adler and Richard McKeon, who had taught the list at Columbia, were also brought in.

These young men, between 1925 and 1929, made what was to them an astounding discovery, an added proof that the American colleges had lost their hold on the perspective of the history of thought. In the words of Scott Buchanan, they began "to feel the thrill of discovery which comes when research begins to dig up a very old traditional thread." They "had run across the two-thousand-year old liberal arts," the arts for the mastery of which the bachelor's degree used to be given, but the tradition of which had been lost.

The depression of 1929 affected the fortunes of the People's Institute and scattered the group. McKeon went back to the teaching of medieval philosophy at Columbia, and Buchanan was called to

teach philosophy at the University of Virginia. But before 1929 Hutchins had contacted Adler. When he became president of the University of Chicago that year, he sent him a call. So, in 1930, Adler was made associate professor of the philosophy of law at the University of Chicago and began to help Hutchins organize a course of reading along the Erskine lines, with frequent revisions in the light of growing experience with high school, undergraduate, and graduate students.

What then did the reading of the "great books" do for Hutchins? It showed him that he had come to be forty-three years of age without having the education which a sophomore might have: an opening acquaintance with the landmarks of the advance of the race toward understanding what man is, and a consequent training in the liberal arts which alone, he held, can make him a free man. "To be free a man must understand the tradition in which he lives," Hutchins writes, and he concludes: "Either we must abandon the ideal of freedom or we must educate our people for freedom. . . . We must attempt to give an education in the liberal arts and in the great books to all our citizens."

Here is the key thought back of all the proposals for educational reforms which rocked the University of Chicago and echoed through the nation. Hutchins had lived the experience he proposed. Since, with disarming candor, he had admitted being uneducated, he had the right to ask others to recognize their own ignorance, their own enslavement, in so far as they knew only the immediate subjects in which they had been brought up, or exposed to, in college. They might be good specialists; they were nevertheless ignorant men. They might move freely within their own subject; they nonetheless were slaves, each locked up within his specialty because they could not handle it in universal terms and hence could not know its relations to other subjects. They were all like the professors in psychology and logic whom Hutchins had consulted and who could not help him with his problems of legal evidence.

So we are back to the young Hutchins trying to be a professor of evidence. How could you understand the directives admitted in evidence if you knew nothing about logic which alone could enlighten you on the logic of evidence; or about psychology which alone could shed light on the workings of the human mind; and nothing about ethics which is the science of distinctly human behavior?

What this ultimately meant we are now prepared to see. During the dozen years in which President Hutchins gave himself the education which the college and the university had not given him, he had to address many meetings. The principal addresses he made between 1930 and 1935 — his period of greatest growth — have been collected in *No Friendly Voice*. One, in particular, throws light on that growth: *The Autobiography of an Ex-Law Student*, delivered before the Association of American Law Schools in 1933.

In the 1920's, Hutchins tells us, law schools considered that the law was what the courts and other government officials would do. To be a good lawyer, therefore, meant to predict what those with whom judgment rested would do in the light of what they had done. Hence, one should read abundantly in past decisions.

But had the courts made right decisions? Pragmatism gave the answer: They had if their decisions worked. But what was successful working? For this, evidently, a social order had to be assumed as legitimate. A court decision was then considered sound if it worked in favor of the continuance of that order. But who could tell the lawyers what the social order should be? The social scientists? They certainly had accumulated numberless facts about society, but dissociated as these facts were, they could throw no light on the soundness of court decisions. And so with the psychologists and the psychiatrists. They each had their own facts, but they could not use them in the field of law.

Why not then go back to the courts to study not what they had done but what they were doing, a "functional approach"? This meant the accumulation of more facts, but still facts in the raw, and the question remained: What should the law be? what the social order? and what the relation between the two? Moreover, this "functional approach," the study of law, not broken up into "torts," "contracts," etc., but as actually practiced, meant to try to give in schools what could best be learned in the law office. Why then maintain schools? So the possibility of an intelligent study of the law through a mere factual study of the present as well as of past practices looked more and more hopeless, especially with ten thousand new cases and statutes a year. Finally, the legislatures might repeal many of these painfully learned law facts, so that any day they might become obsolete.

Faced with those dilemmas, Hutchins had another great awakening. Cases, facts, data are necessary, but "there must be a scheme

into which to fit them." We must have "a body of principles and rules," and these can only be developed "in the light of the rational sciences of ethics and politics."

Hutchins had rediscovered the difference between particulars and universals. Particular facts accumulate endlessly and, as such, remain meaningless. In the physical sciences, their significance can be understood only by sorting them out through generalizations upon them, till they are fitted into the particular science to which they belong, under principles and laws which will at once make other facts of the same kind intelligible. But there are also facts of human behavior. The value of these facts can likewise be ascertained only by distinguishing between them and generalizing upon them more and more till they issue into a science of man, and the science of man is humanism, the "ism" about the distinctly human.

So Hutchins became one of the central figures in the further developments of the humanist movement. The science of man like all sciences must deal with the nature of its object. What is the nature of man? What, according to that nature, is the good life for man? Only in so far as we can know that, aside now from revealed religion, can we tell if a law is sound. It is sound only if it is what it ought to be in the light of the nature of man, and not what the legislator arbitrarily chooses to make it. Therefore, as Hutchins put it, "the principles and the rules of law must come from the rational sciences of ethics and politics."

Thus Hutchins had not only solved his central problem as a teacher of the law, of the human law, but he had been brought back to the "great books" because for him now the history and the principles of the sciences of ethics and politics were recorded in the great books.

Before becoming a lawyer, an educator, or entering any profession dealing with man, one should be educated so as to be able to consider one's subject, whatever it may be, in the light of the principles which stem from man's nature. But to be educated, he concluded, one must have read the great books which down the ages have thrown more light on what man really is. The question remained: which books can we really define as "great books," ethically, philosophically, and doctrinally. We shall have occasion to return to this question.

But here is the all-important point. Hutchins had been led to rediscover the need of metaphysics. For metaphysics is the science



of being, without which we cannot know how to distinguish between beings, and, hence, without which we cannot know what man is and his necessary relations to other beings.

This, in brief, is the story of President Hutchins' discovery of what he henceforth held it means to be educated. Certainly he had awakened to one great fact that he, and most of us, had allowed ourselves to be caught in what Babbitt called "the naturalistic trap" in which man is made to deny his distinct nature and turned away from the methods necessary to deal with his special concerns. Hutchins realized that to be asked to be content with the accumulation of facts was to be asked to perform mere animal acts. He proceeded, therefore, to jump out of the trap so as to be able to act in a truly human way, to use the distinctly human power of understanding in terms of natures and ends, of judging the values of facts, and hence of being able to classify them.

He read Galen, for instance, and he could talk to doctors, as well as to lawyers, because in both their fields the same principles apply. Whatever may be the particulars, there are universals which govern them all.

"How did Galen secure his extraordinary balance of speculation, observation, and experiment?" Hutchins asks, and he answers: "Because he took his stand on Aristotle's general principles applicable to change and motion in all nature." Hence he concluded: "The shift of emphasis throughout education from thought to information and from idea to facts must be reversed." Information is valuable only if it yields thought, and facts are valuable only if they yield ideas.

So Hutchins knew what was the matter with the American college and university. However, to propose definite plans for a reorganization of our whole educational system is to become an easy target for criticism. Are all students capable of receiving a higher education, or even of pursuing liberal studies in secondary education? Even for those that are, how can skills in using the ancient and modern languages be given? How, at the same time, can a good initiation to mathematics, to the sciences, and to the true perspective of the history of the West, of its thought and of its arts be secured? How can the initiation to specialties, which must be undertaken before the twenty-second year if professional education is not to be too long delayed, be connected with such general edu-

cation and so complex an acquirement of skills and social habits? And what about religious education, if we recognize religion? No matter what solutions are offered to the above problems, they must have their weaknesses and remain open to criticism. So it proved at Chicago.

In 1934 President Hutchins had much to say as to how New England, and Harvard in particular, were failing in solving such questions. But his own chairman of the Social Science Courses in the college of the University of Chicago formally challenged Mr. Hutchins' plan as outlined in *The Higher Learning in America*, and opposed to it the plan actually initiated at the University of Chicago in 1931.

Mr. Hutchins himself discussed this plan sympathetically in 1933 before the Department of Superintendents in Minneapolis, and implied that it carried out many of his ideas. But around 1935, Norman Foerster took issue with its central feature of trying to solve through introductory survey courses the problem of the initiation to the various fields.

Mr. Hutchins had criticized, as Foerster had already done, the surrender of the college and university to the vocational, the lowering of standards in all courses to cater to incompetent and indifferent students, the prominence of semiprofessionalized athletics and of extracurricular social activities. It was retorted that Mr. Hutchins gave up too easily the study of modern languages, that he accepted too readily the notion that the classics could be read adequately in translation, and, more fundamentally, that his emphasis on the training of the intellect compromised the development of the whole person, including the development of skills, physical and social, and a proper conception of the importance of science in twentieth century culture.

We are here concerned, however, only with the philosophical battle between naturalism and humanism behind any possible scheme of educational reform. The philosophy of Hutchins' *The Higher Learning in America* was at once critically examined, notably by Whitehead and Dewey; but the issue was brought to a head by the *Reply to President Hutchins' Critique of the American University, Entitled: The Higher Learning in a Democracy*, by Henry D. Gideonse, then associate professor of economics at the

University of Chicago, and now President of Brooklyn College, New York, which took these critiques into consideration.

Dr. Gideonse is an able representative of his own naturalistic school of thought. Born in Rotterdam in 1901, graduated from Columbia in 1923, and from the Geneva Institute in 1928, he lectured at Columbia, Geneva, and Rutgers before he became assistant professor of economics at Chicago. As he is also a specialist in international politics, he has evidently much cultural experience. No less evidently, his early education made him a disciple of John Dewey. So in the critique of Hutchins by Gideonse we had a confronting of naturalistic with humanistic thought.

At the same time it was revealed how much the American humanist discussion had advanced since the days of Babbitt. Babbitt refrained from speaking in metaphysical terms. He was content to develop his own, as we saw, from the Buddhistic doctrine which avoids ultimates. Following upon Hutchins' recovery of the need of metaphysics for the solution of any question pertaining to man, every American humanist must now recognize that we can no more escape metaphysics when we come to deal with man, than we can escape physics when we deal with nature. The question at issue is, then, the quality of our metaphysics.

What makes Mr. Gideonse specially representative of the naturalists is precisely that he still wishes to keep metaphysics out of the discussion about the concerns of man. He writes: "To crystallize truths into Truth, and to substitute metaphysics for science is to arrest a process of intellectual growth that is the basis of the democratic process. . . . To stress first principles without the constant challenge of experience is to produce intellectual conceit and reactionary attitudes. . . . An educational institution not yet committed to outright indoctrination in some secular or formal religion will insist that broken rays of true light are preferable to the glamour of a spurious metaphysical clarity that has no relation to experience. . . . Acceptance of the curricular primacy of a set of metaphysical principles would reduce science to dogma, and education to indoctrination."

Here we have evidently the well-known repudiation of metaphysics by positivism allied to the point of view of the philosophy of total change. Mr. Gideonse admits that he is a disciple of John Dewey: "The classification of the values by which we live will spring from a detailed and synthetic knowledge of the conditioning



means, rather than from sterile parroting of a discarded metaphysics." Such a view, in John Dewey's words, 'renounces the traditional notion that action is inherently inferior to knowledge, and preference for the fixed over the changing; it involves the conviction that security attained by active control is to be more prized than certainty in theory.' "

All these statements, by their very repetitiousness, constitute an admirably succinct expression of the naturalistic point of view opposed to humanism. It is evident, however, that in their very expression of their opposition to dogmatism, they are themselves wholly dogmatic. It is dogmatically stated that metaphysics are to be definitely discarded, and that to bring them back is but sterile parroting; that metaphysics is spurious, and has no relation to experience; that to believe in first principles is to refuse the challenge of experience. Such statements, evidently, represent a completely dogmatic begging of the question. But they nonetheless are most valuable, as were those of the humanitarian naturalists' manifesto, because they make us fully realize that ultimately we are necessarily dealing with contradictory alternatives of thought; and that, no matter which one we adhere to, in so far as we adhere to it, we are equally dogmatic.

The Dewey school believes dogmatically in the philosophy of total change. "If religion," Mr. Gideonse further writes, "seems to have degenerated from the embodiment of the shared values of the group to a part-time embellishment of our leisure, that is one of the penalties attached to identifying spiritual matters with the *status quo* in scientific and social evolution." Here again is the whole point in a nutshell. For Mr. Gideonse any belief in abiding elements is adherence to a *status quo*. Any belief in any aspect of the permanent is automatically discarded by the philosophers of total change. For them there is no truth above the changing social scene. And they accuse their opponents of denying the changing.

The humanist, as we saw, does not deny the changing. He merely insists that there is an abiding in and above the changing. That abiding is the domain of metaphysics. To deny it is to beg the question. Moreover, to deride the metaphysics of the abiding in the changing is to set up a counter metaphysics, the metaphysics of total change. It is merely to substitute the metaphysical term "becoming" for the metaphysical term "being."

The issue between the physicist and the metaphysician is then



not one of nondogma versus dogma. The physical scientist must be as dogmatic about his own subject as the metaphysician, once he believes that he has passed from an hypothesis to real knowledge about physical reality, as for instance when he has discovered that arsenic is a poison. The issue is one of method. Are there other methods besides that of the physical sciences to arrive at truth? The metaphysician believes that there are.

First of all, he believes that there are facts in human life which may be discovered experimentally and experientially and which are unexplainable in purely physical terms; for instance, the distinction between the perception of particular objects and the conception of ideas. The distinction between a general term, an abstract term, a principle or law, and the perception of a particular object is just as much a matter of experience as the distinction between light and heat, but it points to the existence of an abiding element in man.

So too with the distinction between physical determinism and free choice. The materialist may deny the possibility of the conception of universal terms and of the freedom of the human will, but he can do so only arbitrarily. In fact, he can construct a physical science only by rising from particular cases to universal generalizations about that type of cases; and in pursuing his experiments he must constantly freely choose his ends and his means. If he makes discoveries, it is because he chose means that no one had used before, and which, since they did not exist, could not have determined him. His ingenuity in discovering those means is a tribute to his free possibilities of thought within his already existing knowledge.

But where the metaphysician wholly differs from the physicist is that, while the physicist would remain locked up within the narrow range of his own measurements of the changing, the metaphysician would explore the domain of the abiding, by distinguishing between the possibility of knowledge in the physical order, and the added possibility of knowledge in the absolute order.

The physical order is the order of the changing; the absolute order is the order of the abiding or unchanging. In the order of the changing, concrete things act on one another. It may therefore be impossible to discover how they do so except by prolonged experimentation, and even then not beyond doubt; so that the conclusion reached should remain subject to further verification, e.g.: If a substance burns in air and water is formed, the substance contained hydrogen.

But in the order of the unchanging we are dealing with ideas, abstract relations, which transcend particular concrete objects. Our data is unchanging because it predicates aspects of being and not merely of this or that particular kind of being, such notions as truth, goodness, beauty, substance, accidents, causes, whole, part, self-sufficiency, self-insufficiency.

These ideas cannot be, and need not be treated experimentally, though they ultimately stem from generalizations based on experience. You conceive the idea of whole and part, for instance, from experience with concrete objects; but once you understand what a whole is, and what a part is, you do not need to experiment to know that the whole is greater than the part, because the predicate is implied in the subject.

Such truths are necessarily true, and hence true in all times and places. It makes no difference how early or by whom they were formulated. They are not of antiquity or of the modern age. They are neither Aristotelian nor scholastic. They are eternal and universal truths. You cannot tax those who believe in them as having reactionary attitudes because they believe in them. Nor, incidentally, can you feel that you have scored a point when you have called your adversary reactionary. For where there is error, there must be a reaction against it to insure progress. Scientists had to react against phlogiston to discover oxygen.

The second stage of the American humanist discussion has then thrown light on the need of keeping clear the distinction between knowledge in the physical order and knowledge in the absolute order. When Mr. Gideonse told Mr. Hutchins: "To stress first principles (as metaphysics does) without the constant challenge of experience is to produce intellectual conceit and reactionary attitudes," he was overlooking the fact that first principles by their very nature, as judgments in the absolute order, are beyond the challenge of experience, that they are self-evident so soon as we understand their terms.

What Mr. Gideonse's objection really amounts to is that he wants to limit us to the possibility of judgments in the physical order, which truly must remain under the constant challenge of experience because they are not self-evident so soon as their terms are known; since the question is whether a particular fact falls under a tentative generalization, and the predicate is not necessarily implied in the subject.

The upshot of this discussion is then that, as opposed to such

assertions in the physical order, we must also recognize the truths of the absolute order which we may be sure no experimentation will ever overthrow. For, whereas the physical order might have been, and may even become, other than it is, the absolute order is necessarily what it is, so that even if the physical order changed, it could change **only within the limitations** of those necessary truths. A whole will never be smaller than a part, nor will a circle ever be square, nor will any being ever be what it is and what it is not at the same time; nor will a changing being ever be self-sufficient, nor a made object superior to its maker, nor an effect greater than its cause; neither will a being ever be true if it is not in conformity with the absolute type of its nature, nor good **except in proportion as it acts in accordance** with the absolute type of its nature, nor good for another except in so far as it corresponds to some exigency of the nature of that other.

By all means, then, let us have the scientific method for the study of the changing universe. All that the metaphysician asks is that it be not denied that the human mind can conceive truths of the absolute order and reason about them.

"To crystallize truths into Truth and to substitute metaphysics for science," Dr. Gideonse writes, "is to arrest a process of intellectual growth that is the basis of the democratic process." We may now better appreciate the fallacy of that statement.

First of all, the metaphysician does not crystallize truths into Truth. Like the scientist he merely organizes the truths he discovers. Scientific data, duly ascertained as true statements about objective reality, is Truth just as much as the statement that the whole is greater than the part, or that self-insufficient beings require a cause. The latter are merely more general truths than the former. But what is more, the scientist himself works and can only work in the light of such general or metaphysical truths. If metaphysical truth ceased to be, so would the physical, and even all possibility of the physical.

As to the democratic process, it too, far from being independent of metaphysics, wholly depends upon metaphysical distinctions. Scientific truth is not determined by majority vote; neither is the soundness of the democratic form of government. Physical science is the discovery of universal truths from the behavior of particular things investigated on the presupposition of metaphysical truths; and democracy is based on the metaphysical distinction between

natures since the inviolability and dignity of man which calls for democracy depends upon his special nature. This is so true that, so soon as you lose the metaphysical distinction of natures and of the special nature of man, you are likely to pass, as has actually occurred, from democracy to totalitarianism.

Hence it is imperative that we recognize the validity of metaphysical as well as of physical knowledge. It is not science but scientism that repudiates metaphysics, that scientism of which Mr. Gideonse gives us such a notable example, and which he should know has been again and again denounced in Europe in the past fifty years. The denunciation was more easily made because scientism in denying the validity of metaphysics, is necessarily substituting a metaphysics of its own, and is everlastingly guilty of dogmatism in the pejorative sense of substituting itself for the facts.

What all this amounts to is merely that scientism is monistic, that it believes dogmatically only in the impermanent, and dogmatically accuses of being dogmatic all those who believe that reality is dualistic, that there is the permanent as well as the impermanent, being as well as becoming, eternal, absolute, ideal truths as well as changing existences.

What Mr. Hutchins has really done is to bring home to us that the Buddhistic permanent on which Irving Babbitt based his own humanism must be more definitely studied. The permanent, the very crux of the humanist discussion, is the realm of necessary truths, truths in the absolute order.

These truths are not only all-important in their own realm, but they condition the reality of physical beings, and the possibility of reaching truths in the contingent physical order. Such metaphysical truths are so necessarily independent of experimentation that they condition experimentation, and alone can give meaning to the facts of experience.

The physical scientist needs only the more elementary metaphysical principles. The necessity of causes and the principle that a thing cannot be and not be at the same time, are sufficient for a start in the physical sciences, because the changes in contingent beings take place according to their determining natures and the scientist can hope to discover them.

But when we come to man, we are faced with behaviors which are unpredictable because they may be purposive. Man does not have to accept physical conditions; he may modify them, and even



act contrary to them. An animal must continue to breathe; man may stop breathing if he chooses. All the physical sciences are developed through such interferences of man in the working of physical nature. That very capacity of man to interfere with the physical proves that the science of man himself must be more than physical.

Man must therefore further explore metaphysics, and exploring this domain of necessary truths, he may come to distinguish natures, and distinguishing his own as unique, he may come to understand why he is capable of being purposive, of changing or opposing physical conditions. That is why the facts about man, what he did, does, can, may, or should do, must overwhelm him if he does not understand his nature, but may be evaluated if he does. Metaphysics is the key to the understanding of the possibilities of man. As such, it is indispensable to the humanist.

This is what Mr. Hutchins rediscovered; and there is something dramatic in this rediscovery, as there is in the intellectual life of Babbitt and More, who, like him, when still young men, revolted against the dominating forces of naturalism deeply entrenched in the American academic world.

Psychologically, Mr. Hutchins' evolution is particularly interesting, because, in a very complete sense, he did actually rediscover the need of metaphysics, since he had never studied the subject.

He rediscovered it scientifically by the method of experience in a particular field. Buried in the welter of decisions in the field of law, he saw that there could be no law, but only records of arbitrary or self-interested human behavior unless it was again made clear that, above the changing in man and thing, there is an abiding realm of reality and truth, and that because man can have something to say about changes in himself and in society, he can know what those changes should be or not be, yet he can know it only in the light of that same realm.

We are still far from a full understanding of dualistic humanism as part of the philosophy of the abiding in and above the changing, of what may be called dualistic realism, as opposed to the philosophy of total change, the philosophy of idealistic or materialistic monism; but we are on our way.

By now turning to the study of the evolution of Walter Lippmann we should be able to see how another typical American college man, who had been caught in "the naturalistic trap" even more

hopelessly than Hutchins, came to realize his plight and worked out his escape. We shall see how one who was denounced by Babbitt some fifteen years ago as a mere stoic naturalist, came to go even beyond Babbitt, and even beyond Hutchins, to proclaim with all the powers of language at his command the need of reasserting not only metaphysics but the highest pronouncement of metaphysics: the existence of God, distinct from and antecedent to the universe.

# 4

## LIPPMANN'S RECOVERY OF THE NEED OF THEISM

BORN in New York City, Walter Lippmann was graduated from Harvard in 1910, at the end of the Eliot era, synonymous with the elective system. It implied the possibility of studying with William James and Santayana, and of going to listen to Irving Babbitt, a thirty-year-old instructor in French who had just published *Literature and the American College* and who raised anew the question: What is humanism? It meant also to have awakened to the intellectual life at a time when American intellectuals in general were calling on the young to drift away from traditional allegiances.

In fact, it was the Eliot era which had changed the colleges from transmitters of traditions to washing machines capable of completely dissolving the various allegiances of their students. This was particularly true at Harvard where Santayana, in the name of a naturalism out of Lucretius whom he had read as a sophomore and whom, he tells us, he had never outgrown, reverently taught irreverence toward established religions; and where William James opposed materialism only by a pluralism which even more subtly, if no less politely, made all so-called fixed truths appear hopelessly irrelevant to the ever changing scene.

It is true that some students who were more deeply dyed in their private preparatory schools, and who isolated themselves in their private clubs whose very walls reeked with respect for the past, and whose doors were carefully guarded, could keep their original color and odor. Others were saved from the philosophical *ambiance* by the intense pursuit of some technical specialty. But Walter Lippmann was not in either group and was graduated as mentally bare of beliefs as the newborn babe of clothes.

It is not without significance that his first publication was an edition of the poems of a college friend, Paul Mariett, the son of a Congregationalist minister sternly steeped in his church's creed.

Paul had died while he was a student at Harvard. His poems, rich with promise, express the anguish which both he and Lippmann must have experienced as they passed through the prevailing fumigation of fixed beliefs:

O for a lifeless world to lie in!  
Not to be born in, not to die in . . .  
'Tis all I want of thee.  
O, Power, grant it to me!

Had Paul Mariett lived, perhaps the two friends would have gone on working together as Babbitt and More did, and the evolution of his thought would no doubt have been as poignant as that of Lippmann.

If Lippmann's is so significant, it is because he emerged the spokesman of his generation bereft of all the hopes that had sustained men in the past, and because he assigned to himself the task of solving its problems. Four years after graduation, and after showing in his first book, *A Preface to Politics*, what his main field of work was likely to remain, he published, a month before the outbreak of World War I, the first of his inquiries as to what his generation, knocked off "the rock of ages," could do to build up new ideals. He fittingly called it *Drift and Mastery*.

It is a brave book, the promise of the earnest, keenly analytical work through which Lippmann was eventually to attract and keep the national attention. It is steeped in the thought of James and Santayana, a proof that after all, as Lippmann himself will admit later, we can only exchange one set of ideas for another. Mastery of the drift was to be found in James' pragmatic principle that values have reality only in terms of recognizable human needs in the changing life of the day. James had thrown Lippmann into the drift of total change. How was he to master it and learn to swim in it happily? He realized that he had not found the answer, but he thought that at least he had begun to chart a way for himself and perhaps for others.

Fifteen years later he was still at it with a more ripened thought, as was evidenced when in 1929 he published *A Preface to Morals*. In the meantime he had published a half dozen studies on more special subjects: *The Stakes of Diplomacy*, *Liberty and the News*, *Public Opinion*, *The Phantom Public*, *Men of Destiny*, *American Inquisitors*. But in this *Preface to Morals* — he was now forty years



old — he picked up anew in a more detailed way the question of the drift he had started with, and proceeded to give us a more hopeful proposal as to the way to rise above it.

By this time Babbitt had published his three characteristic books: *The Masters of French Criticism*, 1912, *Rousseau and Romanticism*, 1919, and *Democracy and Leadership*, 1924. As is shown by the bibliography of *A Preface to Morals*, Lippmann had read at least *Rousseau and Romanticism*. He quotes from it five times, and even borrows from it the epigraph of its first part: "Whirl is king, having driven out Zeus," which Babbitt had quoted from Aristophanes. One announcement of the book read: "To those who have lost the faith of their fathers, this brilliant new study by Walter Lippmann will give some point to the business of living. A philosophy of self-reliance opens the door from the chaos of modernity. Every thinking man who is bewildered by the dissolution of the ancestral order of things will find this book a refuge and a delight."

In the first part, *The Dissolution of the Ancestral Order*, Lippmann refers to Randall's *The Making of the Modern Mind*, to M. C. Otto's *Natural Laws and Human Hopes*, and shows that he knows Dean Inge, Fosdick, Whitehead, Bertrand Russell, Kirsopp Lake, and that Spinoza has much influenced him. For Catholic thought he is content with two of three articles in the *Catholic Encyclopaedia*. In a summary of this Catholic thought, he concludes that the modern spirit considers it purely "a grandiose picture projected by human needs and desires" to believe that "behind the visible world of physical objects and human institutions there is a supernatural kingdom from which ultimately all laws, all judgments, and all compensations are derived."

His problem is, then, "how mankind deprived of the great fictions . . . born of the desire that such objects should exist . . . is to come to terms with the needs which created those fictions." This he calls the humanistic view, and he is thus seen to side with the humanitarian naturalists.

Lippmann then proceeds to work out more systematically than he had done in *Drift and Mastery* what he understands to be "the insight of humanism and high religion." The whole question narrows down for him to what we are to do with our natural desires. The ultimate desire, of which others are but aspects, is happiness. The right dealing with natural desires should bring happiness. At once the alternatives are revealed. If the natural desires are consid-

ered to be "lecherous, greedy, cruel," than we have need of "some form of the classical and Christian doctrine that man must subdue his naïve impulses, and by reason, grace, and renunciation, transform his will." If, on the contrary, natural desires are to be considered innocent and good, then we must be concerned "not with the reform of desire but with the provision of opportunities for its fulfillment."

We are evidently back to the fundamental question of humanism: What is the nature of man? Considering it only in terms of desires, Lippmann at once recognizes that if all natural desires are distrusted and repressed, they will sooner or later reassert themselves; and, if they are naïvely trusted, will lead to so much disorder and corruption that order and restraint will again be idealized. Hence all the great teachers — as he considers them — Buddha, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Spinoza, and, of course, Jesus and St. Paul considered some renunciation as essential, proving that such a general conviction must be an insight derived from experience. Liberals, then, may well recognize such an objective truth even though they refuse to have it imposed upon them by authority. So Lippmann, like Babbitt, would accept only the authority of human experience, but like him he recognizes that man needs to bring order into his life by some control of his appetites.

If we are to accept this view, how shall we establish the extent of the control of desires? Aristotle in his *Ethics*, considering happiness to be the fruit of virtue, defines virtue as the mean between two extremes — neither rashness nor cowardice, but courage; neither incontinence nor total abstinence, but temperance. However, even Aristotle recognized how difficult it is to determine what the mean consists of in given circumstances. Lippmann, oppressed by the sense of the changing, goes further: Desires are not objective qualities the same in all persons, nor in any one person at all times, and objects of desire are not purely objects but depend upon the changing subject. So there is no objective good or evil but only a relationship between variable desires and variable objects of desire. There are no fixed elements in human nature, only stages in its evolution. So for Lippmann man is wholly immersed within the flux of change.

In what terms, then, can he establish a morality? Here he turns to the psychologists and psychoanalysts for whom the conception of human nature is that of developing behavior. For them, the goal of moral effort, of the control of desire, is natural. So here is how

Lippmann would replace "the conception of man as the subject of a heavenly king which dominated the whole ancestral order of life." For him humanism must "take as its dominant pattern the progress of life from helpless infancy to self-governing maturity." What then is maturity?

Freud tells him that "the passage from infancy to maturity is a transition from the dominion of momentary pleasure and pain to the dominion of reality." And Dr. S. Ferenczi of Budapest in his *Stages in the Development of the Sense of Reality* (1913), Lippmann thinks, describes that passage adequately. The process of maturing from the womb and swaddling clothes period, when one's world responds to one's wishes, to the habitual adjustment of our wishes to the facts of the real world, he believes, is a slow one which we may never wholly achieve, but which when achieved, means happiness. So Mr. Lippmann's formula reduces to the Stoic: abstain and bear. Cease to expect anything of the world which it cannot give; and learn, by understanding, to be satisfied with it as it really is.

According to this creed there is consequently some truth in the constant warning of the sages that we must learn renunciation, though renunciation in itself is not a virtue. Virtue becomes the quality of mature desire, it is the knowing what to desire. Then the moral problem is solved; we know how much to yield and how much to check. This Lippmann calls high religion. High religion, as he views it, is not the theocratic view that there is a God above the universe who governs it. The theocratic principle is really irrelevant. Many of those who held it were truly religious, not because of it but in spite of it. In the last analysis they were not concerned about placating the will of God, but called for a discipline of the will of man because such a discipline was intrinsically good for man.

Here Lippmann reveals himself a disciple of Whitehead: "Religion becomes the art and the theory of the internal life of man, so far as it depends on man himself and on what is permanent in the nature of things." Whereas popular theocratic religion is dissolved by the acids of modernity, this high religion of internal discipline, based on the experience of reality, is not. Happiness does not now depend on a will other than our own, but on having achieved a certain quality and harmony of the passions.

This, we are told, the sages have taught, but they addressed their message only to the few. "Even Jesus spoke the bitter words: 'Give not what is holy to the dogs and cast not your pearls before swine.'"

So the masses ignored the sages as teachers, but worshiped them as the legends of their power grew; they converted the sages' original insight into the need of conversion and self-discipline into a system of commands and promises. Thus high religion was popularized. Within the churches there were often true converts to high religion for whom goodness was pleasant and needed no sanctions; but ecclesiastical establishments on the whole labored to govern, through moral codes, with promises of reward and threats of punishments, the unconverted multitudes.

Today, Lippmann continues, we have this peculiar situation: The multitudes no longer accept the ancient certainties, but they have not outgrown the needs to which they ministered. There no longer exists a moral code which the moralist can interpret, administer, and enforce because the moralist himself is not absolutely sure that he knows what is right, and the multitudes doubt his competence and authority. There remains, then, only one possibility for the moralist: "to elucidate what the good is . . . to encourage the growth to maturity, the outgrowing of naïve desires, the cultivation of disinterestedness which renders passion innocent and an authoritative morality unnecessary." What we need is the practice of such a high religion on the basis of humanistic insight.

Whereupon Lippmann tries to apply his ideal of disinterestedness to the three main domains: business, sexual relations, and government.

The early businessman was unregenerate because he was immature and therefore acquisitive. The businessman of today, who has been forced by machine technology into what are really public service units, must learn to desire the good of the community; thus he becomes disinterested.

Permanent marriage as an institution for the rearing of children may now be easily avoided, but the older convention of the permanent marriage still correctly interprets human experience. It can survive without compulsion through the personal disinterestedness of both parties if they are mature enough to have a realistic insight of the condition for love and happiness in sexual relations.

Government is bad when, in the hands of mere politicians, it promises to satisfy the inordinate desires of the people. It can become good when the disinterested statesman will teach disinterestedness to the people by helping them to become mature and to want only what the existing realities will permit.



By 1929, then, Walter Lippmann had worked out his own conception of humanism and of its solution of the problem of morality. It chanced that 1929 was the year in which the humanist movement, proceeding from Irving Babbitt, was beginning to attract national attention. Henry Goddard Leach had just transformed *The Forum* magazine into a luridly decorated three-ring circus into which, with what might have been considered an almost sadistic eagerness, he tossed opposing representatives of the most controversial issues. In monologues, dialogues, and essays, atheists, humanists, Catholics, Protestants appeared in battle array on such questions as "Does the Modern World Need Religion?," "Will American Catholics Secede From Rome?," "Dry Rot in Holy Places," "Is Western Civilization Dying?" as well as on "Should Adults Play Golf?" and "The Fallacies of Prohibition." Such men as Millikan, Einstein, Dewey, Nansen, Wells, Babbitt were prevailed on to write on "What I Believe." Babbitt was further encouraged to write what he thought of President Eliot; my own book on *Le Mouvement Humaniste aux Etats Unis*, though written in French, was duly reviewed; and Babbitt was called on to write the review on Lippmann's *Preface to Morals*.

What Babbitt said on that occasion about Lippmann could not but throw light on both their understandings of humanism, although in the short space at his disposal Babbitt could hardly do justice to Lippmann's book. Lippmann's doctrine, concluded Babbitt, is neither, as he fondly thinks, humanism nor high religion, but a modern and rather bleak form of Stoicism. Babbitt credited Lippmann with having given a true picture of the modernist's dilemma: "the objective moral certitudes have dissolved, and in the liberal philosophy there is nothing to take their place." But he accused him of remaining modernistic instead of being truly modern; and for Babbitt, to be modern was to be truly critical.

Now, to be critical in terms of the whole of reality was precisely what Lippmann prided himself on. Theocratic popular religion was for him wishful repose in authority, while his "high religion" through humanistic insight was the matured realization of reality. Where, then, was Lippmann's mistake according to Babbitt? It consisted in this: Lippmann as a monistic naturalist did not recognize the duality of human experience. He had accepted the philosophy of total change, and considered man to be completely immersed in the current of becoming, so that there remains for him only the possibility of adjusting himself, as the scientist does, to a changing

universe considered to be the only reality. Our only hope was, then, according to Lippmann, to reach the disinterestedness of the physical scientist by bowing to natural necessity.

He had not reached the understanding of the dualism of the law-for-man as distinct from the law-for-thing. He dismissed as merely wishful thinking and infantile survival every aspiration of the human heart to transcend the physical. He rejected the mediation between extremes of Aristotelian humanism because of the difficulty of bridging the gap between a particular circumstance and a general precept. No wonder. For in Aristotle the general precept belonged to the order of abiding truth, and Lippmann did not recognize such an objective order. His disinterestedness remained personal pragmatic expediency, and his morality purely relativistic. Thus he was still a pseudo-realist; because to be truly realistic, we must become immediately aware of a something in us that is real in a nonphysical way which enables us to rise above the flux of change, above the phenomenal, and to order our lives in terms of permanent values, not merely in terms of expedient adjustments within the changing scene.

Whereupon Babbitt reasserted the key point of his own psychology: "What lifts man above the phenomenal order is a certain quality of the will, and the source of true happiness is an intelligent exercise of this will." So Babbitt asked Lippmann the question which he had so often repeated elsewhere: "Why not affirm this higher will first of all as a psychological fact, as one of the immediate data of consciousness and let the metaphysics and theology come later if at all?"

This, Babbitt insisted, is the truly experimental, truly critical, hence truly modern attitude, as opposed to the modernistic. To the modernist who, because he is a monist, has lost track of the dualism of man's nature, there is left only the possibility of being a Stoic or an Epicurean, or of being, as was often done in decadent Rome, a Stoic in doctrine and an Epicurean in practice. Mr. Lippmann's doctrine of disinterestedness would rise above Epicurean self-indulgence; but whatever its merits it should stand on its own, and not try to identify itself with either "humanism" or "high religion."

Reality is dualistic. Humanism, the distinctly human, and high religion, in Babbitt's view, can be spoken of only when a permanent element is recognized above the impermanence of our changing world. No happiness can be reached save through the recogni-

tion of such a dualism and of the behavior it calls for: adjustments must be made not in terms even of mature personal desire, but in terms of the higher will which, to be a genuine realist, we must distinguish as an immediate datum of consciousness.

Thus, according to Babbitt, Lippmann still wholly misunderstood the nature of man and of reality.

In the course of what Gorham Munson described in his *The Dilemma of the Liberated* (1930), as "the new battle of the books," Seward Collins who, as editor of *The Bookman*, had made of that review one of the main guns in that battle, wrote in its June-July, 1930, numbers resounding articles in which he bade farewell to the twenties. There is no doubt that the blatant iconoclastic spirit which had swept through the first decade of the post world-war era, and had thus helped Lippmann to take for granted that the acids of modernity had wholly dissolved the ancestral order, began now to sober down after the outbreak of the humanist controversy. Even H. L. Mencken became comparatively quiescent, and Dewey was put on the defensive in the American Philosophical Association.

How far the humanists' challenge to naturalism was a direct cause of this turn of the tide would be hard to determine. The early thirties, however, saw the publication of Babbitt's *On Being Creative*, Foerster's work at Iowa which included his criticism of the American university, William P. King's *Humanism Another Battle Line* (a symposium), Mercier's *The Challenge of Humanism*, and further, the campaigns of *The American Review* under the editorship of Seward Collins. Thence, down the decade, followed the posthumously published works of Babbitt, the continuing work of Foerster, G. R. Elliott's *Humanism and Imagination*, the controversies on humanism among the Unitarians, the numerous works of Lynn Harold Hough among the Evangelicals, much discussion of humanism as part of the intellectual activity within American Catholic circles, the increasing influence of the French philosophers Etienne Gilson and Jacques Maritain on both non-Catholic and Catholic philosophical thought, the whole development of Hutchins' work together with the allied renaissance of the conception of the liberal arts which we shall study; finally Werner Jaeger's *Paideia, The Ideals of Greek Culture*, which must be added to More's *Greek Tradition*. They both also link with the educational reforms proposed by Foerster and Hutchins, since it is Jaeger's ideal that mod-

ern scholarship should be reconciled with the tradition of humanism.

But perhaps the most significant sign of the reaction against naturalism during the thirties is to be found in the evolution of Walter Lippmann. In 1937, only eight years after his *Preface to Morals* in which he so readily accepted the notion that the traditional idea of God had been driven from the modern world, he published *The Good Society* in which he reversed himself to proclaim no less emphatically that the traditional idea of God was indispensable to the modern world because a God antecedent to the universe was the only guarantee of morality and freedom.

What had happened in France at the beginning of the century was now happening in America. The eighties of the last century in France roughly correspond to the twenties of our present century in the United States, at least in so far as they saw the high tide of materialistic monism of which Paul Claudel left us such a vivid description.

Claudel turned from this materialism and became a convert to Catholicism; but the conversion of Ferdinand Brunetière to Catholicism, about 1903, offers an even more striking parallel to the re-discovery of the need of Theism by Lippmann in 1937. Not only had Brunetière been for some fifteen years the most prominent literary critic of France, but as a disciple of Comte and Darwin he was looked upon as a high priest of what Lippmann hailed in his *Preface to Morals* as the modern temper. However, Brunetière, like Lippmann, was an earnestly searching mind. He had been brought up in the thick of the atmosphere described by Claudel, and had been completely ignorant of other alternatives of thought. As a consequence he had used his talents in the service of the materialistic schools of the day. But finally, as was to be the case with Lippmann, he could not be satisfied with their monism.

Brunetière had come to realize, as the dualistic humanists have done in this country, the difference between science, which limits itself to the objective study of the physical, and scientism which denies traditional metaphysics only to set up a metaphysics of its own. But further, he slowly became convinced, through his attempt to solve the question of social morality, that there was no possible solution to this question save on theistic terms.

This is exactly what Lippmann did between 1929 and 1937, the more strikingly that in 1929 he was still a monist. By 1937 Lippmann had not only repudiated his monism but he had gone further than



Babbitt in reasserting the dualism of ultimate reality. He had definitely expressed this dualism in terms of the human person and of a personal God.

This is why the last chapter of *The Good Society* is a landmark in the development of the American humanist movement. Those whom Lippmann had proudly called "the modern" because they had dethroned God in favor of the whirl, he now calls "the lost generation." They are a lost generation because there is no longer any consensus of accepted ideas among civilized men, and there is no such consensus because only an antecedent God can save reality from being a meaningless vortex. It was only slowly, Lippmann tells us, that he began to realize that. No wonder, since to do so he had to swim against the currents of the day on which he had so willingly floated.

In studying the history of political freedom, which is the theme of *The Good Society*, he had noted that the men who had perfected doctrines of freedom held that some truths were self-evident, while he had been taught by men who said that there were no such truths. Here Mr. Lippmann, with an intellectual honesty equal to that of Mr. Hutchins, confesses his previous ignorance. He tells us that he began to fumble around in his own prejudices and unexamined notions to study the contending social philosophies and that he began to perceive new facts first vaguely and then clearly. What he came to see clearly was that the history of political freedom was the gradual substitution of the common law, the definition and adjudication of personal rights and duties, in place of the arbitrary wills of men.

Finally, he tells us, "it began to dawn upon me that as the general dominion of men over men had been reduced to definite laws, fixing the reciprocal rights and duties, a new valuation of man had emerged. . . . By the reduction of the general supremacy of the master over the slave, of the despot over his subjects, of the patriarch over his wives and children, something is left over, a residual essence in each man which is not at anyone's disposal. That essence becomes autonomous. And so out of the slave who was a living person treated as a thing, there emerges a person who is no longer a thing." Thus Lippmann recovered the idea of the human person.

The genesis he gives us of that idea should be challenged, as it was the idea of the human person fitfully glimpsed by pagan pre-Christian sages, but clearly formulated by the Christian philoso-

phers, which led to the development of a common law and not vice versa. The all-important point, however, is that the reality of the human person, denied by the monistic naturalists who merge man in nature, with whom Lippmann sided in his *Preface to Morals*, has now become for him fully significant.

It is therefore a testimonial to a complete conversion for him to exclaim: "I submit that here the ultimate question is joined. Shall we be treated as inviolable persons or as things to be disposed of? It is here that the struggle between barbarism and civilization, between despotism and liberty, has always been fought. Here it must still be fought. The self-evident truth which makes men invincible is that inalienably they are inviolable persons. On that conception hinges the golden rule: All things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do you also to them."

In fact, Lippmann now shows that he understands that the notion of the human person did not, after all, issue from the development of the common law. For he finds the golden rule which he now calls "the ultimate criterion of human conduct" expressed in the *Upanishads* of Indian Brahmanism: "Let no man do to another that which would be repugnant to himself"; in Buddha: "To him in whom love dwells, the whole world is but one family"; in Confucius: "What you do not want done to yourself, do not do unto others"; while the Stoics taught that all men "are equal in nature."

Does this mean that Christianity is not to be credited with having promulgated the golden rule and the idea of the human person? No, it merely proves that the natural law concerning the relations of man to man, whereof the golden rule is the epitome, lies within the reach of human reason, at least when it is not blinded by passion.

Suddenly, and dramatically, Lippmann recognizes this. While "the Stoics spoke quietly and in terms intelligible only to an elite, it was the Christian gospel which proclaimed to the masses of the Western World the news that all men are more than things." Logically pressing beyond, Lippmann then pronounces the final word which Babbitt always stopped short of using: "In the recognition that there is in each man a final essence — that is to say an immortal soul — which only *God* can judge, a limit was set upon the dominance of men over men . . . the pretensions of despots became heretical . . . the inviolability of the human person was declared."

Lippmann is no longer the monistic naturalist which Babbitt accused him of being. He is now a theistic humanist which Babbitt never openly got to be.

Whereupon Lippmann proceeds to disown those whose work he had taken to be decisive in the dissolution of the ancestral order. Those men may have been well intentioned, but "they brought down the humanistic ideal in the crash of the supernatural order. . . ." Their mere physical and chemical system, their bundles of conditioned reflexes left no place for God and the soul, and at the same time left no place for the moral law and the human ideals of justice, liberty, equality, and fraternity. For the Hegelians, the Marxians, the pseudo-Darwinians, the Spenglerians, men were no longer inviolable essences, human persons, but emanations of the absolute, pawns moved around by the dialectic of history, animals struggling for survival, cells in a superorganism, incapable of having authentic purposes, inalienable rights, or binding obligations, so that when they spoke of such they were but rationalizing their own desires according to circumstances.

So, concludes Lippmann, "all the landmarks of judgment were gone and there remained only an aimless and turbulent moral relativity." This is precisely what Babbitt had told him in his review of *A Preface to Morals*.

But Lippmann in the middle thirties had other reasons for repudiating the nineteenth century philosophies which he had accepted so readily only seven years before. For those philosophies had now come to their full natural fruition: "Marx and Hegel, Nietzsche and Alfred Rosenberg, Lenin, Stalin, Mussolini, and Hitler reached agreement on a common ground: that the conscience of freemen was incompatible with their purposes." The moral relativity which Lippmann had so long been content with, he now saw could lead to tyrannies accepted by the masses, because such tyrannies could be presented as means for the attainment of class or national desires.

At the same time Lippmann realized that tyrant regimes must be totalitarian especially so as to exclude religious liberty, because between Church and State "the underlying issue has always been whether religious experience should be subservient to or should be allowed to correct secular purposes," so that "it must always be the ambition of the despot to destroy religion if he cannot exploit it as an instrument of his power." Conversely, "it is no accident that

the only open challenge to the totalitarian state has come from men of deep religious faith," because "religion cultivates respect for men as men, and against that respect the totalitarian state cannot long prevail."

So Lippmann not only disowned monistic naturalism for a clear-cut theistic humanism, asserting that man is unique in nature because he has a God-given immortal soul; but he brought out most forcibly that such a humanism is essential for the maintenance of a true liberalism, because true liberalism can be grounded only "on the rock" of the conviction that because men are persons they are inviolable and cannot be treated as things.

Furthermore, he gave us his own testimony, the more valuable that it is the testimony of a convert from naturalism, that humanism must remain linked with traditional religion because historically it is Christianity which made known to the Western World the objective truth that all men are more than things, and it is Christian men who, in spite of the differences that came to separate them, continued to assert in the face of persecutions, that "the pretensions of despots were heretical."

In the light of Walter Lippmann's evolution of thought all dualistic humanists should be able to see that their recognition of the permanent as opposed to the impermanent, their sense of being as opposed to becoming, must finally be expressed in terms of a personal God whose essence is the ultimate criterion of all truths. All that exists can be understandable only in terms of that essence.

The moment we realize this, we may see why truths of the physical order and truths of the ideal order are necessarily to be distinguished; why there must be metaphysics as well as physics; and why, in fact, metaphysical truth conditions physical truth.

Physical truths are what God willed the order of the universe to be. Metaphysical truths are aspects of essences and of essential relations. God might have created a different world with different elements and combinations of elements. But He could not have created a world in which a circle could be square, a being be other than its own given nature, or a being could be two beings of different natures at the same time.

To discover physical truths, therefore, is to discover aspects of God's physical order; and, as that order was freely willed, it is not immediately evident; it can be ascertained only by experimentation.



But metaphysical truths are above experimentation. They are immediately evident to the intelligence of men of good will so soon as they understand their terms, because human intelligence is akin to the divine, and can, provided it does not willfully turn from the divine, immediately understand some of the eternal aspects of God's essential order, for instance, the necessary corollaries of being: All beings, because they are beings, are true in so far as they conform to their essence, and good in so far as they conform to the end of their essence; so that the goodness of a being is not a matter of subjective estimate, or of a changing relativity.

So long as Mr. Lippmann dealt with human facts unrelated to the essence of man, unique in the physical world, he could only flounder about in experimentation, and call that good or mature choice which he found to give fairly satisfactory results from some subjective point of view. He thus remained within the necessary limitations of pragmatism: the assignment of value in terms of personal satisfaction. But the criminal can say that it is to his advantage to kill the policeman, and the despot can say that it is to his advantage to make tools of his subjects. And as circumstances and human moods change, so must pragmatic morality. From that point of view, Mr. Lippmann could say that even desires are not objective qualities the same in all persons, nor in the one person at all times, and that objects of desire are not purely objects but depend upon the changing subjects.

But as soon as Mr. Lippmann saw that man must believe in a personal God, the source of an eternal righteousness, or remain immersed in the chaos of conflicting and arbitrary desires, he caught the vision no longer merely of his own mature conception of order, but of God's moral order, of the objective moral order based on God's essence, and of the relation of man to that essence because of his God-given unique nature.

Then only could Walter Lippmann see that the arbitrary decrees of the despot were tyrannical, because, even if their consequences satisfied him and his group, they were in contradiction with man's inalienable rights and with his freedom from changing circumstance, flowing from his unique capacity to understand the aspects of God's order which constitute the eternal natural and divine laws.

As we now understand that we must so interpret the humanist's sense of the permanent, we are ready to study what a sound humanism should be.

# 5

## THEISTIC INTEGRAL HUMANISM

A SOUND humanism should first clearly assert, as Lippmann re-discovered, that man is unique in nature because he is both spirit and matter. This means that each and every individual is a human person, because he has an individual immortal soul, simple and spiritual, in relation with a personal God who is antecedent to the universe.

Man is shown to have a simple spiritual principle in him, an unextended immaterial principle, because he is capable of conceiving ideas or universals, as opposed to perceiving objects; because he can deal with the abstract as well as with the concrete.

A concrete particular object reflects light and can affect a physical organ, sensitive to light waves. The impression of those light waves can be retained in material tissues because they spring from the material. But an idea, an abstraction, is something essentially different. The eye cannot record patriotism or even what a common noun stands for. A Roman lamp, an electric lamp, a gas lamp, a bicycle lamp, a street lamp, each individually can set up a neural reaction, but the common noun *lamp* cannot. It stands for an idea, for the essence common to all objects called lamp, and that essence can be more or less defined: a man-made object capable of giving light. Such a definition is a universal idea applicable to all particular lamps, no matter by how many accidental qualities they may differ.

Man, therefore, has the capacity to isolate and distinguish from the accidental qualities of particular objects those qualities which are common to all of the same kind, and which reveal their essence. This capacity is what we rightly call the intellect (*intus* or *inter legere*). And because one of its capacities is thus to deal with the nonmaterial, our *anima* or animating principle, which in English we call soul, must be nonmaterial, or spiritual.

Because we can conceive universals, we can pass judgment; that is,

we can see that particular objects have this or that accidental or essential quality, or belong to this or that kind of objects. We can also conceive more inclusive universals, goodness, truth, beauty; and judge that a particular thing is good or true or beautiful, or that it possesses all those qualities.

Because we can pass judgments, we can reason; that is, we can pass from one judgment to another with the help of a third: Is this shelf for this book? we ask, and the answer comes back: This shelf is for French books. This book is a French book. This shelf is for this book. Likewise, we can formulate moral judgments, judgments in the domain of human behavior. We can thus offer rational motives to the will, thus proving that the will can be freed from the determinism of particular appetites, or the lure of particular objects: Is this glass of liquor bad for me? For a rational being to lose the use of reason, as in intoxication, is bad. This glass means intoxication for me. Therefore, this glass is bad for me.

So the whole question of humanism, of the uniqueness of human nature, hinges primarily on the difference between perceptions and ideas, between particulars and universals. Animals live in the domain of the particular because their senses are their only means of knowledge. They may have knowledge of particular things, remember them as such, together with the pleasing or displeasing sensations they produce, and hence they may gain by their experience. But that is all. Animals do not act on principles. Man alone can live in terms of universals, classification, judgments, rational choices. He alone can elaborate sciences, including the science of a human behavior that may secure him a measure of happiness.

There is an important corollary to this. Whereas the animal largely inherits the habits which will insure a behavior according to his nature, man inherits very few physical ones, and no intellectual or moral ones. Man has to attend to his own education as man. He must not only use his intelligence to find out what he should do, but he must school himself to do it. He must develop good intellectual and moral habits. In fact, if he does not, he will fall below the animal level. Man alone can become a pervert.

This is the essence of classical humanism from Socrates to Cicero. Hence the very special value of Cicero's sentence already quoted. Restated it might read: Into our consciousness come, on the one hand, the appetites of the senses for particulars making men oscillate between extremes, as Aristotle indicated, and on the other the uni-

versal principles worked out by the reason. It is the duty of man, as a rational being, to bring order into his life by controlling appetite in the light of reason.

Once we have proved that there is necessarily a spiritual element in us, because we can have ideas as opposed to mere sensations, we have established that there are two kinds of reality, a spiritual as well as a material. To wonder whence this spiritual element may come merges with the more general question: How did man and how did the universe in which man lives come to be?

There are two possible answers. One is that of the naturalists which the American atheistic monistic humanists of the Dewey school, the humanitarian naturalists, would have us accept: the universe is self-existing. The other is the answer of the dualistic humanist: the universe has a cause outside itself.

We may well accept the admission of the monist that there is a self-existing being, a being that must have always existed, that needs no other for its existence; for, if there were not, we should have to push our question to infinity and leave it there unanswered. There is a self-existing being. The all-important point is that this self-existing being cannot be the universe as the naturalists say.

Why not? One reason is that the universe, together with every being in it, is constantly changing. The fact of change is the fundamental fact in all investigation of the ultimate nature of reality.

For a being to be capable of change, it must first exist, it must have actuality. But it must have something else, it must have within it the capacity to develop, to become something more. Thus the seed has the capacity to become a specific plant or tree. When it has exhausted its potentialities, which means when it has completed its cycle of possible development, it dies.

Furthermore, and this is the final all-important point: to change, to develop its potentialities, it must be affected by a being outside of itself. This is not a logical deduction, as would be the legitimate reasoning that it needs another being to explain its actuality and potentialities. It is a matter of experience. When there is a change in a being, it is not merely because that being was capable of change, but because that being was affected by at least another.

Thus to germinate, the seed needs the heat of the sun. To develop into a plant, it needs chemical elements from the air and the soil. Animals including man, besides capacities for physical growth which



necessitate other beings, have sensitive potentialities; but if no objects acted on the senses their powers of recording would not be actualized. Likewise, in man, the intellect's power of conceiving ideas could not come into act, if it was not presented, according to its own nature, with the product of the perceptions of the senses. In fact, if a potentiality did not need to be acted on by another being to come into act, there is no reason why it should remain a potentiality.

Therefore, the universe, because it is a universe of changing beings, is a universe of contingent beings; that is, beings that need at least another to change, not to speak of needing another for their existence. A changing being is therefore not a self-sufficient being, and not being self-sufficient, it cannot be self-existing. A tree, an animal, even a chemical compound cannot be self-existing; nor even chemical elements, as we now know, since they are complex structures susceptible of change when affected by certain relations to other beings. The conclusion then must be: the universe cannot be self-existing because it is made up of changing beings, and changing beings cannot be self-existing because they are not self-sufficient.

So we must return to the other alternative: the universe has a cause outside of itself, and that cause must be self-existing because it is self-sufficient. A self-sufficient Being is the cause of the universe. That self-sufficient being we call God.

By analyzing the idea of self-sufficiency, we can arrive at an idea of the attributes of God. Self-sufficiency truly implies self-existence because a self-sufficient being needs no other for its existence. It implies infinity, or absence of limitations, an absolute plenitude of being, pure actuality, absence of further potentialities, infinite perfection including infinite power; unchangeableness or immutability, since change implies undeveloped potencies and dependence on other beings; oneness, since there cannot be two infinite beings; eternity since time is the measure of change; omnipresence, since existence in a given space implies limitation of being; simplicity or absence of composition, since in a composition neither term is self-sufficient; spirituality, because matter changes and it is not self-sufficient.

Therefore, the only adequate statement that can be made about the Absolute Being is: *He who is*. His essence is to be, and implies His pure actuality, His infinity, His unicity, His immutability,

His simplicity, His omnipresence, His eternity. This absolute being we call God.

We then have a changeable material universe and an unchangeable spiritual God. Nor can an unchangeable spiritual God be a part of the substance of a changeable material world, nor a changeable material world be of the substance of an unchangeable spiritual God, as pantheism would have it, since the two are contradictories.

When Spinoza defined substance: "that which can be conceived of without our having to conceive anything else" (*Ethics*, Part 1, Def. 3), he really defined the Absolute Being, God, a self-sufficient and self-existing being, whose perfection is limited by no potentiality, and who, therefore, cannot change. Because he thus identified substance and God, he gave us a pantheism; but to include in that one unchanging substance the universe which is constantly changing was to fall into contradiction. Spinoza's one substance is the Absolute Being and cannot become anything else.

On the other hand, when Hegel considers the Absolute a becoming, a process which produces itself eternally, and hence the very opposite of a being which is pure actuality, he cannot be said to have an absolute being to start with.

In short, the absolute, eternally abiding, purely actual, and the relative, contingent, changing cannot possibly be one and the same being. They necessarily constitute two distinct orders of reality. There are necessarily two orders of existence. Ultimate reality in the universe postulates a dualism. There must be a self-sufficient God, distinct from, and antecedent to, the self-insufficient beings which constitute the universe.

How did God make the universe come into being? By creating it. Creation is often defined: to make out of nothing, but it really means to make something to be where there was nothing before, without the help of any being. To create is the kind of making that is possible only to a being completely independent of other beings.

We may say: "I cannot believe that." The answer is: If you cannot accept this view which is logical, you will have to believe some alternative which is not. You will have to believe that the universe is self-existing and self-sufficient, which, as we saw, it cannot be, since it is made up of changing beings; or that the universe made itself which it could not do, since, if it had existed it would not have needed to, and if it had not existed, it could not have acted; or that the universe has no cause, and you are altogether incapable of

thinking of anything as existing which was not preceded by a cause, except a self-existing, self-sufficient being. The only alternative left is to deny that the universe exists, or that the universe is made up of changing beings; this you cannot do without denying all experience. You must admit, therefore, that the existence of God, Creator of the universe, is the only rational alternative of thought.

So there is God the Creator and the universe He created, and in that universe there is man, endowed with intelligence, capable of conceiving ideas, of getting notions of the God-given essences of things through their consequent properties and behavior. Because man can do this, he can learn to manipulate created objects, can imagine and make new ones, and can, at least to a certain extent, learn to control the forces of nature.

This is why there is no conflict between genuine science and humanism. The physical scientist studies the order of the universe. He discovers what it is, antecedently to his research. It is not what the scientist may come to think about the nature of things that matters. It is what he ought to think according to the objective reality before him: God's order.

The same, evidently, must hold true for man's nature. Man has a specific nature, and it must be studied objectively if there is to be any knowledge of what the behavior of man should be in relation to all beings, including himself. In these questions of human behavior it is likewise not what we may think that matters, but what we ought to think. Man, too, should live in God's order.

Here we come again to the central problem of humanism, which Irving Babbitt saw so well. Does classical humanism give us a correct conception of man when it tells us with Cicero that "reason instructs and makes clear what is to be done or avoided; thus it follows that reason fittingly commands and appetite obeys"? To a certain extent that is true, and that is why classical humanism may be opposed to the monists and utilized; but the great point is that, as Babbitt stressed, it is only partly true.

It is true, as experience reveals, that man is very different from the rest of creation, for he can conceive universal principles, and hence something of the moral as well as of the physical laws which make up God's order. When, in his *Preface to Morals*, Lippmann says that Moses brought down from Sinai the insights of the moral

conscience which he took there, he may be partly right. Sinai but confirmed the essential elementary moral law which man could work out; or, at least, could readily recognize by reason. The ten commandments are but an elementary expression of the law of justice which is sometimes referred to as the voice of conscience, or as inscribed by God in the hearts of men: justice to God, justice to our neighbor.

This is but another way of saying that we, like all other creatures, should live in God's order according to our own nature: should render to God the homage and express the gratitude an intelligent creature owes to God; should refrain from rendering more homage to creatures than to Him, and from using them against their nature and their plan in God's order; should show honor and gratitude to those to whom after God we owe the most; should refrain from taking from our neighbor his life, his property, his character, and from breaking up his family. This law of justice was included by Christ in His two commandments that embrace the whole Law and the Prophets: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole mind — and the second is like to this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" (Matt. 22:37-39). The second part of it as Lippmann reminded us, is expressed in the golden rule even outside the Hebraic tradition or derived from it.

But if this elementary moral law is conceivable by the mind of man so that Sinai was but a corroboration and solemn proclamation of what men might already know, experience also teaches us that, however elementary and obvious that code may be to a reasonable man not blinded by passion, man, nevertheless, has great difficulty in living up to it, so that classical humanism was altogether too optimistic.

The explanation of this difficulty is usually associated in Christian teaching with the doctrine of "the fall." However, the doctrine of "the fall" must be carefully distinguished from the present discussion of what is a theistic integral humanism, because humanism is the "ism" about human nature as such; while "the fall," as recorded in the Bible, is a fall from the supernatural state to which, we are told, man was raised by God when He created him. The study of this supernaturalizing of human nature should evidently be called Supernaturalized Humanism, and must receive separate considera-



tion. It is a matter of dogmatic theology which is the study of Revelation, and is beyond the province of the purely rational study of man which is humanism.

Returning, then, through observation and induction, to this purely philosophical study of man as a rational animal, we may now note what is really the key to our understanding of the real difficulty in the problem of human conduct.

The difficulty which man experiences in living up to the natural law of justice to God, to himself, and to his neighbor is not to be exclusively attributed to "the fall" as studied in dogmatic theology. "The fall" was a fall from the state of supernatural grace; it was not a fall from man's nature to a lower nature. Though it weakened man, "the fall" did not change man's nature because, as St. Thomas says, natures cannot change. Man remained a rational animal. He could still reason his way to universal principles of conduct. He could still choose to act in the light of those principles.

But, and here is the all-important point in the discussion of humanism: Rationality cannot really be depended on to secure right conduct because the presentation of abstract principles by reason is weak compared to the pull of the sensual appetites, and to the appeal of concrete objects to those appetites, especially as these can be greatly magnified by the imagination. So a rational animal, as such, is really incapable of consistent moral conduct. He is not ethically a going concern.

St. Thomas recognized this. In the course of his discussion as to when man was raised to the supernatural order, he writes, following St. Augustine: "Stripped of grace, the obedience of the flesh to the spirit was dissolved, because it was only through the grace present in the soul that the flesh was obedient to the spirit." So St. Thomas accounted for Adam's original state of righteousness by the presence of supernatural grace.

Theologians who discuss philosophically what man would have been if had been left in the natural order, share this point of view. They state that, if man had not been raised to the supernatural order, God, in His justice, would have given him some help to overcome the difficulty a rational animal naturally experiences in trying to act according to the abstract principles of reason.

Here, then, is the real key to the problem of humanism: the possibility for man of righteous behavior, and hence of attaining

happiness. When, in psychology we have established the power to conceive ideas as opposed to the conditioning of the materialists, and the freedom of the will as opposed to their determinism, then we have as yet only begun to explain what must go on in the soul of man that he may conform his life to the natural law. A rational animal simply cannot be steadfastly righteous without the help of God and without utilizing that help. Even in the purely natural order life would have to be a co-operation with God.

The conclusion, then, must be that, though rationality constitutes the distinctly human, it is not enough to make humanism integral. Man needs more than rationality to be integral, to have all that he needs to lead an ordered life. Theistic Integral Humanism may therefore be defined: the recognition that man was created by God a rational animal, but that even a rational animal must constantly be prepared to co-operate with a needed help from God to be consistently ethical.

This all-important truth proves that man, even if he had lived in the natural order, should have been religious, that the recognition of God and of the need of God's help, does not merely pertain to the supernatural order in which man lives now, but that it would have been indispensable for happiness through right conduct even in the purely natural order.

This element of God's help, constantly necessary to man to insure the mastery of animality by rationality, constitutes therefore a third element as a factor in man's conduct that must be clearly taken into account for a right understanding of integral humanism. The need of help from God to strengthen rationality, faced by the excitement of the sensual appetites, is a logical induction. As St. Thomas says, it is not natural that the sensual appetites be submissive to reason.

But, moreover, it can be reasoned that, as God is the Creator, creation is God's and no act in creation should be independent of God. Animal acts call for no special help aside from their nature because the animal follows his God-given instincts. All creatures except man are permanently true and good according to their kind. Man is not, because he is a free being. But even as a free being, even in his free acts, he should not be independent of God. Indeed, if it were true, as Cicero says, "that reason fittingly com-

mands and appetite obeys," he would be. He could as it were, strut about creation in self-righteousness, as the Stoics tried to do.

The relation of creature to Creator must evidently be otherwise. There must in every aspect of every act of every creature be a dependence on God. So even man's rational life, even the free acts of man, must need the help of God. Only God can be self-sufficient in all His acts and aspects of His acts. Even the rationality of man cannot be self-sufficient. So man needs humility. The fundamental sin is the sin of pride, the sin of self-sufficiency, the thought that we can be righteous without the help of God, the failure to ask for that help, the failure to use that help, the refusal of that help, the turning away from God.

Theistic Integral Humanism is then purely a philosophical doctrine. The Christian may well say that, as such, it does not deal with man as he really is; since according to Christian Revelation man was raised to the supernatural order, and when fallen from grace was redeemed by the cross; since he needs sanctifying grace to reach his final end; and since, even when he has sanctifying grace, he constantly needs actual graces; so much so that even men not in the state of sanctifying grace receive them. The answer is that no purely philosophical doctrine can deal with the supernatural; so that even scholastic philosophy does not so long as it remains pure philosophy and does not pass into dogmatic theology.

On the other hand it can be said in favor of Theistic Integral Humanism that it includes all that Aristotle, St. Thomas, and the scholastics in general, teach about ultimate reality and about man aside from the supernatural order: the dualism of percept-concept, particular and universal, senses and imagination-intellect, animal body and rational soul, potentiality and actuality, changing and abiding, contingent being and necessary being, creatures and God.

But, moreover, it emphasizes one fact about the natural man which scholastic philosophy seldom brings out, since it limits its psychology to the study of man as a rational animal. It further stresses the all-important fact that, if we are to have a complete view of even natural psychology, natural ethics, and natural religion, if we are to have a truly integral humanism, we must not only accept God the Creator, and man distinct in creation through his rationality, but we must also become fully conscious of the need of the help of God to secure even natural happiness.

And because it thus fully stresses our dependence on God,

Theistic Integral Humanism points only the more surely from the natural to the supernatural. For if to live in God's order is the natural end of man, and if we cannot live in that order without the help of God; if our rationality is not fully competent to insure even our natural righteousness, it is even more evident that we cannot hope to know God more intimately without a special enlightenment of our intellects and wills.

Once it is understood that humanism must be Theistic and that Theistic Humanism implies a constant co-operation on the part of man with God's help, all the questions raised in our analysis of the thought of Hutchins, Lippmann, and Babbitt fall into place, and receive an answer. We may perhaps more profitably re-examine, in the light of Theistic Integral Humanism, first the evolution of Lippmann and the Hutchins-Gideonse controversy, because they represent the more recent head-on collisions between naturalists and humanists. It will enable us to test Theistic Integral Humanism as a criterion of criticism.

In his *Preface to Morals*, Lippmann was still a monistic naturalist. So the highest morality he could hold up to us was the mature preference for what we ought to want in the light of experience and reason. His morality remained relative and pragmatic, and he retained the Stoic pride. On the contrary, in his *The Good Society*, he showed that he had become a dualist, an avowed believer in the immortal soul of man which made him a human person, and in God the Creator.

Lippmann did not fully work out a moral system on that basis, but at least he recognized that the conviction that men were persons came from the dualist tradition, and had been proclaimed to the world by Christianity, so that we had come to our present pass of being threatened by dictators, who treated men as things, because the belief in an antecedent God had been lost. Mr. Lippmann then evidently became a Theistic humanist. There is no evidence, however, that he as yet appreciates all that Theistic Humanism must include to be integral.

Mr. Hutchins has not avowed his Theism as clearly as Lippmann, but he has written: "Either metaphysics or theology must be called upon to order the thought of modern times. If we cannot appeal to theology, we must turn to metaphysics." It is clear that he has in mind the metaphysics of Aristotle. This means the metaphysics of



an antecedently absolute as opposed to the philosophy of total change. What gives Hutchins his importance is that, at the very center of the American educational world, he challenges the naturalists to abandon the pragmatic doctrine that the true and the good are what succeeds in imposing itself in the course of the evolution of a constantly changing social scene; and its consequent claim that the end of education should be to adapt itself to a totally changing world, even to changing moral practices.

As opposed to this ultimately monistic point of view, Hutchins recovered the dualistic conception that, though it is true we are living in a changing world, it is not true that it is totally changing or that we are wholly, necessarily, and irrevocably ever immersed in its flux. There is constant change, but there are abiding elements within the change, due to abiding elements above that change; for instance, the nature of man.

So the lawyer should not allow himself to remain wholly immersed in the flood of court decisions, nor should court decisions forever and arbitrarily change. Above, and antecedent to court decisions, there is an abiding natural law, a law of justice, according to which court decisions should be made; and, no matter how much social conditions may change, as a result of growth and displacements of social groups or of inventions and consequent abandonment of tools, that law of justice, superior to the flux of changing circumstance, should have been, be, and remain the guide, not only in court decisions, but in the general behavior of all citizens.

Accidental differences of race or color may differentiate them, but they all have inalienable rights, and consequent duties to God and their fellow men because of their common nature; and the courts should have seen and should see forevermore that those rights are respected.

The lawyer, therefore, needs to know more than what courts have decided because they may have decided arbitrarily, according to the prejudices of the hour. He needs to know the metaphysics back of the doctrine of the human person.

But such a metaphysics logically leads to the assertion of God, Creator of the universe, who gave man such a nature that he truly endowed all men, whatever their race or color, with inalienable rights.

This, Mr. Hutchins maintains, and so his position is really that

of Theistic Humanism, though, as in the case of Mr. Lippmann, there is no proof that he has come to realize the logical need of the help of God that we may co-operate with Him in the maintenance of His order of which the natural law is but a part.

The reference to the solemn statement in the American Declaration of Independence that God, the Creator, endowed men with inalienable rights, brings up an additional testimony to the importance of a clear reassertion of Theistic Humanism, for there is no doubt whatsoever that Theistic Humanism and even Theistic Integral Humanism, as we have defined it, was the doctrine of the Founding Fathers. Several of them had begun to turn away from the churches, impatient with their differences, and disturbed by the hard Calvinistic doctrine of predestination; but they had remained firm believers in Theism, encouraged in this by English and French Deism, and also by their knowledge of the scholastic tradition which came to them through the Puritans — John Harvard, for instance, owned the *Summa* of St. Thomas.

There were also the books on the controversies about sovereignty, such as Filmer's *Patriarcha*, owned by Thomas Jefferson, which reproduced Bellarmine's restatement of the view held as probable by the scholastic doctrine that sovereignty was bestowed by God through the people. If you unite Jefferson's statement that "men were endowed by their Creator with unalienable rights" to the prayer of Washington: "May God spread His holy protection over these United States," you have implied the complete formula of Theistic Integral Humanism.

Walter Lippmann also realized this. On the occasion of the celebration of the anniversary of the Bill of Rights in 1939, he wrote: "The Bill of Rights does not come from the people and is not subject to change by majorities. It comes from the nature of things. It declares the inalienable rights of man, not only against all governments but also against the people collectively. . . . As Jefferson and Franklin were fond of saying: 'Rebellion to tyrants is obedience to God.' For them the rights of man came from his Creator. In their view the framework of government and the form of the social order were the things of Caesar; but the rights of man were not Caesar's but the things of God."

This is precisely what Theistic Integral Humanism asserts, and what cannot be maintained on the basis of the monistic philosophy of total becoming. Lippmann shows further how thoroughly he

understands this: The conviction that the human person was sacred became irresistible "by means of a progressive revelation which began in the Mediterranean world. On this revelation of man our civilization is founded . . . this revelation is the argument of the perennial philosophy . . . it is the major premise of the laws and institutions of the civilized world. Without a comprehension of this truth about the nature of man, nothing that we value is comprehensible. . . . No one can prove the value of liberty by drawing up a balance sheet of profits and losses. If men do not understand that the origin of their liberties is in the nature of man, they will not really understand their liberties." Thus Lippmann testifies that our continued hold on the Bill of Rights depends on the understanding of the nature of man which Theistic Humanism gives us.

This may well bring us back to Dr. Gideonse's criticism of Hutchins. Dr. Gideonse tells us that President Hutchins' proposed reorientation of college studies is "conceived and born in authoritarianism and absolutism, twin enemies of democratic society . . . while the true scholar finds his unifying principles in the humanistic spirit and in the methods of science. It is not so much the tentative truths that he discovers, as the developing methods for discovering and analyzing truths that unite him with his associates into a community of scholars and scientists."

Here we may see how the quality of our democracy depends upon the quality of our humanism. What Gideonse calls humanistic is the philosophy of total change; what Hutchins calls humanistic is the philosophy of the abiding above and in the changing. For Gideonse there is no abiding truth but only tentative truths which are, as he adds, "multiple, fractional, and evolving." For Hutchins, as for Lippmann, there are the things of Caesar, of changing time, and there are the things of God, eternally true. For Gideonse democracy means the possibility of passing laws to meet ever new situations according to the interests of the changing time and place. For Hutchins, as for Lippmann, democracy means the possibility of passing such laws, but also the impossibility of passing laws against the abiding principles of justice established in the light of the abiding nature of man in relation with an abiding God.

There must then be authoritarianism and absolutism in so far as the abiding element is concerned, for instance, about the abiding truth that the human person is sacred. But this authoritarianism and absolutism are not the twin enemies of a free and democratic

society. On the contrary they are its only possible guarantee; for a democratic society is possible only, as Lippmann came to see, after we have recognized that all men are by nature, and hence have always been and always will be, human persons. There can be nothing "fractional" or "evolving" about that truth.

The Bill of Rights cannot be defended on the premises of Gideonse's philosophy of total change. It can only be defended on the premises of Theistic Humanism. This fact alone should throw much light on the comparative value of the two contradictory philosophies now standing in stark opposition to each other in American thought, thanks to the development of the American dualistic humanist movement.

We are now ready to return to Irving Babbitt and to the questions which he raised, which Paul Elmer More took up, and which we left unanswered, as to the relations between the subhuman, the human, the superhuman, and the supernatural.

If Hutchins and Lippmann did not reach the question of the need of a third element to make Theistic Humanism integral, Babbitt did. In fact, by his fundamental reassertion of an ethical will as a power of control clearly higher than the natural reason and will, he challenged us to re-examine not only the problem of an integral humanism but our religious beliefs. By condemning the rationalistic pride of the Stoics and of classical humanism in general he sided with traditional Christianity whose special message was the need of a third element, higher than the natural reason and will: supernatural grace through Jesus Christ.

The question then arose: Was Babbitt's higher will supernatural grace, was it its equivalent, and, if not, just what was it? Babbitt thus made it imperative for us to become more definitely conscious of what is to be understood by the supernatural.

There can be much imprecision of impression as to what is meant by the supernatural order. It might, for instance, be believed that, so soon as we speak of God, we speak of the supernatural. In one sense we do, since God is distinct from the universe. But that is not what is meant by the supernatural order in Christian discussion. God the Creator, and man the creature, unique in the universe, have natural relations, that is relations according to the rational nature of man. Man can reason his way to the existence of God and to an idea of His attributes. He can also know of His power



through the study of creatures. He can even reason that he needs God's help to lead a righteous life in this world and secure a relative happiness. This is precisely what constitutes Theistic Integral Humanism. But this is not the supernatural order.

By the supernatural order is meant that this natural man, endowed with intelligence, was raised to an order above his nature. This cannot be known by reason; it can be known only by a revelation from God. It is not a matter of philosophy, of natural religion, or of natural ethics. It is a matter of dogmatic theology, the field of which is the interpretation of Revelation.

Essentially it implies that man was not only created a rational animal, but that he was endowed with supernatural grace. It is this which gives him a higher life than the purely rational, which makes him participate in the divine life, which enables him to live in union with God in this life and, through the *lumen glorie*, "the light of glory," renders it possible for him to have the direct vision of God in the next. Evidently this is much more than Theistic Integral Humanism. As distinguished from it, it must be called Supernaturalized Humanism.

We saw that Paul Elmer More, who had elaborated with Babbitt his Buddhistic dualistic humanism, became dissatisfied with it, and a believer in Supernaturalized Humanism; and that after Babbitt's death he put on record his conviction that Babbitt's humanism did not reach the supernatural order. We are now prepared to answer More's critique more fully than we did before.

With reference to what Babbitt called the higher will More wrote: "Babbitt, so far as I can remember, never distinguished between the supernatural and the superhuman, or made clear why he accepted the one and rejected the other." According to More, Babbitt recognized merely a lower human and a higher human, so that Babbitt's superhuman remained wholly in terms of man.

There is no doubt that Babbitt discussed humanism wholly in terms of man. He did so, we saw, because he wanted to be purely experiential. To meet the naturalists on their own grounds he confined himself strictly to the analysis of the immediate data of consciousness, and for him the higher will was such a datum. So it could be truly said that his higher will, and, with it, the higher imagination, constituted the higher capacities of man; and so it could be considered as being part of the higher nature of man,

merely in the sense of the higher human as opposed to the lower human.

But to be content with noting what can be found at work in man is not to take sides as to the origin of the elements concerned. The Theistic Integral Humanist actually begins his demonstration as Babbitt does. He, too, finds experientially that the impressions, emotions, expansive desires, often magnified by his sensual imagination, constantly make him tend to excess; that they are centrifugal, dispersive, disordered. He may even note that his very reason is apt to side with them, since as a process of generalization, it can just as well generalize experience into principles of conduct based on mere desire, such as the Horatian *Carpe diem* and the Ronsardian "Pick the roses of life while you may." He may note also that the rational will readily acts upon those generalizations presented to it by the reason as the good. This is what theologians call a false conscience. The natural reason and the natural will do act within the flux of the particular, and they may remain immersed in it.

The theistic integral humanist, however, is not as pessimistic as Babbitt was as to the unaided power of reason. He does recognize, with the classical humanist, that reason is able to rise above the flux to right ethical generalizations. He feels more that it is the will that needs help to follow the dictates of reason. But, in any case, he should accept gratefully Babbitt's corroboration of his own belief that a third element must come in to help the reason to discover the ethical truth and especially to help the will to follow it.

By a comparison of Babbitt's doctrine with that of Theistic Integral Humanism, therefore, we should be able to catch the difference between the subhuman, the human, and the superhuman as he understood them, and finally the relation of the superhuman to the supernatural.

The subhuman is the biological plane, the plane of "the merely temperamental man." The human is the rational plane, the plane of the natural reason and will which distinguish man from other animals; but on which, through false reasoning, he is in danger of remaining a prey to the drives of the passions. The superhuman plane is the plane on which the human accepts a higher help. Babbitt calls it the help of a supercosmic higher will. The Theistic integral humanist recognizes it as a help from God. This means that Babbitt's humanism, though not avowedly theistic, is also

integral in the sense of recognizing the need of a superrational and therefore truly superhuman element.

That is why, even if he did not mention God, Babbitt could say that meditation on the higher will may give, with the help of the ethical imagination, religious insight above the humanistic level in regard to the mediation necessary for right conduct. As he expressed it: "The energy of soul which has served for mediation (between the extremes toward which we constantly tend) appears on the religious level in the form of meditation. Religion may, of course, mean a great deal more than meditation. At the same time humanistic mediation that has the support of meditation may correctly be said to have a religious background. Mediation and meditation are after all only different stages on the same ascending 'path' and should not be arbitrarily separated." So Babbitt did recognize a religious level above the humanistic.

Finally, we may recall Babbitt's conception of Buddhism already quoted: "The unification of life that Buddha seeks is to be achieved by the exercise of a certain quality of the will that says 'no' to the outgoing desires, with a view to the substitution of the more permanent to the less permanent among the desires, and finally to the escape from impermanence altogether."

Again, of what does this permanent consist? Babbitt answers: "Remaining within immediate experience, we can at least distinguish as one of the immediate data of consciousness, a human law, what Buddha calls *dhamma*, distinct from the laws of physical nature . . . a will that transcends the cosmic order . . . and may therefore be called supernatural." Here we have the moral law distinguished from the physical law; we have further the higher will as the manifestation of that law in us; and both are presented to us as transcending the cosmic order and identified with the permanent. Evidently, all this points in the direction of the supercosmic essence of God. Thus again Babbitt's humanism is clearly seen to be truly superhuman, that is superhuman in more than merely human terms.

We must admit, however, that this description of the superhuman permanent is not yet the supernatural in the Christian sense, since it is at most the conviction of the need of a superrational and supercosmic help to right conduct in the natural order.

But the theologians who recognize that we would need such a

help, even in the purely natural order, further assert that, since man was raised to the supernatural order, supernatural actual graces, graces given when man needs them to act ethically, replace that help. So, finally, we may see that Babbitt's third element, the higher will, would replace, at least in function, what in the supernatural order are supernatural actual graces. Babbitt, therefore, did reach vaguely the sense of the need of what the Christian calls supernatural grace.

Again and again this last point was made in *The Challenge of Humanism*. Babbitt read all those statements in the manuscript and allowed them to stand. That is why he could repeatedly assert that his humanism was not contrary to revealed religion, and that there could be co-operation between humanists and Christians.

Because Babbitt refrained from discussing his humanism in theistic terms, although privately he refused to be considered an atheist or even an agnostic, his doctrine remained hard to express, to interpret, and to apply. Restated in terms of Theistic Integral Humanism, the essence of the American dualistic discussion should gain in clarity and effectiveness and become readily usable as a critical criterion in the natural order, as we have tried to show.

Hutchins, by rediscovering that no order can be introduced in any domain save through the recognition of metaphysical principles; Lippmann, by reasserting the need of the recognition of God the Creator as essential to the safeguarding of the inalienable rights stemming from the God-given nature of man; Babbitt, by summing up the aspirations of the wisdom of the ages toward the permanent above the changing, and especially by stressing the need of a super-cosmic and therefore truly superhuman help in human action, suffice to furnish the elements of such a restatement.

This restatement, which corrects the prideful self-sufficiency of classical humanism, may be summed up as follows: The universe is a manifestation of God's order. Man, the one being in the universe capable of understanding that order, has the duty to live accordingly: to render the homage which in justice he owes to God, and to be just in his dealings with his fellows. To understand fully his duties and to fulfill them, he needs the help of God. The Mosaic law sums up the law of justice, the Lord's Prayer sums up what the relation of man to God the Creator should be. Both together express the full doctrine of Theistic Integral Humanism.



This doctrine is so logical that it may be said to be instinctive to a rational being, because to believe that there must be a First Cause, necessarily an uncaused cause, and that all creatures are dependent on their Creator, is to follow the logic of the most elementary use of reason. And the cry: "So help me God" is also natural to man.

Theistic Integral Humanism, a strictly philosophical doctrine, is essential as a prolegomenon to faith in Revelation since it is the natural man which Theistic Integral Humanism describes who, Revelation tells us, was raised to the supernatural order. You cannot study Supernaturalized Humanism before you have studied Theistic Integral Humanism. It should be equally acceptable to those who do not see their way to the acceptance of the supernatural, since the Mosaic law and the Lord's Prayer would apply in the natural order.

Moreover, the sincere theistic integral humanist is a man of good will, since he is ready to recognize his duties to God, among them the duty to pray. He is, therefore, in a favorable position for the reception of the supernatural grace of God, and should be ready to expect and welcome assistance from God.

Above all, what we should retain from this study is the central lesson of Theistic Integral Humanism which is also the central theme of the nonavowedly Theistic Humanism of Irving Babbitt. This momentous lesson which even scholastic philosophy in its rational animal psychology fails to bring out, and which consequently remains very generally ignored, is that even in the purely natural order mere rationality would leave man practically helpless ethically.

This is the most significant fact about human nature. It means that there can be no successful human life in any order without the help of God. Even if there were no supernatural order, even if man were not called to participate in the nature of God in an after-life, he would still need what Babbitt called a supercosmic permanent element, and what Theistic Integral Humanism calls the help of God, in order to be righteous.

But still more, even if there were to be no after-life, man would nonetheless need this superhuman element to be ethical and hence to be happy in this life. For, even if God had left man in a state of pure nature, man would still have had an end to attain; and because of the opposition between reason and concupiscence, man

so conditioned would have required some natural assistance — *adjutorium naturale* theologians call it — to attain that end. God would have given man this help, for otherwise, he would have made a creature unable to attain his end. Man, therefore, cannot with impunity turn from God. God's help is indispensable to us even in the natural order. Even in that order, men and societies lacking the humility necessary to recognize the necessity of this help can only know moral failure, frustration, and misery. So man cannot escape the need of genuine religion. Human life must be a constant co-operation with God.

What we should have learned so far is that without knowledge of truth beyond the physical order there can be no knowledge of the eternal truth at the core of all reality, no knowledge of the abiding which conditions the changing; that without the individual and social recognition of the need of a superhuman help, there can be no morality; and that, consequently, without an avowed Theism there can be no sound humanism or science of man.

How inevitably then must man aspire to God, and, if so, how natural it is to believe that God in His infinite goodness should have raised man to the possibility of a greater, a higher, a supernatural intimacy with Him. Theistic Integral Humanism and Babbitt's concept of humanism, though they do not reach the supernatural order as Christianity describes it, nevertheless may lead to its expectation because they reveal the imperative need of a supercosmic and hence truly superhuman element in the daily life of man.

It is fortunate that among those who came the closest to Babbitt's doctrines there is one, no less eminent in his sphere than Hutchins and Lippmann in theirs, who is a minister of an Evangelical church and has utilized humanism as a preliminary to the exposition of Christianity, as such a church understands it.

In the work of Lynn Harold Hough we may begin to study the passage from Babbitt's humanism to the domain of the supernatural to which it logically leads but which it left unexplored.

# 6

## LYNN HAROLD HOUGH: FROM THEISTIC HUMANISM TO CHRISTIAN EVANGELISM

LYNN HAROLD HOUGH was graduated from Scio (Ohio) College in 1898 and from Drew Theological Seminary in 1905. As a Methodist minister he held various pastorates in New Jersey, New York, and Maryland. In 1914 he was appointed professor of historical theology at Garrett Biblical Institute, Evanston, Illinois; he served one year as president of Northwestern University but resigned in 1920 to accept a call to the Central Methodist Episcopal Church in Detroit, Michigan, where he remained eight years.

By this time, he tells us, he "had already read pretty much everything written by Irving Babbitt, "with the more eagerness that his own early thought had tended along the same lines. He met Babbitt in 1927 after he had written an article on his work for *The London Quarterly Review*. They were to remain in touch until Babbitt's death, and it was Lynn Harold Hough who spoke the last words at the service in the Harvard Chapel.

Called to the deanship of Drew University in 1930, he soon became famous in Protestant circles as a preacher of conviction and eloquence, and received calls from Canada and Great Britain. He held pulpits in Glasgow, London, and Birmingham. But through it all he remained a teacher. In his seminar at Drew University he anticipated the St. John's experiment. A voracious reader, he, too, went to the great books, in particular to those of the Christian tradition. St. Augustine and St. Thomas became for him Christian classics for all churches, while he believed he had found in Babbitt a model for the criticism of modern thought in the light of the wisdom of the ages. He began to write about what he read, *The Shelburne Essays* of Paul Elmer More becoming for him thoroughly assimilated models. He began to spend his summers in New Hamp-

shire, not far from the cabin where More had written, and he called his own volumes, *The Forest Essays*, in remembrance of the setting at Drew. In them he told especially of his finds in the world of books in a way which showed that he had mastered the liberal arts of reading intelligently, of writing clearly and harmoniously, and had meditated on the great problems of philosophy and religion.

In Hough, then, we may study how one of the most gifted representatives of the evangelical churches was able to utilize Babbitt's humanism, and therefrom plot the way to the higher reaches that led to Christianity. For ten years, in his seminar, he went over that ground with his students, till, in 1941, after having written some twenty-eight books, and receiving nine honorary degrees, including one from a Catholic university, he summed up his findings in *The Christian Criticism of Life*. That the Western World, the highest thought of which he had so long studied, was crashing down about him in an unprecedented catastrophe, even as he wrote, could not but add to the earnestness of his appeal to his readers to pursue with him relentlessly the problem of man's nature and destiny.

Naturally he begins with the Greeks because it is in Greece that humanism was born; for it is in Greece that man came to realize fully by his unaided reason that he was distinct in nature. After that, it may be said, there were Greeks and barbarians, and those who would not become Greeks would remain barbarians. The barbarians were described as more largely following instinct and appetite. The best of the Greeks strove to conduct themselves according to standards, and they have taught us that we can do so because they showed clearly that what separates man from the animal is the possession of an intellect which, out of particular experiences, can conceive universal ideas and thus distinguish the true and the good. A particular thing is true if it conforms to the universal nature of its type. A thing is good if, being true, it reaches its end. A man is bad if he does not live according to the standards by which a man should live simply because he is a man, a being capable of passing judgments and of choosing in consequence. The working out of standards through the exercise of judgment will remain the hallmark of the distinctly human. So Hough concludes that essentially "it was the genius of the Greek to discover humanity," beings capable of governing themselves according to ideas. He even claims that in the last writings of Plato the eternal ideas



are conceived as the perpetual thoughts of a conscious deity, so that the city of man is already envisioned to be the City of God. Such was his judgment of the Greeks.

What could the Romans add to what the Greeks had done? The Romans acted more efficiently than the Greeks. After they had distinguished, like the Greeks, between appetite and reason, they used the discipline of reason to build roads that would remain the great highways of the Western World, the symbols of the development of an empire ruled in the name of law. If the Roman philosophy of nature remained inferior to the highest insights of the Greeks, it was at least an attempt to escape from the caprice of the gods into the realm of eternal law. And so through Rome "man acted as man over ever-widening areas." The picture thus presented by Dean Hough may be oversimplified, but it is undeniable that the Greeks discovered the possible reign of reason, and that the Romans made it the reign of law.

What then will Dean Hough say of the Middle Ages? Have not Protestants, as well as naturalists, consistently misrepresented that crucial period of the history of the Western World because it was Catholic? In opposition to all such, Dean Hough asserts that the Protestant churches cannot repudiate the Middle Ages because those who became Protestants were themselves out of the Middle Ages, and because it was in the Middle Ages that the synthesis was worked out between Christian and pagan thought.

Leaning heavily upon Henry Osborn Taylor's *The Medieval Mind*, he stresses what should be obvious facts: that Boethius, St. Augustine, St. Thomas, Abelard, Dante, all had minds molded in classic intellectual forms, and that their analyses and formulations of the content of the Christian Revelation were thus, through the utilization of this very revelation, a continuation of the intellectual progress made by Greece and Rome.

Even the scientific progress which was to follow the Middle Ages was due, as Whitehead pointed out, to the sense of logical structure which the scholastic thinkers borrowed from the ancient world and bequeathed to the modern. The Middle Ages may have utilized the metaphysics of Aristotle more than his physics, but the method of both depended upon the same conviction of the power of the human reason to deduce ideas from experience, and to follow through from lower to higher generalizations. No thinkers trusted the mind of man more than the philosophers of the Middle Ages.

There was then, it is true, an ascetic current which seemed to repudiate the material world and the natural life, but the modern world needed to be cleansed from the sensualism of the decadence into which, we must acknowledge, Greece and Rome had fallen. In the medieval cathedral there was no repudiation of matter but its spiritualization.

Thus Hough is ready to recognize that the Middle Ages are not, as they have been too often pictured, an era of imprisonment for the human mind from which it had to emancipate itself at the Renaissance and the Reformation; but were the period during which most powerful thinkers, with ardent and long sustained effort, used particularly the Greek inheritance to interpret the Christian message. They did not deny the power of the human intelligence. They did not assert that it had been so corrupted by moral evil that "it was unable to seize divine truth when it is presented to it." They recognized its limitations before the infinite, since it was finite, but only to proclaim that it was capable of being transfigured by divine grace. Of course this means that it is God and not man who is of first and final importance in the thought of the Middle Ages. But man's dignity is only the more assured by the recognition of the existence of a personal God as the Creator, Sustainer, and Redeemer of man. Indeed Hough is ready to admit that in the medieval intellectual achievement is to be found his own final thesis regarding humanism and theology: "The mind of man finds its fulfilment in the mind of God." So much, Hough bravely admits, must be said in fairness to the Middle Ages.

Having thus boldly re-established that the Protestant churches and modern thought cannot disown the Middle Ages, what will he do with the Renaissance and the Reformation?

As to the Renaissance, he tells us at once, we must transcend Symonds who, too often, let his emotions run away with his intelligence. We must also re-examine the claims so often made to its glorification that it turned from the supernatural to the natural, from theology to the ancient classics, from ethical other-worldliness to virile this-worldliness.

Here is the dividing line in the thought of the Western World. Ask a man what he thinks of the Renaissance versus the Middle Ages, and you will have his measure. For if other-worldliness is ethical, this-worldliness must order itself accordingly. In so far as the Renaissance opposed man to God, it was an emancipation,

if so we may call it, but an emancipation from order which was bound to issue in the slavery and decadence of disorder. In its totality, it might be added, the Renaissance was far from being wholly an emancipation, since it bound the artist to the imitation of the ancients, and since philosophically one of its main currents was a revival of stern Stoicism, not to mention Platonism.

If, however, you single out its exaltation of the powers of man, and of all possible human experience, even the unethical, then you have a twofold result. On the one hand you have its tribute to the powers of man's intelligence, which was good, but only continued the tradition of the Middle Ages. On the other hand you set up the dignity of man in opposition to the dignity of God, in so far make man his own idol, and leave him to his own lusts on the path to catastrophe.

The Renaissance may have coined the word humanist, and it is a precious word, setting off, as it does, the study of the distinctly human; but it also let loose the pseudo-humanism of man with no law above his own desires. In pursuing these, even within the Renaissance itself, man reached abnormal vice and sadistic cruelty. This he was to do over and over again, until the orgy of our own times, in proportion as he lost sight of what true humanism really is. Here Dean Hough coins a final formula: "Man under God controlling nature." Yes, man's intelligence opens to him the possibility of all the sciences and of all the arts through the manipulation of nature; but man and nature are God-created, a part of God's order, and when man applies his intelligence to the use of nature against God's order, when he ceases to control nature under God, then he must necessarily fall from the human to the sub-human. So it was the Middle Ages that were right. And yet the Renaissance in recovering more knowledge and in leading man to discipline himself to the higher forms of expression which antiquity had worked out, made possible more progress within special fields of order.

What then of the Reformation? Dean Hough rightly calls it: the Protestant Revolt. Revolt against what? Essentially against the claim of the Catholic Church that it stood between God and man. So Luther proclaimed that "every man was his own priest and prophet, every Christian an evangelist taking the message of Christianity to other men." In one way, then, the Protestant Revolt coincided with the Renaissance in that it could boast of setting

man free. The Renaissance, at least in one of its aspects, set man free from God; the Protestant Revolt set him free from the Church which claimed to be the representative of God on earth.

There was this further difference. The Renaissance set men free from God by denying the need of His grace either because it returned to the Stoics with their faith in the powers of the human will, or because it legitimized all vital instincts. The Protestant Revolt set man free from the Catholic Church by asserting that the grace which they needed came to them wholly and directly from God.

Here Dean Hough is on delicate ground. He is not afraid, however, to recognize that the Protestant Revolt was most complex, that Luther's relation to the bigamy of Philip of Hesse, his relations to the Peasants' War, and in general, the Lutheran doctrine of the relations of Church and State cannot be defended and were to taint German Protestant thought down to Hitler's day.

On the other hand, Dr. Hough recognizes fully that the pre-Reformation Catholic Church was not antihumanistic; that, at the Renaissance, it more than favored the humanist movement; and that it could do so because, if the humanist "did not always see that man finds his ultimate freedom through the grace of God," he could always rise "from the thought of a man free in his own manhood to the thought of a man whose real freedom is in God." So the upshot of Dr. Hough's chapter on the Protestant Revolt is a plea for concerted action with "the contemporaries of the Latin communion" on the part of all those "Protestants who still represent the central stream of the classical Christian thought."

For Dr. Hough admits that the characteristic of the thirteenth century was unity, that this unity had been secured by the medieval Church, and that "since the seventeenth century the world has been falling apart." What is evidently needed, now that it has wholly done so, is a return to as much unity as can be achieved through joint action in the humanistic realization of the dignity of man and in the Christian explanation of that dignity in man's origin and consequent relations with God.

Dr. Hough does not hesitate to summon the Protestant world to work out, in its own thought, an equivalent of the neo-Thomist movement. We need not ignore our differences, concludes Dr. Hough, addressing both Catholics and Protestants. But with such a great common corpus of thought as the belief in the personality of



God and of man, in the deadliness of sin and the need of grace through Christ, and in the possibility of restoring to the social organism the divine life of unselfish love bestowed for the love of God on our fellow man, the Christian churches may unite in fighting a common foe.

What then is the nature of this common foe? Dr. Hough entitles his next chapters: *The Modern World, Humanism and Science, Humanism and the Machine Age, Humanism and Social Change*. Is then the common foe the modern world, or science, or the machine, or social change? No, but the common foe is whatever in science, in machine industry, and in social change has robbed the modern world of its humanistic and Christian inheritance. Dr. Hough treats these topics far from exhaustively; but his text, nevertheless, furnishes or leads to the essential comments.

The recovery of the classics by the Renaissance issued in a great neoclassic age, the French seventeenth century. Dr. Hough hardly does justice to that age by calling it pseudo-classic or pseudo-humanistic. Here he does not distinguish enough between the scholars who thought that you could write masterpieces through rules extracted from the practice of the ancients, and the men who actually produced masterpieces: a Molière, a Racine, a La Fontaine, or a Bossuet, not to mention many others. These men were no slaves of the ancients. They utilized them according to the true humanist formula of testing the constants in human nature and the requirements of adequate expression, but their own work grew out of their own experiences and often out of their own sufferings. It is nevertheless true, as Dr. Hough stresses, that within this age there was much corruption, and that the standards it set up were too often artificial. Thus then, after Babbitt, would Hough explain the reaction to be found especially in the work of Rousseau. It was there, in reality, that the modern world began to lose its hold upon the humanistic and Christian traditions.

In his recoil from the artificially conventional, Rousseau led man back to a concept of nature freed from the control of grace and of reason. "Impulses became powers to be obeyed and not energies to be controlled. Freedom from law replaced freedom through law." Human nature came to be looked upon as essentially good, neither in need of rational control, as the Stoics had held, nor in need of the help of grace as the Christians maintained. Passionate as op-

posed to sublimated emotion was held to be the key to artistic creation.

Admirers of Rousseau can easily deny this, for Rousseau is full of contradictions. But there is no doubt as to what his disciples did with his doctrine throughout the development of romanticism. Rousseau's influence on education was no less disruptive. In so far as he encouraged starting with experience in every learning process, he did well, since this was but to recover the Aristotelian humanistic formula: the conceiving of ideas on the basis of experience. But in so far as he taught that man is naturally good, that he may trust all his impulses, that he must beware of the formation of habits and systematically mistrust tradition, he condemned his student to become what he was himself: a self-satisfaction-seeking individualist, limited by the scope of his personal experiences and socially irresponsible.

And here it may well be added that Rousseau himself, together with Hobbes, opened the way to totalitarianism when in his *Contrat Social* he dropped the medieval teaching that man had inalienable rights because of his God-given nature, and held instead that man's only original right was his natural impulse to self-assertion. This right, man renounced, Rousseau claimed, when man formed the State because he found this renunciation advantageous to himself. For, to become a political being through the formation of the State, he concluded, is to belong to the State politically and thus to have no rights against the general will, which however he supposed to be also naturally good.

By the middle of the nineteenth century other influences had been at work, materialistic determinism for one. This led Taine to assert that vice and virtue were products like sugar and vitriol, and to account for great authors by determining the racial and environmental factors playing upon them: thus making men mere puppets of matter, time, and space. There was also Hegelianism, even more dissolving, for it pictured the onward march of humanity as the gradual realization of an absolute, contradictorily conceived as a perpetual becoming. In both cases man was left the product of impersonal forces. The personal God of whom Plato had caught a glimpse, whose existence the Christian Revelation had proclaimed and medieval philosophy had established with the help of Aristotelian logic, the God whose antecedent righteousness was to be the model for the righteousness of man, and whose co-operation

was assured to man through Christ, was denied in favor of a god or rather of a goodness in the making through the achievements of nations whose right to represent the highest was proved by their victory over weaker peoples. The latter, in turn, were shown to have no rights, as they were but obstacles on the onward march of the absolute. Thus the way was paved for the Nazi dream of domination, gradually woven by Hegelian historians and pseudomystics. This was possible in proportion as the tradition of a humanism proudly asserting the autonomy of man as due to his spiritual soul had been lost. It was this tradition which had assigned to him the task of working out his own destiny because he could freely make his choice on the basis of his intellectual grasp of standards which were grounded on the reality of God's created order. Even the greater critical minds of the nineteenth century, such as Sainte-Beuve, were left to waver from doctrine to doctrine; or like Emerson, they asserted one moment that there were two distinct laws: the law for thing and the law for man, thus restating the faith of humanism, while in the very next instant compromising it, through an optimism born of pantheistic influences. Thus, too, Matthew Arnold reformulated humanism when he wrote: "Man must begin, know this, where nature ends"; but he failed to follow up with consistency the consequences of that saying.

Much more might be added to what Dr. Hough recalls. In fact the whole history of nineteenth century thought and of its consequences might here be reviewed as seen in its novels and plays. The personages of these are but puppets of circumstance. What then became of the doctrine of the dignity of man, for which the word humanism stands, is abundantly clear! It went under. It had asserted since the day of the Greeks free intelligence and the power of man to control the world of things, but the modern world spoke of a universe in which things reacted according to mathematical laws and in which man was but one of the things. God had been eliminated or merged in nature, and man had been merged in nature with Him. Humanism, the doctrine of man distinct in nature had to be recovered.

It is because Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More determinedly set to work at the recovery of the sense of the dignity of man that they mark a great date in American philosophical thought. With this Dean Hough agrees. Because so many had labored against hu-

manism as the doctrine of man distinct in nature, Babbitt and More had to break a lance with most of their contemporaries and with most of the leaders of the nineteenth century, an ungrateful task which easily exposes to ridicule. But in the light of the catastrophes which have followed upon the dehumanizing of man, it is easier to take up the work where they left off. With Stuart Sherman we may say: "The revolutionary task of the nineteenth century was to put man into nature. The revolutionary task of the twentieth must be to take him out again."

This is what Dr. Hough further helps to do by taking up in turn the question of science versus scientism. Now the putting of man into nature was done in the name of science. Is then science the enemy of humanism? No, because through the very methods of science the humanist discovered that man was distinct in nature. The very study of facts through observation leads to generalizations based on them. The quarrel of the humanist is not with the physical sciences but with the pseudo-scientist. It is he who steps out of his own realm when he pretends to find in physical facts, measurable by his physical instruments, the whole of reality. This apriorism is the very antithesis of the scientific method.

Take, for instance, the question of the possibility of freedom. To hold that there are no facts except such as are determined by measurable forces is to deny the possibility of freedom; for freedom is the opposite of determinism. And yet to deny the possibility of freedom is to deny the realm of the distinctly human, of choice in our conduct according to standards of morality, of art, of religion. For the exercise of morality, art, and religion depend upon what man does with his freedom. He may or may not refrain from injustice, he may or may not reach the beautiful, he may or may not recognize and worship God, just as he may or may not choose to breathe or to live, no matter what may be the incentives to do so. In so far as nineteenth century scientists have denied freedom, they have run counter to the facts, and hence have been not only anti-humanistic but antiscientific.

Whereupon Dr. Hough makes his most telling point against the pseudo-scientist and scientism. The true scientist, he tells us, cannot but be a humanist even if unconsciously. The reason is that his own work depends upon the exercise of freedom. The scientist chooses to observe selected phenomena and to classify them in selected ways. His hypotheses are rational choices; and his final find-



ings are triumphs of free intelligence which, significantly, will enable men to harness the determinism of matter by turning it to their own freely chosen purposes. There can therefore be no quarrel between humanism and genuine physical science because physical science itself depends upon the exercise of that freedom which shows man to be distinct in nature, as humanism holds him to be. It is true that there are measurable elements in the behavior of men; but literature is not the measured philological study of words, social science is not the reduction of human relationships to impersonal laws, history is not a mere collection of predetermined facts. Literature and history are the records of what men have done with their freedom, and social science should study what was done with freedom in the past that the future may use it more wisely. So, by all means, let us study the physical sciences, but let us recognize that the humanities are distinct from them; for they are the knowledge of the use of freedom, and the attempt to establish the standards of what that use should be. The physical sciences cannot establish such standards, and a world, rich in scientific knowledge but poor in ethical norms, will put scientific progress at the service of the uncontrolled passions of man for his own destruction. This is what has actually happened, and our only hope is therefore in the subordination of the physical sciences at least to the humanities.

Nor will it do to trust in social change as such, as the nineteenth century did. It was natural for those who no longer made a distinction between man and thing to think that man's improvement could be achieved by merely changing the environment supposed to determine him. Even the Protestant churches, feeling ill at ease in their growing doubts as to their creeds, sought reassurance in working for social improvement. We may grant that some good was done by thus awaking a sense of justice in the materialistic plutocracies of the day, but the humanist must remain critical before this humanitarianism born of a deterministic conception of man. He does not deny that environment may have an influence on the individual; but he understands that what makes man unique is precisely the fact that he is not wholly determined by heredity or environment, and that to some extent at least he never ceases to be free. Realizing this the humanist knows that no amount of social improvement will by itself alone insure a good society or righteous men. History is witness to the fact that great rascals were born and raised in most favorable social environments. The dream of improv-

ing men by merely improving their environment is bound to issue in disillusionment because man is a free being, free to be unjust, greedy, sensual, dishonest, cruel, no matter how good his circumstances; free too to rise to the heights of character even in poverty. Social progress cannot come merely through a change of social conditions because man is not determined by social conditions. It can come only through the training of men in the use of their freedom. What humanism must do, therefore, is to search to their very depths the psychology and superpsychology of man to see what men must do to insure the right use of that freedom.

Dean Hough, therefore, takes up in turn the analysis of the three levels on which men may live: the subhuman, the human, and the superhuman. This distinction, as we know, goes back to the critique of Babbitt. Here we are once more at the heart of the real humanist doctrine, and of its stand against both idealistic monism which would reduce all reality to thought, and materialistic monism which would reduce it to matter. Genuine humanism is dualistic in that it recognizes as a fact that man is both matter and spirit, since he has both bodily senses, which bring him particular experiences, and intelligence, which is capable of conceiving universal ideas on the basis of those experiences.

The subhuman level is then the level below human intelligence, the inanimate realm of purely mechanical interaction, and the animate realm of biological impulse. Here is the legitimate domain of the physical sciences: biological impulse, sensation, hunger, thirst, sexual urges; such activities, shared by living beings below man, can be measured.

But when man appears, we have a new and distinct set of facts, a higher level. Man, of course, moves in the world of mechanical interactions, in the realm of things, and he has biological impulses. Even the human child, before he attains the age of reason, acts unconsciously, spontaneously, uncritically. But man does not remain a child, at least if his intelligence is properly developed. Because he has an intelligence capable of development, he can be educated to enter his estate of man, with its practice of conscious, controlling intelligence. The animal cannot control its environment; man can. He can conceive universal ideas, ideals, ends; he can use or oppose the subhuman to reach those ideals or ends. Man by his intelligence and will can, at least to some extent, and more and more as he

develops right habits, become the master of the subhuman outside of him and in him, of things and animals, and of his own biological impulses. He can change the world about him through creative science and art. He can develop a more ethical character and society through the mastery of appetite. As Dean Hough expresses it: "He has a kingdom which is all his own. It is the kingdom of conscious intelligence, foreseeing ends and making them the object of action." Man is not a mere thing, not a mere bunch of neural reactions. Millions of facts are there to prove it. You cannot deny, as the monist does, the fundamental assertion of the humanist that man is unique in nature, that he alone of all beings on earth is an intelligent controller, unless you would run counter to some of the daily acts in every normal man's life.

The subhuman and the human may be further contrasted. The physical subhuman works with a uniformity which can be measured and formulated in laws, and the temptation is strong to personalize it and call it "nature." Then the laws of nature are called the norm of morality: "Follow nature," the Stoics said, meaning follow the laws of nature. And Spinoza added in effect: "Worship this integrated complex of impersonal laws and you will have true religion." To this the humanist must answer: "If you have no freedom, if you are yourself but a part of the determined whole, how can you choose to follow? You can only accept, and your worship will be but this acceptance of the inevitable. Moreover, if you are incapable of choice, it must be that you are constitutionally incapable of being conscious simultaneously of two alternatives and of a principle in the name of which you might choose between them. You are therefore an amoral being, since morality has no meaning if all acts are determined. To fall to the ground according to the law of gravity is not a moral act, a personal act, since you cannot help it. To have morality or religious acceptance, you must have the consciousness of following, and the power to follow alternatives. You must be a free agent capable of true choice."

The humanist would then restate the situation. There is really no "nature" but an orderly universe which reveals laws of order and points to the existence of an intelligence capable of having conceived them. Because man has an intelligence capable of discovering the laws of nature, he can learn how to modify their relations and choose to do so. Thus he can invent and thereby modify the physical world. He need not merely accept it. His freedom, born



of intelligence, can control physical determination by utilizing physical law. Recognizing further that there must be a greater intelligence than his own, the source of all order, he may become truly religious, respect his own intelligence and its powers, and stand in awe at the thought of that mighty Intelligence from which the world order must have sprung. Here again, we may see how the facts establish a dualistic humanism. The controlled and the controller cannot be of the same nature.

Man can control nature. Does he need to control himself? Yes, because he finds in himself biological impulses which would determine him. These impulses are good and necessary. But experientially man finds that these impulses are often more than necessary. They tend to excess. **He must satisfy his hunger and his thirst**, but his natural appetite may lead him to eat too much, and his intelligence may invent dishes and drinks which stimulate his appetites and are capable of making him lose the use of his reason. And so with sex and all social relations. Because he has intelligence and freedom, because he is not determined like the beast, man can really descend below the level of the beast. The beast is never pervert; man can be.

Man must therefore discover the standards, the laws according to which he should live, because he is not wholly determined, because he can live freely. That is why the problem of standards or ideals is the great humanistic problem. In his consciousness that he may fall below the beast, he may develop unnatural standards, he may formalize an artificial code. Whereupon there will be a lawless reaction in the name of naturalness. The uncontrolled following of impulse will then be held to be more human than what will come to be called conventions and taboos. Thus the establishment of standards and the struggle against standards make up the moral history of man reflected especially in literature. Often has literature expressed the ardent response to impulse and pictured capitulations to the subhuman as laudable emancipations.

More recently, under the impact of the materialistic substitution of physiology for psychology, and of the study of subconscious biological impulse rather than that of conscious choice, we had attempts to depict human beings as toys of instinct and circumstance, left floundering in the slime of sexual indulgence. And yet, in literature too, especially if taken in its whole perspective, is to be found the record of the struggle to live on the human level, from the



Greeks even to the present day; while the crisis of war, and the final challenges to freedom in our day, have suddenly made us forget deterministic theories and gird ourselves to use all the powers of our conscious intelligence to defeat those who would have enslaved us.

The character of a man, of a social group, of a civilization must then be judged by the quality of its standards. As Dr. Hough sums it up, the distinctive meaning of the human is "that functioning of man in which he uses intelligence to choose among alternatives in the light of standards in order to control his world of thought and his world of action, and thus turn the world of things to his own purposes."

Hence no man is cultured unless he knows about the centuries of man's experimentation in his search for dependable standards. He must know as much as possible about the physical and biological sciences, because the laws according to which things react and his biological impulses are parts of his daily life; but he must study especially how man has exercised his freedom in utilizing physical laws, in sublimating biological impulses, in discovering more truth, creating more beauty, and aspiring to an ever nobler life. The final problem then is that of an adequate and firm knowledge of the necessary, permanent standards and of their use through an efficient will.

This was the problem which so troubled Irving Babbitt. His solution of it was so original that it was bound to remain unappreciated. It stayed so consistently short of ultimates, though so drastically opposed to all types of monism, that it remained open to the criticism of both materialists and spiritualists. Because Babbitt refused to use logical deductions leading to metaphysical assertions, but wished to remain wholly experiential, he sought his solution, as we saw, in the assertion of a higher will as an immediate datum of experience to be exercised in connection with a combined use of a higher imagination and of reason. This was the more difficult to understand in that it really meant a superhumanism. If, as Dr. Hough holds with Aristotle and the scholastics, it is intelligence and will, as the power of intelligent control, which make man distinct from the other animals, then Babbitt's introduction of a third needed element, of a power of control over even the intellect and the will, made his humanism a substitute for the Christian doctrine of grace. His humanism, like Christianity, was not merely dualistic

but trialistic. For Babbitt also there was not merely the subhuman (the biological), the human (intellect and will), but the superhuman, the principle of control over the intellect and will, or over the combination of both the subhuman and the human. Babbitt's doctrine remained mystifying in so far as he remained short of explaining satisfactorily what he understood by this superhuman. His reluctance to become an avowed Theist prevented him from satisfying the spiritualist in spite of his blasting of the naturalists. All this we have discussed.

How will Dean Hough treat in turn this crucial point of the humanist discussion? As opposed to Irving Babbitt, he at once asserts that the problem of an adequate and firm knowledge of the necessary and permanent standards, as well as the problem of an efficient will, can be solved only by discussing the existence of God and the possible help which God may give to the intelligence of man by His Revelation, and to both the intelligence and the will of man by the help of His grace. Thus Dr. Hough passes immediately from the purely positivistic approach of Babbitt, not only, like Lippmann, to a frankly theistic humanism, but to the question of the possible co-operation of God with man.

He does not begin his demonstration by speaking of the weakness of the human intelligence and will; but, as the scholastics still do, by asserting their powers as the distinguishing mark of man. But if man has this power of intelligent control, whence can it come? From the determined, impersonal, unconscious reactions which we find in the physical world? No; for how could the conscious come out of the unconscious, the free out of the determined, understanding and free choice out of a chemical reaction? The scientist may discover the mechanical uniformities in the universe, because he can conceive and choose alternatives as their explanation; but mechanical uniformities cannot produce the free intelligence of the scientist. Can the organic vital appetites produce the power of intelligent control? Again, no. The biological urge seeks its own gratification; it cannot produce the power of control which would turn it to a higher purpose. It cannot, any more than the mechanical reaction, lift itself out of its own nature to become a nature higher than itself, capable of controlling itself. Nor can we merge the world of organic impulse with the world of intelligent choice as has been proposed in panpsychism, because impulse and choice are

essentially contradictory, since impulse is the very material on which choice is exercised. The impulse to travel will make you a wanderer on the face of the earth. Choice will utilize that impulse to reach the intelligently selected alternative of a destination. Appetite may be the occasion of preparing a balanced menu, but it cannot prepare it or evolve the power to prepare it.

Intelligence only can beget intelligence. The conscious controlling intelligence of man, therefore, forces us to accept the existence of an intelligence which preceded man's; and that superior, conscious, controlling intelligence, necessary to explain the conscious, controlling intelligence of man, is what we mean by a personal God. To believe in the distinctly human, you must believe in the distinctly divine.

It will not do to try to escape that conclusion by speaking of a god wholly immanent in the universe, of a world which somehow secretes a deity who finally becomes conscious in man. This is to try to explain God as well as man in terms of the subhuman. Why should an impersonal universe produce God if it could exist without God? There is no need of God if there is no need of explaining the universe. And how could an impersonal, unconscious universe produce a personal, conscious, and intelligent God?

Pantheistic monism, it is true, does not say that it does. It says that God becomes conscious and intelligent only in the conscious intelligence of man, that God is only the total idealism of the race, the highest thought of men. If so, then we are back to our first question: How could the mechanical reactions and biological impulses of the subhuman world produce the intelligence of man, begetter of free choices that can control them; and how could we have high thought without the power of distinguishing standards and choosing to follow them? Pantheistic monism merges God in nature through man. Thus we see that the fate of the notion of God is bound up with the fate of the notion of man. Merge man or God with the universe in a pantheistic monism, and you will have to merge both. Moreover, once this is done, you will have to deny the power of intelligent control over the universe to both. You can have left at most the consciousness in man of a certain superior order gradually begotten by determinism; and that too is a contradiction, because a superior order cannot be begotten if there is no consciously selective intelligence above what is to be ordered.



But, further, there is the harrowing ethical consequence. Since pantheistic monism holds that man's thought represents the highest good, it must necessarily lead to man's self-worship. If the highest good is the product in the consciousness of man of the determinism of everlasting change, man will naturally come to consider his biological impulses and his will to power to be the highest good. Thus he will enthrone the subhuman on the ruins of the human, and his god will be merely the deification of his own uncontrolled desires. The refusal to face the challenge of the presence in man of free intelligence, and of the problem of its origin, will have brought him to deify the unethical.

There is then only one saving possibility: to face the fact of the intelligence of man, distinct from the subhuman, and to explain it by the superhuman or divine. This implies a superior, conscious, controlling intelligence, distinct from man and the universe, and thus explains the possibility of a conscious controlling intelligence in man which makes him also distinct from the universe, and a being capable of relations with God.

Only thus, can God, man, and the universe be seen to be a coherent and uncontradictory whole. Thus do we get a hierarchy of reality: God, the free creative intelligence, independent of all beings for His action; calling, in turn, into existence, and sustaining in existence, an ordered world of mechanical reactions and biological impulses, together with man, unique in that world because endowed with a conscious intelligence which enables him to master the secrets of the physical order and to govern his own impulses according to the principles of conduct that are in conformity with those relations to God and to his fellow men which constitute the moral order, and which his intelligence can to some extent discover, but which to the Christian are clearly made manifest. Thus, to use Dr. Hough's own phrase, we have: "Man over nature and under God, man controlling nature, and obeying and worshipping God."

We might stop here, satisfied to be saved from the contradictions and the degrading self-worship of pantheistic monism, from the mechanical and biological determinism of materialism, from the defeatism of positivism and of agnosticism, and finally, from the intellectual dishonesty of the modernist who would retain the name of God when it is held that there is no personal God. Nor should we be dismayed if our rising from the indubitable fact of the free intelligence of man to the assurance of the existence of a free intel-



ligent God is called anthropomorphic reasoning, since we can only reason on the basis of our experience; and reasoning from our highest experience, the free acts of man, saves us from reasoning merely from our lower experience of the determined acts of the rest of nature. Clearly, then, if man were not a person, a free conscious intelligence, we could not reason our way to the existence of a personal or free, intelligent God. Clearly, too, if God were not a personal God, man could not be a person.

Shall we go on further with our reasoning which has already carried us to face the ultimates which Irving Babbitt refrained from discussing? Why not reason as far as reason will carry us, even to the point of the reasonableness of revelations of God to man? If both God and man are persons, both free, intelligent beings, then there must be a whole gamut of possible relations between them. If man, conscious of what he owes to God, is impelled to worship God, God can be ready to communicate with him and may do so more liberally in proportion as man is ready to respond to His call. We may then legitimately surmise that there have been communications from God to man. If so, they must be a matter of history.

Dean Hough, at this point, without discussing the need of the help of God that man, as we saw, would have required even in the natural order, comes at once to the question of the Incarnation of God through the historical Christ, the culmination of all the communications of God to man recorded in biblical history. He thus passes directly from a Theistic Humanism, not necessarily integral, to Supernaturalized Humanism. What Dean Hough wants to do is to show how logical it is to pass directly from a purely rational humanism to the Christian faith in the Incarnation, whereby the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity assumed our human nature.

This coming of God to dwell among us under human form — “and the Word was made flesh” — is a stupendous thought, from which the rationalist may well recoil, as it is ultimately beyond adequate comprehension by human reason. That is why some may stop short at the demonstration that man is unique in nature and claim that this is sufficient to work out a good life. And yet the Incarnation, with its assumption of a human nature by a divine person, this espousal, as it has beautifully been called, of the human nature by the divine in the womb of Mary, is far less taxing on our reason than the propositions of the monists that the physical world has no cause, or that God, who must be an absolute unchang-

ing being, nevertheless coincides in nature with the contingent, ever-changing world. For such an identification is a contradiction in terms, and reason should reject it. But the existence of the God-Man, consisting of one Divine Person and two natures, one human the other divine, is not a contradiction, once humanism has established the dignity of man as chosen to become by grace a partaker of the Divine Nature. Because God has made the human to His own image, we can approach nearer to understanding how He could unite the Divine Nature with the human in the Incarnation of the Word.

This is what Dean Hough would demonstrate. As he puts it: "The Incarnation is possible because of the inherent dignity of man. . . . The very structural qualities of humanity are such that God could enter into human life and live the life of a man and so reveal Himself to man. . . . Man can think God's thoughts after Him. Therefore God can think His own thoughts in human life." Nay more, "The human was created with such subtle kinships with that above the human" that "the possibilities of humanity could never be understood until you could see Jesus Christ walking the earth. . . . The glorious assertion of the Christian that God Himself has become man is the very flower of the humanistic insights." Hence Dr. Hough's repudiation of the extreme teachings of Luther and Calvin that the Divine Image had been completely blotted out of human life by sin. No matter how much human nature may have been misused, it cannot have become bad in its very essence. God could not have entered a nature essentially evil. "God can enter a nature which has been misused in order to turn it to right purposes. . . . He could not become incarnate in the satanic for any purpose whatsoever."

We are now prepared to see, in Dean Hough's terms, the superiority of Christian humanism over even Theistic Humanism. Theistic Humanism shows us man as a free intelligence controlling nature and worshipping God. It thus stands opposed to all doctrines that would merge God and man in impersonal nature, but its God remains still distant. On the contrary, with Christian humanism the divine invades the human. It invades the human to complete the human. "The human will," as Dean Hough puts it, "can come to fulfillment only as it becomes one with the will of God."

So, again, we come to the need of that third element which Irving Babbitt recognized: the need in man of the action of a higher power. Dean Hough agrees that it is most significant that, quite aside from Christian thought, Babbitt should so clearly have pointed out the need of a higher control superior to that of man's natural intelligence and will; that experientially he should have found it at work in man; that he should have found recorded in history and literature that men went astray to the ruination of character and civilization, whenever they did not submit their intelligence and will, as well as their biological impulses to "supra-cosmic control," as he vaguely described it. Dean Hough finds it valuable, too, that Babbitt taught that men should recognize the need of that control, even if they refused to inquire further as to the nature of its source. It was valuable; but, Dean Hough also stresses, it was not enough.

The third element which Babbitt calls for needs to be avowedly God's help, truly a divine aid, God enlightening the intelligence and strengthening the will of man. God's aid must in some way come to every man to save or rescue him from sin. In the present order that aid is given us by grace. Even those not possessed of sanctifying grace are not denied actual graces to enable them to overcome sin and do God's will in their regard. Hence we get the formula of what we have called Supernaturalized Humanism: man capable of controlling his impulses, with the help of the grace of God.

Not only is there need of strengthening, but of atonement and of redemption. For even though man is not bad in his very essence, the sins of men, so startling in our own times, are a challenge to justice, beginning with the first sin as committed in Paradise. Men must realize their guilt, and know in their hearts that it is beyond their atonement by merely human means. As Dean Hough puts it: "their selfish choices have pushed them to a spot where human fellowship is impotent, and divine fellowship impossible." As they cannot forgive themselves, they can no longer see how a just God can forgive them. The mathematics of justice demands their punishment.

Here enters the further feature of the message of Christian humanism: the Incarnation became a redemption. God took upon Himself, with the humanity of man, the sins of humanity. He restored to every man the possibility of standing again before Him

cleansed from his guilt. Thus man can face his ultimate alternative and use his free intelligence to respond to God's redemptive love. No poet has yet worthily sung how God made man took on Himself the sins of man, and how through the cross He called man to the triumph of a resurrection here made possible for him.

Then, there is the final reassurance. As there is the resurrection from sin, so there will be resurrection from death, there will be immortality. Subhumanism's explanation of all reality in terms of mathematical or biological reactions makes all thought of survival impossible; for if all is change, all must disappear through change. The acceptance of the law for thing as the law for man can but consign man to the fate of things. But humanism necessarily points to immortality; for, from its very start, it shows us man dealing with the abiding, and it is of the very nature of the abiding to continue to be. To have the distinct life of conscious free intelligence, poised between alternatives and reaching a decision in the light of abiding standards, true in all times and places, is to deal with values and ideals which are independent of time and space. But further, as we have seen, the finite controlling intelligence of man necessitates a perfect controlling intelligence as the ultimate reality. There are abiding standards and values because there is the eternally abiding essence of God; and if man has the power to think the abiding thoughts of God, that power too must be abiding. It brings him to the consciousness of the spiritual, immortal soul. As Dr. Hough puts it: "To be capable of experiencing an eternal value in consciousness is to have a consciousness which by its very nature and the quality of its experience belongs to eternity. . . . Fellowship with the eternal cannot be a wholly temporal experience. So when the critical humanist meets the Christian affirmation about the resurrection and the life to come, he is ready to receive them. He is prepared to accept the message: 'He is not here, He is risen.' Humanism finds all its questions answered in the life and death and resurrection of Jesus Christ."

So, too, the humanist is prepared to try to live the good life, to live in what Dr. Hough calls "the beloved community." Critics have accused humanism of recoiling from the fullness of life. On the contrary, only the humanist, and finally only the Christian humanist, can know all its possibilities. To lead the uncontrolled life which inevitably issues in disintegration, frustration, and despair, is not to live the fullness of life, nor is this gained by giving up spiritual



freedom in order to accept material comfort. The fullness of life begins with the exercise of the life of the intelligence, utilizing but mastering the material and the biological in the light of standards with the help of the grace of God. Only through this individual living in God's order can society be improved and can the beloved community, the City of God on earth, be made possible. This calls for no repudiation of any level of life. Christian humanism understands that the material and the biological are for men the stuff out of which life must be woven, even if it holds that the weaving must be done according to God's patterns of righteousness. The humanist asks but to rationalize nature; the Christian humanist adds that it must be sanctified. As the humanist does not scorn science, neither does he scorn secular literature. He searches eagerly through its pages for its glimpses of abiding truths, and is awed at the sense of tragedy which exudes from its greatest books whenever God's order has been violated. But the more the humanist knows the Greeks, the Latins, India, and China, the more must he appreciate the superior message of the Christian gospels, their sense of sin, their call to love, their promise of expiation and redemption, their assurance that the good life may be led even here on earth through the help of the grace of God. The humanist knows from the record of the race and from his own experience how difficult it is to have the human master the subhuman, but the Christian humanist is not dismayed because he also knows that he can count on the help of the Divine.

With Lynn Harold Hough we are then a long way forward from the humanism of Irving Babbitt, and we see a possible co-operation between the Christian churches much more clearly than in the later works of Paul Elmer More. But Dean Hough does not forget how much he owes to these predecessors. Before concluding his *Christian Criticism of Life*, he pays them tribute, and shows his own grasp of American thought as he sketches their contribution against its background. But Babbitt left to others the exploration of Christian humanism, remaining content to oppose the human and the superhuman as he understood them, to the subhuman; while More, ultimately a Platonist, never came to give due credit to the more Aristotelian *Summa* of St. Thomas.

Dr. Hough knows St. Thomas as well as St. Augustine, nor is he unaware of the great neo-scholastic revival of our day. He has fully recovered the perspective of the history of Western thought, and shows no trace of those prejudices, petrified in catchwords of de-

nunciation, which so long prevented and still prevent too many from recognizing that the Protestant churches can have no creed, no theology, no philosophy except in the terms of the philosophy and the theology of the Christian Church as it existed from Peter to Luther. After all, those terms are simple: a human nature dignified by intelligence, but incapable of reaching the more perfect knowledge of God or of the supernatural life without the help of a revelation; incapable of avoiding consistently capitulations to the subhuman without the help of God's actual graces; a human nature incapable, too, of atoning for its sins, and hence in need of divine redemption; and finally, incapable of having the vision of the infinite God in eternity without the enlightening of finite intelligence by "the light of glory," surpassing supernatural grace bestowed here below.

That the Christian churches may still be far from reunion, as we shall study further on, is only too evident. Especially does there remain the supreme truth to be accepted as to the foundation by Christ of one fold of which He is the Shepherd, and of the historical fate of that fold which, despite all that men may do, can never be destroyed. But we have nevertheless a certain possible common corpus of indubitably Christian doctrine. Dean Lynn Harold Hough recognizes it. As he states, referring to what we may call classic Christianity, "this corpus of thought is held in common by the Greek and Latin communions, by the great state churches, and by the free churches of the Protestant world. It unites the neo-Thomists in the Roman Catholic Church with the representatives of classic Christianity in any Protestant communion. It is the basis of an ecumenical Christianity which transcends all the walls built up by the different communions. It centers in Jesus Christ. Its fundamental assertion has to do with the Incarnation. Its central spiritual message has to do with the cross. In its name embattled Christians in this bitter and difficult age confront the world."

Because Lynn Harold Hough has thus worked out the promise of that humanism which, in opposition to modern atheistic monism, redistinguished the human from the subhuman, revindicated the dignity of man's nature, and showed how it was capable of divine penetration, his work stands as another landmark in the rescue of Western thought begun in American secular circles by Babbitt and More. It prepares us to study in more detail the implications of a Christocentric Supernaturalized Humanism.

# 7

## SUPERNATURALIZED HUMANISM

WHILE Theistic Integral Humanism is a philosophical study, Supernaturalized Humanism, the doctrine of the raising of natural man, the rational animal, to the supernatural order, is strictly a theological one. It can be known only through Revelation.

The transition from one to the other, however, is easy since Theistic Integral Humanism recognizes that, though God is distinct from the changing universe, He is present in it through the exercise of His power; and, especially, since Theistic Integral Humanism stresses that, if man had not been raised to the supernatural order God in His justice would have given him the help he would have needed to lead an ordered life.

The transition to Supernaturalized Humanism is, therefore, one of degree in so far as even in the natural order there would have been a co-operation between God and man's intelligence and will; but it is also a transition in kind, to a higher order, since the soul possessed of sanctifying grace is made "a partaker of the Divine Nature."

All this is difficult to understand, but certainly not as difficult as to try to argue that matter could beget life and intelligence, or that the manifold changing reality could be a simple absolute being as asserted in pantheism. In a manner all forms of life on earth are mysteries to us in the sense that they are beyond our power to explain them, no matter how much we may get to understand about their working.

So if we must reason, as we have seen, that the absolute and the contingent cannot be the same being, that the changing cannot be self-existing, that there must be a self-existing and absolute First Cause, that the self-existing must be self-sufficient and possess all perfections, and that therefore, there is a God, and that God is He who is; then, surely, we should be ready to admit that this all-powerful God, creator and necessarily sustainer of the universe, of

all the forms, powers, animating principles, and potentialities in the universe, including the soul of man, may specially co-operate with man, and even make his soul partaker of the Divine Nature, so that he may truly commune with his Maker.

We may believe it the more readily since the power of God must permeate and move all beings according to their kind. Since the soul of man is spirit, there is no reason why God who made it cannot raise it to partake of the highest spiritual nature: His own.

Thus we may vision the universe distinct from God but, nevertheless, permeated with the presence of God throughout the hierarchy of beings. God and the universe cannot be one and the same being; but the universe is God's, the power of God made manifest; and man the link between the material and the spiritual, may well know in a special way the embrace of God. So the revelation that God is a triune God, God the Creator, God the Redeemer, God the Sanctifier, sums up the necessary relations of God with man. For the world could not be without being created; man could not be saved from the consequences of having misused his freedom without being redeemed; nor could he live the supernatural life without being especially sanctified by the indwelling of the Holy Spirit.

The work of Lynn Harold Hough showed us how a dualistic humanist may readily admit all this. But we have another searching contribution of American scholarship connected with the American humanist movement, in which we may study the passage from humanism to Christianity, namely the later works of Paul Elmer More on the Greek Tradition: *Platonism*, *The Religion of Plato*, *Hellenistic Philosophies*, *The Christ of the New Testament*.

Dissatisfied with mere humanism, More patiently examined the record and concluded, against the modernists, that Christ was truly proved historically to be the incarnate of God:

"If the Divine Nature has at any time in any wise directly revealed itself to man, if any voice shall ever reach us out of the infinite circle of silence, where else should we look but to the words of the Gospel? Not Christianity alone is at stake in our acceptance or rejection of the Incarnation, but religion itself."

To the words of the Gospel, of course, the Catholic Church must add the voice of apostolic tradition.

Paul Elmer More stresses how the Incarnation cannot be rejected because the historical record of the Resurrection of Christ as contained in St. Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians is indubitably



reliable: "How that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures; and that he was buried, and that he rose again the third day, according to the Scriptures; and that he was seen by Cephas and after that by the eleven. Then was he seen by more than five hundred brethren at once; of whom many remain until this present; and some are fallen asleep. After that he was seen by James, then by all the apostles" (15:3).

The Resurrection of Christ is evidently the crux in the acceptance of Supernaturalized Humanism, since that astounding event suffices to guarantee the veracity of the miracles which first testified that Christ was God, as He claimed to be, and stamped His teachings as a genuine Revelation of the triune God which human reason by itself could never reach.

Ultimately, then, there is no arguing about this. It is a matter of accepting or rejecting the historical record. Once he has accepted it, the humanist must accept Revelation through faith, because it is historically proved to be the word of God. Subsequently, the now Christian humanist can in humility study the implications of the divine message having on hand the help which Christ has provided for him. Lynn Harold Hough worked them out as Evangelical Christianity may see them. Here is the Catholic position.

Convinced of the divinity of Christ, the Catholic cannot fail to accept all that Christ has taught, and in particular Christ's foundation of His Church upon the one Apostle to whom already He had given the name of Peter, "Rock." The words of Christ are plain and no one can mistake them: "And I say to thee: That thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it" (Matt. 16:18).

It is a Church, therefore, whose main foundation indeed is Christ, its founder, but which rests upon Peter, the "Rock," as its chief pastor and ruler, on whom in the very next breath Christ bestows the plenitude of ecclesiastical power, signified by the Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven: "And I will give to thee the Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven. And whatsoever thou shalt bind upon earth it shall be bound also in heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth, it shall be loosed also in heaven" (*Ibid.* 19).

Since that one Church of Christ was to last to the end of time, in spite of the forces of hell that would rise in arms against it, the conclusion inevitably follows that the supreme authority within the Church, bestowed upon Peter, must continue with his successors

through the ages. And such in fact, by the Providence of God, has been the unbroken line of sovereign pontiffs amid toppling thrones, the rise and fall of nations, and all the powers of darkness could devise to confuse the minds of men.

That, therefore, in a nutshell, is the Catholic position. It does not prevent the full flowering of theological literature, and yet it is clear and plain for a child to understand. But for that very reason it supposes a child's simplicity and humility, such as was possessed by the great theological minds of a Dante Alighieri and a St. Thomas Aquinas. For all of us the truth announced by Christ must hold good: "Amen, I say to you, unless you be converted and become as little children, you shall not enter into the Kingdom of Heaven" (Matt. 18:3).

Since, then, humanity through Adam had detached itself from God, only God could relink humanity to Himself. Only the precious passion and death of the Man-God Christ could make possible for us our redemption. Individual men were wholly incapable of atoning to God for humanity's repudiation of God, and yet until this had been done there could be no restoration of the former relation between God and humanity.

Finally, if all men were redeemed through Christ's sacrifice on the cross, it should be evident that they must individually accept the Christ if they wish to have the benefit of that redemption. Severed from the supernatural life as an inheritance, they must, if capable of reason, be supernaturally revitalized by a personal act of loving acceptance of the Redeemer.

Supernaturalized Humanism is necessarily Christo-centric. The gospel text constantly reiterates this fact. "I am the way, and the truth, and the life" (John 14:6). "I am the bread of life; he that cometh to me shall not hunger and he that believeth in me shall never thirst. . . . And this is the will of my Father who sent me; that everyone who seeth the Son, and believeth in him, may have life everlasting" (John 6:35, 40).

As opposed to all this, Walter Lippmann, in his *Preface to Morals*, had much to say about the God of what he called popular religion: "God seated upon a throne, the Law Giver, the Judge." He also accepted the idea that the popular conception of God is but a projection of the political systems of the day; in turn an Oriental despot moody and vain; a feudal lord supreme but bound by a system of reciprocal rights and duties; a constitutional monarch who

reigns but does not govern, according to the Deists' ideal of a constitutional monarchy; a constitutionalism deified as in the modernist's reducing of God to the *élan vital* within the evolutionary process. This is such a clever parallel that it may well appeal to those eager to dismiss the idea of God as anthropomorphic.

But Lippmann, as we saw, outgrew this easy solution and earnestly reasserted the need of believing that God infinitely transcends the changing images which men may use down the ages to picture His attributes. Nor was this irrational. *I am who am* is the name under which God revealed Himself to Moses. God is *He who is*, infinite spiritual life, independent of time and space, eternal and divine, necessarily permeating all that ever was, is, or will be. So creatures are bound to Him wholly in their entire existence, while our visible universe can render praise to Him through man, who alone of all visible creatures on earth is endowed by Him with the gift of reason. The earth and all its fullness is the Lord's and it is made by Him for the use of man.

God could have made man as intended for a natural order only, with a purely natural beatitude for his reward. Instead, He raised him to a supernatural order and to the possibility of participation in the Divine Nature through the free gift of sanctifying grace.

Supernatural Humanism, then, is the system of thought and the ideal of life built upon this great truth. For its practical realization man is obliged to make use of God's means of grace that will be denied to no one who honestly seeks to obey Him.

That and that only is high religion, the linking of man with God.

Revelation alone, guaranteed by the Resurrection of Christ, following upon all the miraculous events of His entire life on earth, can fully explain that linking. On the basis of faith in that Revelation, we may go on studying what may be that special life which man may lead, provided he co-operates with the supernatural grace of God, attainable to us through the merits of Jesus Christ. We must do so, if we would understand the Christian alternative of thought. Yet it should be clearly understood: what here has been so inadequately sketched and hinted at needs far fuller explanation, such as can duly be provided by direct contact with the one Church that Christ has founded, which alone goes back to apostolic days.

The supernatural life, as might be expected, has necessarily a mode of its own. The animal perceives. Man can conceive, and discursively come to understand. All these methods are employed as

well by man raised to the supernatural order. But beyond these operations there is the possibility of the act of contemplating the abiding as contrasted with the changing, of the permanent as contrasted with the impermanent. At its highest it is the contemplation of the Triune God as perfectly as may be granted to man here on earth, awaiting to receive in heaven the reward of the Beatific Vision. There, in fine, is perfect love, perfect satisfaction to be found in the Divine Plenitude of Being, a delight participated in according to the possibility of each soul that enters into eternal bliss.

That is why the liturgy speaks of eternal rest in the next life and of eternal peace: "Eternal rest grant unto them, O Lord. May their souls and the souls of all the faithful departed through the mercy of God rest in peace."

Nor does this rest, this peace, mean inactivity. Contemplation by the soul in bliss implies the highest kind of activity, where the soul is thrilled with the intensest love and all its possible aspirations are filled to the full in the Vision of Infinite Plenitude, which is God — and God is Charity.

It should be clear also that this intensity of heavenly bliss will be the greater in proportion to the amount of sanctifying grace in the soul, to the extent of the habit each individual has formed to co-operate in this life with the actual graces God has bestowed, to the abundance of the gifts received by that soul and the use made of them, to the virtues practiced, the duties performed, and the sufferings endured here below for the sake of God, and in particular also in proportion to our love of the neighbor for the love of God.

A distinction is to be made between the sanctifying grace which on earth puts us in the state of partaking in the divine life and the use we make of supernaturalized life. What would have been true in the natural order is also true in the supernatural. No one of our acts must be independent of God. To make use of the divine life in us, we still need the help of God. In the supernatural order, this help is called actual grace. In this order, as would have been the case in the natural, God is ever ready to help us, to strengthen our intelligence and will, and we must pray for that help. "Give us this day our daily bread" takes on a new meaning.

Independently of co-operation we receive graces, but as we thus co-operate with God's grace at all times, we shall not only receive more actual graces but have an increase of sanctifying grace; and those who have best co-operated with God in this life, who have



loved Him the most, who have aspired the most to the contemplation of the abiding, even when living in the changing, must necessarily have the power of a lofty vision and hence of a most intense supernatural life of love in the next. Hence the need of constant prayer that may grow to be contemplative prayer, contemplative love even in this life.

Understanding this, it is truly moving to see how men may aspire to this supernatural life, even when by turning away from it they can only reach its caricature. It shows how the spiritual soul of man aspires to a more intimate knowledge of God. When Buddha teaches that "depth of peace is in proportion to rightness of meditation"; when Babbitt calls this: "meditation on the higher will with a view to the substitution of the permanent to the less permanent, and finally to the escape from impermanence altogether"; even when Lippmann proposed as an ideal in his *Preface to Morals* the high religion of a cleansed and mature personality; and when the modernists would make religion, in the wake of Plato, an aspiration to ideal other-worldliness: all in various ways seek, above the tumult of the transient, the peace that passeth understanding.

Professor Werner Jaeger in his studies on Greek humanism goes so far as to say that both Plato and Aristotle "proclaimed an idea of man which includes the Divine, and show the way how mortal man may participate in eternal life." He adds that this constant return of the Greeks to the thought of God seems to indicate "an inherent structural law of the mind which requires God as the center of the world, [of] the cosmos both without and within."

But though all these aspirations show us that the Christian assurance of man's possibility of participating in the divine life is a rational desire from which man can never escape, there is nevertheless a radical difference between the thought of Buddha or the Greeks or their modern disciples, and Christianity.

Buddha would not speak of ultimates. To reason one's way to the need of a prime mover, as Aristotle did, or to a world of ideas ultimately but loosely identified with the supreme good, as in the case of Plato, is not "to show how man may participate in eternal life," at least not in the sense of participating in the divine life in the Christian sense. Neither Aristotle nor Plato give us "the words of eternal life," because reason cannot do so; and much less, as with the modernists, can human feeling, or prideful disinterestedness, or the scorning of the impermanent.

For feeling may be irrational; and intellect, at best, reaches essences in terms of ideas. Moreover, experience teaches that reason may rationalize mere appetites or accept mere imaginings, and thus deceive us as to values; and that, even when it leads us to conceive the right principles, we may not use the freedom which such conceiving may give us, but only too readily fall back to the subhuman level.

There are then many obstacles for man on the way to the achieving of contemplation which is an exalted mode of the supernatural life. No one has expressed this better than St. Paul: "I am delighted with the law of God, according to the inward man; but I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin, that is in my members. Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" (Rom. 7:22-24.) And no one has more clearly stated the remedy in the Christian terms: "The grace of God, by Jesus Christ our Lord" (*Ibid.* 25). Participation in eternal life, then, is not merely a matter of reason. It can only come through the grace of God, and our acceptance of it on God's own terms.

So we are back to "the original sin," the refusal of God's own terms. The test is still there, no longer the prohibition to eat of the fruit that, in the person of the first man, humanity believed could make it like unto God; but, on the contrary, the possibility of refusing to eat of the fruit of the cross, of refusing to accept the fruit of the Redemption that alone can make us partake anew of the life of God.

So there is God's order, natural and supernatural. Human life is to be a co-operation with God through the acceptance by man of his exact place in the hierarchy of beings, and of the exact plan of God for his salvation. Thus he can become wise only by meditating on that order: on the order of nature through the physical sciences which may enable him to control nature; on his own rational nature through philosophy; on the raising of that nature to the supernatural order, considering this through the study of Revelation as worked out in an authoritative, dogmatic, moral, and mystical theology.

Man must recognize Christ in his historical life, in the Church which He founded as the community of all those who accept Him, and in the sacraments He left which respectively introduce men to the supernatural life, strengthen them in that life, restore them to

that life if they have forsaken it but are sincerely sorry for having done so, feed their souls with the fruit of the cross, bless their unions, prepare them for the fearful passage from this life to the next, endow chosen men with all the powers needed to transmit the Revelation authoritatively and to be the instruments of the sacraments.

There can be only one fold, and that fold must be visible since man is not a pure spirit; but to that fold nevertheless invisibly belong all men of good will who at least recognize God the Creator and respond to their instinctive conviction of the need of His help in every act of life, all those who are therefore in the axis of God's will, and would accept the Christ if they knew Him, and would accept Him on His own terms if they understood them. Thus Supernaturalized Humanism completes Theistic Integral Humanism.

What, then, should human life be in the supernatural order to which it was raised? The rich young man asked that question of Christ and Christ answered: "If thou wilt enter into life keep the commandments" (Matt. 19:17), and the commandments, as we saw, mean no more than living according to the law of justice, even in the natural order: justice to God, to oneself, and to one's neighbor.

To obey the commandments implies an avoidance of sin. Thus there is the sin of pride, a sin of the intellect, which would make us not only abstain from rendering to God what belongs to God, but would lead us to set ourselves against God and to erect creatures as idols before Him, as we do when we make them our final ends. Closely akin to pride is the sin of envy, a sin against our neighbor which leads us to begrudge him or to regret his spiritual or temporal well-being.

There are the sins of the will: covetousness, or the inordinate love of worldly goods and of power; and with it the sins of the senses, gluttony and luxury, the inordinate love of physical pleasures, and their practice contrary to nature and to justice toward our neighbor.

Moreover, we have what are more particularly sins of individual temperament: anger, or inordinate emotion when we are displeased, which may lead to many injustices to God and neighbor; and sloth, which recalls the Buddhistic *appamada*, a lack of energy in the fulfillment of our duties to God, in the use of our talents, in the carrying out of the obligations of our state of life — sloth, the great source of sins of omission.

Pride leads us to refuse God the allegiance we owe Him; anger may lead to murder; gluttony to theft; envy to both murder and theft and to slander; covetousness and luxury to sexual abuses.

Experience teaches us that constantly we tend to all these sins and hence that we are constantly in danger of violating the natural law, as unfolded or applied in the Decalogue, which we can readily recognize to be a law we must obey if we are to live in the proper relations toward God and our fellow men. Our nature has a real nobility since we can recognize these relations; but it certainly is not necessarily moral since we are only too conscious that we experience constant impulses toward their violation. Hence our need of the help of God, even in the natural order, and our need of repentance and forgiveness and of divine atonement.

Evidently the constant fight we must put up against our natural selfishness, pettiness, and sensuality; and the habits of resistance to them we must build up with the help of God, can hardly be considered an advanced stage of the spiritual life. Even the pagans knew that nature must be so disciplined. The golden mean of Aristotle was in opposition to extremes which correspond to the cardinal sins we have described. Vaingloriousness, overambition, boastfulness, spitefulness, anger, rashness, irascibility, shamelessness, spiritlessness, mentioned as extremes by Aristotle, are evident forms of pride, envy, covetousness, anger, gluttony, luxury, and sloth; opposed to them, as the golden mean is to the extreme, are moderation, right ambition, liberality, modesty, courage, which all may be included under the four basic virtues which Plato recognized: justice, prudence, temperance, and courage.

Classical comedy held up to ridicule the meaner manifestations of pride and covetousness; even more did its most able modern imitator, Molière; though both, it must be added, tolerated or encouraged others. Classical tragedy unfolded with awe the fatal consequences of pride, overambition, and of passionate love turned to jealousy; and so did notably Racine and Shakespeare. The fable, too, taught the necessity of at least a continued practice of prudence if we would escape punishment. As the Greeks had seen, every excess calls for a nemesis.

When the humanists tell us to look to secular literature for the wisdom of the ages, they point to a wisdom that is merely the natural law of justice, and, at that, very often but imperfectly conceived. When they denounce romanticism it is because romanticism repre-



sents a revolt against that law, a constant tendency to present the drives of the passions as not only exciting and fascinating but as natural and normal—life as it should be lived in unrestrained emotion and indulgence.

Romanticism is not, as we are too often apt to think, a late phenomenon. In modern Europe, it flows uninterruptedly from the days of the troubadours to our own. Nor is even ancient classical literature free from such encouragement to the free play of the passions. As Babbitt put it, quoting Pascal: "Unless man has the support of the supernatural, unless in short he attains to true humility, he will fall fatally either into the stoic pride, or else, through the intermediary stage of scepticism into the epicurean relaxation." Horace preached moderation only that the pleasures of the day might be longer and more exquisitely captured. And his disciples have been many. Rabelais preached both the need of discipline and the love of every manifestation of life, down to the coarsest, which even in the Middle Ages was not unknown; Montaigne ran the whole gamut of which Pascal speaks, from stoic satisfaction in natural virtue to epicurean complacency in natural vices; while Molière and La Fontaine gave many an encouragement to free love.

Thus the records of literature offer the humanist a very mixed legacy, one which can hardly satisfy the theistic integral humanist, so that he must really go for his moral code to the philosophers, with his best hope in the *Ethics* of Aristotle.

But the Christian humanist cannot be satisfied even with these. Not only do they fail at crucial points, as in their denial that all men are born free persons; but they do not go beyond a mediation between extremes. They are to be reverently welcomed and utilized as the highest reaches of unaided human reason, but the Christian must press beyond, the Christian has the moral code of the Gospels.

For the Christian, the self-discipline necessary in the light of the commandments is but the purgative stage on the way to perfection in the supernatural order. He cannot look merely to literature for a guide, for the reasons we have seen. Moreover, comedies, tragedies, and lyrics depict moral conflicts, failures, dissatisfactions which the Christian must strive to avoid. Since what he seeks is peace, his own natural expression is the liturgy, prayer, and the arts connected with the symbols of his faith. His books to guide him in the spiritual

life must be the Gospels, his model must be Christ; and his positive spiritual life can begin only in so far as, having disciplined his appetites, purged himself of his vices, and grown ashamed of all the pettiness that accompany them, he becomes supernaturally virtuous in a positive way.

As distinct from the purgative way, there is the illuminative way: life in the light of grace and of the example of Christ. Here Supernaturalized Humanism becomes fully Christo-centric. We must distinguish clearly, however, between the counsels and commandments. "Sell all that thou hast, give to the poor, and follow me," is a counsel, pure and simple, and not a rule of normal morality. Nevertheless it can be an inspiration for every man to advance in the spirit of Christly poverty, transmuting some at least of his wealth into power of Christian action, leading to detachment from riches for their own sake, ready acceptance of tribulations, and more positive action in the imitation of Christ. The vanity which constantly haunts us and makes us work for self-glorification should be gradually replaced by the desire to work only for the glory of God, by the humble satisfaction of doing, however imperfectly, the work of Christ in the world, of bringing nearer the advent of God's kingdom on earth as it is in heaven.

In the light of this realization that one must be truly a follower of Christ, that one should literally aspire to be in his own humble way another Christ; and moreover through a growing abundance of grace, partly due to our more eager co-operation with the graces already received, our prayers may become "affective prayers," prayers in which affection, disinterested love of God predominates.

Walter Lippmann was right when he called on us to cultivate disinterestedness and to achieve "a cleaned and matured personality." But disinterestedness and maturity should not mean "to take the world as it comes, and within oneself remain quite unperturbed." It should mean at its height the self-disinterestedness and maturity that may put an end to our pursuit of self-satisfaction, except in so far as our self comes to coincide through love with the self of Christ.

So, affective prayer comes more from acts of the will than of the intellect, because the intellectual love of God has become more habitual. Loving aspirations gradually displace analytical meditations, the natural will becomes ever more spiritualized; and when

the intellect, illumined by grace, begins to act according to that mode of the supernatural life which is contemplation, then the intellect and will merge into acts of pure love.

Babbitt was groping his way to that conception when he spoke of meditation on the higher will. But for the Christian that type of meditation is not what it remained for Babbitt, a link with the superhuman not recognized as the supernatural in our sense. It is the result of an indwelling of the triune God in the soul, in proportion as the soul, responding to His grace, makes possible this indwelling. Hence, too, we arrive at an habitual sense of companionship with the saints, through and in the love of God. Then the natural virtues become more and more supernaturalized as the intellect and will do.

It is a tribute to pagan thought that spiritual writers recognize the natural virtues which it also recognized: justice, temperance, prudence, and fortitude, and admit that those who ignore the supernatural life can practice them from natural motives. Indeed they need to be practiced by all and always at the natural level at least. The teacher, the physician, the businessman need prudence and courage in their work. Temperance is needed for mere physical health, and, at least in a civilized community, justice must be practiced to keep the respect of our neighbors.

But, exercised at the supernatural level, with the help of prayer and of the sacraments, the four cardinal natural moral virtues change both in their nature and in their object. In the natural order, they are to be developed into habits by choices of the will in the light of natural reason, and may issue in an ordered life within given spheres of activity. In the supernatural order they cannot depend merely on the natural intellect and will. The supernatural order is wholly a matter of the infusion of supernatural grace, so the cardinal virtues become infused virtues through supernatural grace.

They are transformed also as to their ends. On the purely natural level their end is worldly success and natural happiness. On the supernatural, their end is to enable us to remove the obstacles which would keep us separated from God and elicit positive actions in conformity with His will. Temperance is no longer to keep us merely decent and fit, but to keep down the carnal that the spiritual life may grow; prudence becomes the avoidance of all that would stifle that life, and the selection of all that will promote it; fortitude now

means the courage to pursue it even to martyrdom; and justice the loving recognition of what we owe to God and of what we need to do to help our neighbor toward the development of his own spiritual life. And so with the virtues which flow from the cardinal: humility, good counsel, common sense, good judgment; religion, filial devotion, obedience, truthfulness, gratitude; magnanimity, patience, perseverance; meekness, clemency, modesty, moderation.

But in our study of the supernaturalizing of the natural virtues we have not come as yet to the heart of the spiritual life. The heart of the spiritual life is charity, with its attendants: faith in revelation which feeds it, and hope in the goodness and mercy of God. The latter may even survive our loss of the supernatural life through mortal sin, for we may still hope even after we have offended God.

Faith, hope, and charity are called the theological virtues because God Himself is their direct object. The natural virtues, as such, had for their direct end happiness in this life. Even when supernaturalized, they still deal with this life, since they still pertain to its use even though for supernatural ends; but the theological virtues directly deal with those ends, since they are acts which unite us to God.

Faith in Revelation, because it comes from God, is primarily an act of the intellect, since it deals with truth; but it requires an assent of the will since this truth is not wholly evident. It cannot come to us without the enlightenment of the intellect and the strengthening of the will by grace. Hope is a trust that God in His goodness will help us to attain our supernatural end. But charity is a supernaturalized act of the will, for charity is the love of God, not for the sake of our own happiness in this world or even in the next, but for His own sake, for what He is; and it is the love of our neighbor, not because of what may be lovable in him, or for what he may contribute to our natural happiness, but because, like us, he is God's creature to be loved in God's order, and because, like us, he has been redeemed by Christ. Hence the injunction to love even our enemies.

Thus is it that in Supernaturalized Humanism not only are the natural virtues transmuted, but they are to mingle their flowering with that of the theological virtues, till the imitation of the virtues of Christ may become habitual.



To travel along the illuminative way in the light of the example of Christ may carry us even further. The illuminative way, writers on the spiritual life tell us, leads to the unitive way: to intimate union with God even in this life, a foretaste of the next.

Here again we must aspire, and pray, and be anxious to cooperate; but even greater graces must be given to us. For while in the illuminative way we should strive to live like Christ; in the unitive way, we should be able to say in the words of St. Paul, "I live, now not I, but Christ liveth in me" (Gal. 2:20). Here only may the heights of contemplation be attained.

We speak of contemplating nature, of contentedly recalling images; and there is the possibility of summing up in simpler form intellectual data, discursively acquired, whether historical, scientific, or philosophical, till we catch their synthesis as in a flash and admiringly dwell upon it. Supernatural contemplation, too, is a simplification, the simplification not only of the intellectual approach toward God at the natural level, but of the affective acts of which the will is capable through the supernatural virtue of charity.

It is no wonder, therefore, that this simplification requires not only an advanced degree of purification, an habitual self-control, and a further prayerful yearning for God, but additional supernatural gifts which are specially referred to the Third Person of the Blessed Trinity: the gifts of the fear of offending God, of piety that fills us with a joyful, filial confidence in our heavenly Father, of knowledge, understanding, and wisdom as to all our possible relations with God, of counsel as to the best way to meet them, and of fortitude in overcoming all obstacles. Though by no means reserved exclusively to the unitive way, the gifts of the Holy Ghost may be expected to be especially rich and copious here.

But there will be degrees. On the unitive way, spiritual writers distinguish acquired or active contemplation, infused or passive contemplation, and a mixture of both.

In active contemplation, also called the simple unitive way, affective prayer becomes even more simple, not only free from discursive reasoning, but with its acts of love unified in a deep sense of the presence of God, and in a more direct and synthetic realization of all His attributes, till life becomes a pure consecration to the greater glory of God under the action of higher graces referred to as special gifts.

Only then, and even then only gradually, may acquired or active

contemplation, in which our part of initiative is still great, pass into passive or infused contemplation, in which we become more acted upon than acting. In active contemplation we work to act like Christ with the help of the special gifts; in passive contemplation the Divine acts in us by a special favor; the transition being sometimes so gradual that the soul may alternate from one state to the other.

When passive contemplation is reached, the imagination, intellect, and will become passive, the Holy Ghost acts on the soul directly, no longer through its faculties; and the soul responds with an ever more ardent love, till it experiences God as a living reality, even though this does not mean a clear vision.

With this passive contemplation, a special gift of God to whom He chooses, but which cannot be hoped for before a long practice in purification and a positive practice of the supernatural virtues, we have reached the mystical stage of Supernaturalized Humanism.

Mystical writers, summing up the recorded experience of privileged saints, have much to say about the suffering which may accompany progress on the unitive way. For, called to abandon the use of the senses, of the imagination, and even the acts natural to the intellect and the will, the soul finds itself in darkness, till it has learned to let itself be flooded with the divine light. Hence arise feelings of aridity, even as the soul longs for the more intimate union with God to which it is about to be admitted, till yielding itself to God in complete humility, the soul finds itself bound to God in an intimate union.

It has frequently been asked whether all men were called to try to travel not only on the purgative but on the illuminative and the unitive way. The answer would seem to be that those ascending paths are but one way, constituting as they do the full development of the spiritual life. Progressive as they are in their intensity, the same elements are at work on all: the co-operation of the will with the grace of God. The greater the co-operation the greater may be the grace, even though God always remains free to favor some more than others. All then may not attain to the fullest union with God possible in this life, but all can make use of the grace of God to increase their faith and their charity to the limits of their possibility. God is ever more bounteous to those who constantly strive to love Him more and more.

Evidently, with this brief study of the possible phases of Supernaturalized Humanism, we have ascended far from our starting point in classical humanism. We may note, however, that granting the existence of the triune God, the Incarnation of Christ, and the descent of the Holy Ghost into the souls of men; the spiritual life shows a most logical progression. From efforts to control our pride, our lust of power, and our sensual appetites, that we may act positively in imitation of Christ, it ascends to the possibility that God in turn may, if He so chooses, act directly upon our soul and unite us with Him as we become habitually more and more conformed to the will of God.

This may all seem the wildest imagining to the materialist who deliberately habituates himself to deal only with the physical world; and yet, as we have already begun to see, even those who through circumstances have had to work out their own religion, though not without God's help, or who would dictate its terms, have aspired to travel the same path. When the classical humanist speaks of controlling the passions in the light of reason, or when the Stoic goes so far as to condemn the emotions, they are evidently dealing with the purgative way. When Lippmann, still their disciple, talks about disinterestedness as high morality and high religion; when Spinoza views all reality as aspects of the one substance which he calls God, and speaks of the intellectual love of God; they are both visualizing in their own way an ideal of life in the changing world, in conformity with the illumination of an abiding law. When Babbitt, following Buddha, speaks of meditation on the higher will and of rising more and more out of the impermanent into the permanent, he is groping to describe in tentative terms the ascent to the unitive way; while the *nirvana*, even if conceived as an annihilation of the self, is an aspiration to that peace which can only be achieved by union with God.

Here, then, we can see that the Supernaturalized Humanism of the Christian message, in spite of the mysteries in which it is rooted, is logically superior to all other formulations of the highest aspirations of the soul, so unquenchable, so inevitably recurring, that truly they must flow from its very nature.

The Revelation of God the Creator cancels all efforts to explain all reality through one substance. It satisfies reason since the changing and the abiding cannot be one. The revelation that God is a triune God, Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier answers to the need

of explaining not only the origin of the human soul, but how it could be purified from the sins to which its freedom rendered it ever liable, and sanctified by grace that it might gradually free itself from sin and ultimately abide in the love of God.

The unaided efforts of reason ever oscillated between the denial of the spirit and the assertion that the spirit was all; between the deification of the passions and their condemnation as wholly bad; between the prideful setting up of the self as its own god and the aspiration of the self to seek the peace of annihilation.

Unaided reason thus forever tends to the extreme of exaggeration or of negation, but the Christian message, Christo-centric Supernaturalized Humanism, solves all antinomies: We are human, we are animal and rational, but we can rationalize the animal, and with the help of God's grace, divinize the rational.

There is no negation in the Christian message, but a call to an ever more abundant life, embracing our whole nature, in harmony with the will of God, with an ever greater and final happiness through the love and in the love of God.

That is why it may be said that even those who know not or turn away from Christianity must constantly circle around it, and that their best efforts to explain life in their own way can only be distorted aspects of its complete truth.

Such, the believer in Supernaturalized Humanism may say, is my alternative of thought.



# 8

## THE ALTERNATIVES OF THOUGHT

IT SHOULD now be evident that the American humanist discussion has led us to face, in a purely objective way, all the alternatives of thought. Hence the value of the American humanist challenge to naturalism.

In the course of the nineteenth century, as we saw, naturalism largely displaced Christianity and humanism in our educational system, and that the more easily since many of the Christian churches had become uncertain as to their creed, while even classical courses gave but a scant introduction to classical humanistic thought.

Thus many students in the past two generations knew little at first hand about either humanism or Christianity and took naturalism for granted. If they became teachers or writers they started from the premises of naturalism, as for instance Lippmann did. Claudel has well described the process, Hutchins the consequences, and Foerster the practice in many university classes. Textbook authors who write from the point of view of the naturalistic alternative without doing justice to the other views, and even more or less grossly disparage them without due examination, are legion. If Nazi Germany rewrote her textbooks from the point of view of Nazism, we have often rewritten ours from the point of view of naturalism. The obstacles in our day to a genuine intellectual life are therefore very great.

Babbitt's challenge to naturalism at least did for us in America what Brunetière's and Claudel's and that of so many others had done in France. It recalled to us that naturalism, even if it was the most prevalent in our academic circles, was but one of the possible alternatives of thought.

To the monism of naturalism Babbitt opposed the dualism of his humanism by recalling the difference between the permanent and the impermanent, the abiding and the changing. This brought us back to the beginning of Western philosophical thought, for West-

ern philosophical thought began in Greece with the realization that everything in nature was changing (Thales). Hence the question could rise: Was then ultimate reality a total change? Soon, however, it was surmised that there must be some cause for that change, and that this cause must be one of order (Pythagoras). No, said Parmenides, change must be an illusion of the senses. There can be only *being*. On the contrary, retorted Heraclitus, there is nothing but change; there can be only *becoming*. By 450 B.C., Empedocles was teaching that there must be *both* being *and* becoming, some kind of matter and an exterior force. Thus at the very beginning of philosophical speculation the two fundamental alternatives of thought appeared: there is *only* being *or* becoming, or there are *both* being *and* becoming.

A little later, Anaxagoras began to distinguish between mind and matter, while Leucippus, better known through his disciple Democritus, still accounted for change only in terms of matter. The temptation was now to play with the arguments on both sides, and an era of skepticism set in. There is only becoming and in terms of the perceiver, said Protagoras. Gorgias boasted that he could prove everything equally false, and Prodicus brought out the consequences that if there is no objective truth, there can be no laws and no ethics: whatever seems good is good.

To this anarchy of thought Socrates addressed himself. He took up the challenge of the Sophists by inquiring into the conditions of knowledge. In doing so he transferred the attention from the problem of change in the physical universe to the problem of the nature and end of man. He wanted men to know how to think that they might know how to live. Thus his whole inquiry culminated in an ethical doctrine. There was an intelligence above the world because there were evident ends in it. Man had a mind and he must cultivate it; for knowledge is virtue, it was held, and virtue means happiness.

Some of his disciples showed again how easy it is to rest in one-sided extremes. Euclid, remembering Parmenides, concluded that what Socrates had shown man can reach, the ideas, are the only reality. Antisthenes, on the contrary, exaggerated the Socratic doctrine to the point of despising all particular goods, so that he preached the proud ascetic detachment which is still called cynical, and which reappeared after Aristotle, somewhat corrected, as Stoicism. Finally Aristippus, recalling the saying of Protagoras that

only what seems true is true, took the opposite extreme, proposed pleasure as the only good, with the restriction that overindulgence begets pain. Thus his doctrine was a practical hedonism which, again after Aristotle, was to reappear as Epicureanism.

Yet Plato and Aristotle had but to elaborate upon the doctrine of Socrates to give us the two schools of thought which the great exponents of Christianity, St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, utilized and reinforced in turn, thus making them the basis of Western thought down to less than two hundred years ago. For them there were both being and becoming, an unchanging First Cause and a changing universe.

The point to be noted in this enumeration is that all the possible fundamental alternatives of thought were exhausted long before our time. Aristotle in particular faced all his predecessors including Plato. St. Thomas did the same, and moreover confronted Plato and Aristotle with the Christian Revelation. The consequence is that, in so far as we dropped Aristotle and St. Thomas, we could only return to some of the alternatives of the pre-Socratic or sub-Aristotelian schools.

This is precisely what happened after the later representatives of the great Aristotelian-Thomistic legacy failed to handle their doctrines in a vital way, and after within the newly formed Christian churches quarrels arose about the Christians' own tradition. Descartes went back to a complete separation of mind and matter which led again to a denial of each in turn. So we have once more the materialism of Democritus, the pure idealism of Euclid, the total becoming of Heraclitus, the agnosticism and skepticism of the Sophists, and the pragmatic hedonism of Aristippus. More specifically, Christianity was dropped in favor of Deism, Deism was replaced by pantheism, and pantheism in turn by naturalism, here materialistic, there idealistic, but essentially atheistic in its denial of a personal God who is eternal righteousness.

If then we are uneducated and bewildered, it is because the history of Western thought is not presented to us in its full perspective, so that we do not realize that the current skepticism, relativism and naturalism have their counterpart in the first bewilderingments of antique thought; and that monism represents a devolution which takes us back to the pre-Socratic systems.

In listing the alternatives of thought we may then take the two

fundamental systems from the beginning of philosophical speculation: there is only being *or* becoming; or there are *both* being *and* becoming. So we have either a monism or a dualism.

Monism today is the monism of becoming as opposed to that of being: the philosophy of total change, either an idealistic process realizing itself and appearing to us as changing thoughts, conditions, and institutions of men; or a materialistic process accounting for changes in men and society, as well as in animals and things, through the action of some physical forces of unaccounted origin. The least that can be noted as to the problems raised by these two systems is that they violate either the principle of contradiction: that a being cannot include its opposite, in this instance the absolute and the contingent; or the principle of causality: that every change must have a cause proportionate to its nature, and hence that life cannot have been begotten by matter.

But furthermore, to consider reality as one process of change, whether materialistically or idealistically, entails a whole train of most drastic consequences. The alternative to the denial of the existence of a Creator antecedent to the changing reality of the world is that the universe is self-existing; as is asserted in the manifesto of the American humanitarian naturalists who call themselves "religious humanists." This truly means, as the manifesto boasts: "that the time has passed for theism, deism, and modernism." But it also means that the whole of the history of Christianity in any form is but the history of a vast illusion or delusion.

The materialist does frankly say, as he must to be logical, that Christianity is a tissue of fables, an escape mechanism. His view of history must be that men were freed from such infantilism when they accepted materialism, and his understanding of working for the social order must be to uproot all faith in God or hope of immortality from the minds of men that they may be wholly consecrated to material progress. So, logically, he must be for the destruction of all existing churches whether Christian or even purely deistic. In psychology he is committed to explain human behavior wholly in terms of inherited reflexes or of brain modifications due to experience with the environment, and his highest ideal must be the hope of improving the environment that man's behavior may be improved. Likewise, the materialistic creative writer can only deal with the biological urges, and the physical reactions to their environment, of his personages. Nor can the materialist safeguard



the rights or even the notion of the human person. If there is no God who is the origin and end of man, then all possibility of inalienable rights disappears, since they are a corollary of the duty to follow an antecedent natural moral law superior to the State because it stems from God's essence.

The idealistic monist, with his illogical conception of an Absolute gradually realizing itself, may claim that he can still speak of God; but his God has fallen back into the confusion of the Platonic ideas and has issued from them as an unsubstantial ideal. This Paul Elmer More has shown. Even more drastically, the notion of God has become, in the wake of Hegel, a mere becoming that realizes itself through struggle; so that it is might only that finally makes right, while any means that may bring success may be used to attain supremacy, whether in the economic or political fields, or in international relations. As Lippmann brought out, neither can the individual so indoctrinated retain traditional Christianity nor maintain immortality in terms of the human person. He must re-interpret the whole of Christianity in monistic terms, until he may be accused by the naturalist of intellectual dishonesty.

As opposed to monism, we have dualism. The dualism of Plato clearly asserts an other-worldliness, and escapes the lack of logic of the monistic merging of the Absolute and the contingent, but it remains nebulous as to the being of God. The dualism of Aristotle, picturing God as the unmoved mover, gives us the majestic picture of the universe moved by the desire which the unmoved mover inspires. The modern Deists' idea of God as creator of the universe, but without further relations with it, completes the possibilities of a dualism short of Theism; and this dualism constitutes the second fundamental alternative. Buddhism and Confucianism, though not clearly deistic, can also be included under it, as they assert at least the dualism of the permanent as opposed to the impermanent.

In all dualistic systems we have the assertion of a reality distinct from and antecedent to the universe, and this is of the utmost importance. Because if righteousness, whether related to the ideas of Plato, the abiding God of Aristotle, or the clearly personal God of the modern deists, is posited as antecedent to the changing universe, it follows that human righteousness must be in terms of the eternal unchanging righteousness which is above change. Then we have a universe of law, and one which may include a law for man distinct from the law for thing. There may be evolution, but it will

be according to a pre-existing pattern through potentialities inherent in definite natures. Being is above becoming, and becoming is in terms of being.

So, instead of a purely pragmatic selection from the changing elements in terms of personal, social, or racial satisfaction, we may have a morality in terms of an eternal justice, of what ought to be, including the respect of inalienable rights once more assured by the necessity on the part of every individual to live according to the righteousness of the permanent and not according to the whims of a tyrant. The abiding is then clearly the measure of the changing. There is a reality above the flux of change, and man can master the flux because he can come to know something of that reality.

Deism may then have a natural religion and a natural ethics. It can and does speak of the Supreme Being and of the great Architect of the universe. However, since it does not recognize any possibility of intercourse between God and man, it cannot hold the Incarnation to be possible; and history proves it to have been the archenemy of Christianity, as it attacked the Christian church and all the churches as obstacles to the advent of a purely natural religion.

Classical humanism fits here. Clearly deistic with Aristotle, even though he does not conceive clearly the origin of the world, it recognizes fully an order in the universe in accordance with the divine laws so well described by Sophocles. And even when, with the Stoics, these laws became merely the laws within nature, they remained antecedent to man and he had to make them the norms of his conduct.

But it is only when we come to the theistic alternative that we get the possibility of Christianity, since philosophers have agreed that the word Theism, as opposed to Deism, means that God is not only the Creator but continues to have relations with man.

The peculiarity of Babbitt's humanism should appear more clearly against this background. In revolt against monism but unwilling to be an avowed Deist or Theist, he accepts as a general rule of conduct Aristotelian mediation, but speaks of eternal laws, of an element superior to the natural will but with which the natural will is to co-operate: the higher will which is superhuman since it is superrational, and may be supernatural since it is supercosmic, which can be meditated on, this meditation yielding religious intuition.

Babbitt's insistence upon using purely experiential terms, and

like Buddha avoiding ultimates, made this humanism so difficult to express in known terms that it lost a great deal of its possible effectiveness. But it also evidently belongs under Theism. It may be called an unavowedly theistic humanism, while the third element, that of the higher will, can be said to make it integral. Hence there is Foerster's statement that it was incompatible with revealed religion in the sense that it did not speak in terms of Revelation; but, on the other hand, we have Babbitt's own opinion that his humanism could rise to the religious level through meditation on the higher will, and that there could be co-operation between his understanding of humanism and the churches that used Revelation.

Here, too, we can measure Lippmann's progress from an atheistic Stoic self-sufficiency to a Theism proclaimed as absolutely necessary to safeguard the notion of the human person; and when Hutchins speaks of the need of a metaphysics, he evidently means one that is theistic.

With a fully worked-out Theistic Integral Humanism, such as we have described, faith in a revelation becomes not only possible but logical; since it stands not only for continuing relations between God and man, but stresses man's need of God's help for right conduct even in the natural order. So all religions which are connected with the biblical tradition belong under Theistic Integral Humanism.

We may then draw up the following table of the fundamental alternatives of thought:

PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS		CORRESPONDING RELIGIONS
MONISM	Materialism { Stoicism Epicureanism Modern Materialistic Evolutionism	Naturalism, the philosophy of becoming { "Religious Human- ists" or Humani- tarian Naturalists  The modernistic elements in Protes- tant churches
	Idealism { Neo-Platonism Spinozism, Pantheism Hegelianism, etc. Modernism	

DUALISM, the philosophy of being and becoming	Not clearly deistic but dualistic	{ Buddhism, Confucianism. Aspects of Stoicism and Epicureanism. Classical Humanism.		
	More clearly deistic	{ Platonism		
	Clearly deistic	{ Aristotelianism 18th Century Deism (Cf. Voltaire) Modern deistic Rationalism (with possible tendencies to Theism)		{ "Natural Religion"
	Theism	{ Unavowedly theistic but clearly integral Humanism (Babbitt)		
		{ Avowedly theistic but not as clearly integral Humanism (Lippmann)		
		{ Distinctly Theistic Integral Humanism		
		{ The dualistic realism of the Aristotelian- Thomistic tradition, when to its psychol- ogy of the "rational animal" it adds an analysis of the na- tural state of man.		{ Unitarianism Judaism (Present Day) Mohammedanism Supernaturalized Humanism: Apostolic Roman Catholicism The Greek churches The English church The traditional Protestant churches.

The table reveals not only the two clearly contradictory alternatives of monism (the philosophy of becoming) and of dualism (the philosophy of being and becoming), but also that within each there are gradations and even blurrings. All monistic doctrines, however, merge man and whatever they still call God with nature; so their general doctrine has come to be known as naturalism.

When we reach dualism, we pass from Buddhism which is clearly dualistic only in that it opposes the permanent to the impermanent, through the Platonic dualism of "this-worldliness" and "other-worldliness," the "other-worldliness" of "the ideas," to the thoroughly worked-out dualistic doctrine of Aristotle which is clearly deistic.



Stoics and Epicureans, though monistic materialists, often speak in dualistic terms, so that they must be recalled under dualism though not belonging to it, while classical humanism in general is, like them, dualistic in its psychology and in its estimation of moral values, though not necessarily clearly deistic.

With the deist movement of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, finally represented by Voltaire, we get an undoubted Deism, but it is hard to determine whether deistic rationalism in general (Descartes, Locke, and even Rousseau) does not merge into Theism. Here the criterion is whether a personal God is considered merely the Creator or also considered as remaining in constant relations with man.

So we pass to Theism, and here the criterion becomes that of the Theistic Integral Humanism which recognizes not only God the Creator but the need of help from God to secure righteous human conduct. As we saw, Babbitt's humanism is not avowedly theistic, but on the other hand, it does assert the need of an element above the rational, and hence we may call it integral; while the later Lippmann became an avowed Theist without going into the question of the need of God's help.

Distinctly Theistic Integral Humanism is most clearly expressed in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, too often known only as "scholastic" philosophy. Thomistic psychology is purely Aristotelian, but before passing into theology it must study what man would have been in the natural order, and so establishes the principle of Theistic Integral Humanism: the need of the help of God for ethical behavior.

When we come to attempt to classify the various religious systems against this background, we see that the so-called "religious humanists" or humanitarian naturalists of "the manifesto" clearly belong under naturalism, as do the modernistic elements in the Protestant churches, though modernism is more clearly idealistic.

Unitarianism has a unique position at the confines of Deism and Theism. Its adherents are probably not always clear whether they are Deists or Theists. Some might even recognize a supernatural end for man, but they evidently cannot believe in grace through Jesus Christ though they may utilize the ethics of Christianity. They may easily pass to modernistic views, and the religious humanists out of their own church have challenged them to abandon even Deism.

Present-day Judaism is more clearly theistic, but it is not clear

on what basis it would accept a doctrine of supernatural grace. Mohammedanism has enough Christian elements to be theistic. It certainly practices prayer to God, but, as it believes in determinism and pictures a heaven of sensual pleasure, it evidently does not belong under Supernaturalized Humanism.

The distinction between Theistic Integral Humanism and Supernaturalized Humanism is wholly in the raising of man from the natural to the supernatural order by means of supernatural "sanctifying grace." This is necessarily most easily studied in Apostolic Roman Catholicism, since its whole creed is fixed; but the Greek, the English, and the traditional Protestant churches all retain in some form the doctrine of grace.

In the separation of the Protestant churches from the Roman communion there entered many political factors; but what actually still separates the Christian churches is their difference of outlook as to the means of supernatural grace and the transmission of those means. In so far as the Protestant churches believe in private interpretation, their doctrines are always liable to disintegrate; hence the passing of some of their elements to modernism, with the religious humanists asking them to pass to naturalism. But in proportion as they do so, they evidently cease to be traditional churches.

To clear up our respective beliefs, we need therefore to ask the following questions:

Are you a monist, a dualist, or a trialist? the word trialist being used to denote those who believe in supernatural graces as well as in both matter and spirit.

If you are a monist, you have completely abandoned the biblical tradition so far as its conception of ultimate reality is concerned, though you may still use its ethical code. You can only be an atheist or some sort of pantheist, and you cannot use the word religion in the traditional sense.

If you are a dualist, you may be in the biblical tradition, but not necessarily, as you may be merely a Deist. You can at least be a humanist in the classical tradition.

If you are a trialist, if you believe not only in the physical and the spiritual which meet in man, but in the need and the possibility of a help from God even in a supposedly natural order that man may lead an ordered life, you are a theistic integral humanist.

If further you believe, and you can do so only on the basis of revelation, that man was raised to the supernatural order by the

grace of God, that this grace replaces the help that God would have given to man in the natural order, and that it does much more, lifting man up to a supernatural life and making it possible for him ultimately to enjoy the Vision of God in the next life, then you are a believer in Supernaturalized Humanism. You may then belong to one of the traditional Christian churches, and those churches can remain traditional only in so far as they continue to adhere to this doctrine. The full sacramental system, as a divinely instituted means of supernatural grace, is sacredly retained in the Catholic Church from Apostolic days.

Adherence to one or the other of the Christian churches or else to Unitarianism will have to be settled on the basis whether we believe that under God's dispensation the Incarnation was necessary to make supernatural grace again available to man, whether Christ founded a Church which was to teach one doctrine authoritatively, and instituted as a means of grace a sacramental system to be administered by those whom He appointed and by their successors duly appointed in turn; or whether doctrine and grace may be considered as wholly a matter between God and the individual.

Some such survey of the alternatives of thought should at least enable us to understand more clearly just where we personally stand. It should also give us the basis for an objective comparative criticism; for, irrespective of our own personal beliefs, we should be able to analyze all other possible beliefs dispassionately and objectively. Only a complete listing of all the basic alternatives, from the simplest to the most complex can enable us to do this. The most limited is found to be materialistic monism, and the most extensive is Supernaturalized Humanism.

What should also be clear from this survey is that each alternative of thought has its own range of thought. You can choose the alternative you prefer, but you cannot change its range; and, once you have chosen it, you must think exclusively within that range.

This is so true that once we know whether a writer is a monist, a dualist, or a trialist, and writes as such, we can not only know what is his possible range of thought; but if we know the facts of the subject he treats, we can know before reading him how he will have treated his subject.

The materialist cannot speak of God or of grace, or even admit the power of abstraction in psychology. The idealist must rewrite the life of Christ in his own terms. The mere deist and even the

theist who does not believe in revelation must consider all Christian thought a tissue of fables; both must rewrite the whole of history and limit education according to the range of thought of their own alternatives. We should know, before we read a book, to what alternative the writer adheres, unless he were practicing comparative criticism.

This brings out another fact which too often escapes us, namely, that we lose our freedom of thought in proportion as we think that we know anything. Not only do we lose our freedom of thought with respect to all other alternatives of thought, once we have chosen one, but we lose that freedom of thought within the chosen alternative so soon as we hold any fact within it to be true.

The materialist loses his freedom of thought with regard to the composition of water so soon as he believes it to be scientifically demonstrated that it is composed of oxygen and hydrogen, as much as the Christian does when he believes that the historical record establishes the historical fact of the Resurrection.

When the Protestants began to deny the doctrinal authority of the Roman Catholic Church they gained freedom of thought in so far as they denied tenets which that Church had taught to be objectively true; but they lost it again so soon as they asserted tenets of their own.

Nor could even complete skepticism give freedom of thought; for, if we say that we are unable to know anything, even which alternative of thought is true, then our freedom of thought is at zero, since thought of any value is held to be impossible.

So, the only possibility of freedom of thought is in ignorance, either ignorance of which alternative of thought is true, or ignorance of facts within that alternative. What we really wish to maintain, when we speak of freedom of thought, is freedom of research to put an end to that ignorance; so that the end of freedom of research is to put an end to our freedom of thought. The baby is free to think that he may eat red pepper; but, after a bit of experimental research, he will take a dogmatic stand on its edibility.

Only such dogmatic stands can assure progress. If genuine knowledge of objective reality makes us lose our freedom of thought, it adds, and it alone can add, to our range and possibility of thought. One objective truth is the key to many others. The freedom of thought due to ignorance is barren, but the loss of that freedom through knowledge is fruitful. It is objective truth that makes us



free, free from ignorance and free to search further into the implications of the truth we have found. The prospector who ignores where the gold really is remains free to roam about, but he is glad to have that freedom removed by his discovery of the mine. Progress in any truth is vertical rather than horizontal.

It is objectively true that the physical world is material and changing, and that its changes can be measured. The materialist within his range of thought can make many discoveries. We may well honor then all those who helped to develop the scientific method, the method which starts with the observation of change in the physical world, passes on to a hypothetical generalization, tests this through further experimentation, tentatively formulates a theory, and keeps it open to the control of further experiment, until it is abundantly proved to be an objective truth.

The success of the scientific method does not mean that other methods are not needed. The range of thought of the materialist is the most limited because he recognizes no other method of discovering objective truth than physical experimentation and measurement. But methods of physical measurement are of no avail outside the world of changing beings. And historically, as shown by the table of alternatives of thought, other vast domains have been explored: the metaphysical and the supernatural.

The issue between the physicist and the metaphysician and Christian is therefore not one of nondogma versus dogma. The physical scientist must be as dogmatic as the metaphysician and the Christian, once he believes that he has conquered his ignorance and passed from a hypothesis to real knowledge about physical reality. The issue is one of method. Are there other methods besides those of the physical sciences to arrive at truth? The metaphysician and the Christian know that there are; the question at issue, as we saw, is whether the methods that they use to arrive at their conclusions are sound.

We must, therefore, list all the alternatives of thought which the historical record reveals; and, in proportion as we are called to discuss them authoritatively, we must know something of them at first hand through the books in which they have been best expressed.

A remarkable aspect of the American humanist movement is that from various quarters, there sprang the proposition that college education should be reorganized in order to become liberal again

and that to be liberal it should fundamentally consist in the reading of such books.

We must then try to see how, through such an educational reform, the attempt was made to reliberalize American education by making it more than mere conditioning in technical skills, mere second-hand presentation of the history of thought, or mere indoctrination within the narrow range of the naturalistic alternative.

# 9

## HUMANISTIC EDUCATION I: THE ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE EXPERIMENT

Now that we have worked out the relation of humanism to the perspective of Western thought, we may ask: Has there been in the past ten years any practical progress toward making the reaction of dualistic humanism bear upon American life? The answer is "yes," and in a most complete and unexpected way, taken both directly out of Babbitt's critique of American education, and out of Hutchins' independent recovery of what he considered it meant to have a liberal education. Moreover, even more surprisingly, an unprecedented advance toward concerted action was recently achieved by all the churches on the basis of Theistic Humanism.

This last epoch-making development deserves separate treatment as a final study of that possible humanistic and religious co-operation of which Irving Babbitt spoke. But before we take it up, we must see how the American humanistic renaissance found a chance of developing and trying out its own idea of educational reforms in the college and in the graduate school. We may study the first in the experiment of St. John's College in Maryland, and the second in the work of Norman Foerster and of the School of Letters at the University of Iowa.

It was in 1937, as we saw, that President Hutchins invited Scott Buchanan and Stringfellow Barr to come to Chicago with some of their graduate students from the University of Virginia to form a Committee on the Liberal Arts for a three year study of what the curriculum of a liberal college should be.

The same year, at Annapolis in Maryland, St. John's College for men (the third oldest in the United States, because after its foundation in 1784 it absorbed the King William School founded in 1696) was facing the need of a reorganization. A member of the Board of Visitors and Governors who knew Scott Buchanan,

chairman of Mr. Hutchins' Committee on the Liberal Arts, interested the committee in coming to St. John's College. Stringfellow Barr and Scott Buchanan became respectively president and dean of the new St. John's, and President Hutchins became chairman of the governing board. In September the new program was launched with twenty freshmen. This new program was drastic; it abolished all electives, and set the students to reading the "great books" as still tentatively listed by the Chicago committee. A catalogue was issued with a manifesto of the henceforth well-organized humanistic revolt in college education.

Why the revolt? Because the American college was held to have ceased to be liberal since it had capitulated to the electivism of President Eliot of Harvard which led men to consider any given subject matter as important as any other. Many new subjects and units had been added to the curriculum, but the principles for their selection in terms of a liberal education, the argument ran, were forgotten. Courses came to be picked for uneducational or for utilitarian reasons. But vocational training, preparation for professional schools, or for money-making do not constitute a liberal education; nor do the social contacts, the athletics and extra-curricular activities which became for some additional, and for others the principal reason for going to college. What, then, is a liberal education? A liberal education is one which makes the student really human. In its purpose at all events the St. John's revolt revealed itself to be a part of the American neo-humanistic movement.

What distinguishes man as such, St. John's recognized, is that he has an intelligence distinct from that of the animal so that his needs are not only physical but intellectual and spiritual. Man is capable of understanding. To understand, he must not only learn facts and store them in the memory, but must distinguish between them, think his way through to their significance, and come to do so habitually. "Ultimately the ends of a liberal education are the intellectual virtues," was the conclusion arrived at.

To be liberally educated in the proper sense should mean to have been liberated from thoughtlessness, from the sway of animal appetite and caprice, and thus to have become a free man capable of governing oneself and hence of working for the good of society. Only by such a discipline can the spiritual, moral, and civil liberties be safeguarded. The point is that — aside now from the indispen-



sable positive religious education — this discipline can only be achieved by the practice of the liberal arts.

So much for the criticism. What about the constructive program which should show us what liberal studies must be?

The liberal arts are the distinctly human arts, the arts of thinking. Now we think through symbols, through words, and through numbers. We must, therefore, learn to read intelligently, to write intelligently, to reckon intelligently. Yes, the liberal arts really reduce to the three R's — reading, writing, and reckoning. But note that those three R's imply much. The Middle Ages recorded those implications in the trivium: grammar and rhetoric, the techniques of reading and writing, and logic the technique of thinking. In the quadrivium were included: arithmetic, geometry, music, astronomy. Music is here the Pythagorean name for mathematical physics or measurement in physical science. The products of those liberal arts were: first, the fuller study of philosophy and theology (namely the products of logic working on the study of man and of a possible revelation); second, the physical sciences (or the products of measurement and of logic); and last, history and literature (the products of logic, grammar, and rhetoric).

How then can we best study the liberal arts? We can do so by studying the productions of those who best practiced them. That is where the great books become of service, at least the greatest books of the Western World, in history and literature, in mathematics and science, in philosophy and theology. If we read them intelligently, if we think our way through them, if we practice restating their content, we shall obtain a liberal education through the personal practice of the liberal arts which produced them; we shall develop the intellectual virtues.

Truly this means an educational revolution. It means not only to give up studying for practical ends, but to give up studying "subjects" as ends in themselves, or languages, for instance, as languages. Books, written in whatever language, are to be read solely because they represent the highest travail of the race to discover objective reality, to think through the problems it raised, to record what worthy works men had done, to voice their noblest emotions and aspirations in the most adequate form. Such books complement one another. They are inexhaustible in their implications; they are understandable by and have lessons for every age; they have been constantly read since they were written; and they

must be read by all who would become free men capable of creating a free civilization. These most highly representative books are in a liberal education to be the means used to insure the training of men as men.

How far the books chosen and the methods followed at St. John's answered this ideal will have to be discussed. Clearly, however, the St. John's faculty were burning their bridges behind them. What? No study of subjects as such, practically no reading of secondary or explanatory books, no seeking of information for mere information's sake, no majors, no minors, no electives, no concentration and distribution, no preprofessional work as such, no practical end whatsoever; only one end: mental training, in an age when psychologists teach that there is no such thing as mind? Right, said the St. John's faculty; and moreover, no unrelated or disturbing activities, no extramural athletics, no exclusive clubs, no extracurricular pursuits whatsoever except in terms of the one central aim.

Here, then, was most original pioneering in the restoration or inauguration of methods of liberal teaching, entered upon in the most honest spirit of inquiry through experimentation, since the list of great books had been revised for some twenty years, and since it was through the actual handling of them that there had come the realization of what a liberal education should be. Whether, again, we would agree with this selection is quite another question.

How, then, was the new program to be carried out? First, by classifying the great books historically: from the dawn of Greek thought to the Alexandrian period; from the end of that period to that of the Middle Ages; from the end of the Middle Ages to the middle of the eighteenth century; and from there to our own day — a classification which was to correspond to the four college years. Secondly, and especially, by developing special teaching techniques. Four were worked out gradually as had been the list of books: seminars, tutorials, laboratory work, and formal lectures.

The seminars are the backbone of the new procedure. They handle the reading of the great books. In them ten to twenty students meet twice a week for two hours with at least two instructors who act as leaders of the discussion. The real teacher is the great book discussed. The instructors and students are the learners, the instructors representing a stage of understanding somewhere between the author and the best student. Thus, the

intelligent reading of the great book is a co-operative enterprise, each learning from those above and teaching those below through the discussion of the meaning of the passages read, of their beauty, adequacy of expression, and informational content.

This effort to understand and to restate the productions of the greatest minds constitutes a practice of the liberal arts of thinking and of expression. It should issue in a greater capacity to read intelligently, to think logically, to speak and write more clearly. Likewise, through the books dealing with science or mathematics, the liberal art of understanding measurements, of thinking in terms of quantities and of their relations, is developed with a corresponding growth in that power.

This means that in the seminars the Socratic method of the dialogues of Plato is assimilated, and it is not a little significant that the first freshman class to practice that method, while supposed to read only three of the dialogues of Plato, read them all except the *Laws*.

The seminars, then, furnish the core of the whole teaching procedure, both the basic intellectual experience and its general analysis. But this very experience motivates a more detailed study and practice, and consequently more leisurely self-improvement. This is furnished by the tutorials, which must be divided into the language and mathematics tutorials, according to the liberal art practiced, the art of expression or the art of reckoning.

These tutorials are more prominent in the student's schedule than the seminars; the seminars meet two evenings a week from eight to ten, whereas tutorials are held five mornings a week. For them the students are divided in groups of not more than ten; one hour being assigned to the language tutorial and one to the mathematics.

In the language tutorial is given an opportunity to study Greek, Latin, French, and German, one a year for the four years, not for their own sake but as instruments in the practice of the liberal arts of understanding a text, of storing the memory, of enriching the imagination, of perfecting the powers of expression. During the first term — the college year includes three of about ten weeks each — declensions, conjugations, and passages of good prose and poetry are committed to memory by rote, the danger in the process being avoided "by devices that force memory to carry its proper load of imagination and thought."

It would be clearer that this will be the result if the rule were laid down that experience with the language shall first be given through the passages to be memorized, and that the declensions and conjugations are to be isolated from them. At least, however, we are told that the texts selected are analyzed, and that this yields the grammatical knowledge which is necessary to understand a text and control a translation. It is also implied that the principal rules of syntax are deduced from the texts studied; for we are told that the work "contributes to the knowledge of universal or general grammar, such a knowledge of forms being an indispensable part of the liberal art of expression."

Thus, the St. John's faculty seems to have recovered the principle according to which Latin was studied at the Renaissance, and by the classical colleges out of the Renaissance, notably according to the Jesuits' rule: Study not merely to understand Latin texts, but study them as means to self-expression.

At St. John's after the mechanism of the language studied has been isolated from memorized short texts, the second term is given to translation of longer specially significant texts. These provide occasions for a further study of the grammatical mechanism of the language, and also for the study of stylistic variations; attempts are next made to express the same thought in English in as many different forms as possible. These efforts at an original expression in the vernacular of an idea found in a classical author is followed in the third term by "grammatical, rhetorical, and logical commentaries on the texts read." Finally, original writing on the topics suggested by the texts is called for.

All this implies that St. John's has also recovered the practice of the great neo-classic writers: to assimilate the best productions of the ancients, to profit from the liberalizing experience, and to use the power thus acquired to create in turn. It was through such enrichments of the imagination, of the sense of word values, of critical thought, that the French writers of the seventeenth century, a Molière, a Racine, a La Fontaine were able to contribute original masterpieces to world literature.

The same principles govern the mathematics tutorials. Just as educators have lost the conception of the use of the classics as incomparable material for the practice of the liberal arts of thought and expression, so have they lost the conception of mathematics as the liberal art which fits men for the study of the sciences of nature.



Essentially, the most elementary and the most advanced intellectual life are the same. Mathematical ability and ability in reading and writing differ from individual to individual; but everyone must develop them to lead a truly intellectual life. Therefore, at St. John's, just as men are first taught to read and write by studying Homer because Homer's is the first great achievement of the West in secular writing; so are they taught to reckon by studying Euclid because Euclid's *Elements* is the book which revealed the possibilities of the science of measurement to the Western World. When the study of mathematics is revitalized by being conceived as the practice of one of the liberal arts, it is shown to depend on a continual use of the imagination and of logic, just as much as literary creation. So, even in the freshman year, along with the Euclid they study in tutorial, the students read Aristarchus and Archimedes so as to see from the start how mathematics contributed to the genesis of the physical sciences.

But, as in language and literature, so in mathematics and science there must be experimentation, and if possible, original experimentation, since these studies are in turn expected to yield training in the practice of a liberal art. Hence, St. John's adds a third technique to its learning process: the laboratories in which the students spend at least three hours a week the first two years, and six the last two. Necessarily there are three types of laboratory: the mathematical, the analytical, and the synthetic.

The mathematical laboratory is equipped with the basic instruments of measurement in all the sciences so that the freshmen who use it learn not only how to handle instruments, but also that instruments embody mathematical principles; thus they are led to realize how intimately physical research is linked with mathematics.

The second type of laboratory, the analytical, is used throughout the sophomore and junior years, during which the students read in the seminars scientific and mathematical works from Nicomachus to Boyle. In this laboratory they repeat the basic experiments which first uncovered principles and opened up whole fields of investigation. By thus going back to the earliest scientific discoveries, and retracing the fascinating and truly awe-inspiring, cumulative findings of the men endowed with superior powers of imagination and reasoning to whom we owe our knowledge of the laws of nature, the student gets a genetic, dynamic initiation to science. The recapitulation of the growth of the liberal art of scientific research

cannot but issue in a growth of the capacity to appreciate scientific achievement and its requirements.

The mathematical and analytical laboratories provide a repetition and manipulation corresponding to the handling of language and techniques of expressions in the language tutorials. To secure self-expression and personal contributions in science is evidently more difficult than in letters. But at least there can be a third kind of laboratory, the synthetic, in which problems are handled that call for the combining of scientific findings. The medical sciences furnish them: problems of the cell, of blood balance, of embryology. This work is reserved for the senior year.

Finally, at St. John's, there is a fourth teaching technique. The seminars, the tutorials, the laboratories, following a Socratic method of discovery, are sharply opposed to the lecture system which in college so often issues in that dull perfunctory handing out of information which has been described as the passing of the professor's notes to the student's notes, without passing through the heads of either. As opposed to this, St. John's would restore the lecture to its dignity as an artistic exposition of a subject in which interest has already been aroused. Such lectures are given formally in the Great Hall once or twice a week by members of the staff or visiting lecturers; they are complementary to the seminar or laboratory work, and afford an opportunity for historical or philosophical exposition or recapitulation. Their character is indicated by the following titles of lectures which were actually given: *Grammar*, by Stringfellow Barr; *The Liberal Arts in the Middle Ages*, by Otto Bird; *Leonardo's Last Supper*, by Edgar Wind; *The Intellect*, by Mortimer Adler; *After Rousseau*, by Alexander Meiklejohn; *Man's Immortality*, by Jacques Maritain; *Form in Music*, by Nicolas Nabokov.

Once again the students are called on to try to achieve something original corresponding to the models to which they have been exposed; and on the first of June is due from each student a long essay. This may be in the form of a lecture on some subject suggested by the great books.

With the seminars as the core of the curriculum, and with the tutorials, laboratories, and lectures drawing from and contributing to the understanding and the utilization of the great books in the practice of the liberal arts, St. John's College is most evidently an

organized unit of liberal education. But there is still a large area of the standard college life which remains to be considered: the extracurricular activities.

Student activities are necessarily elective. Personal interests and natural talents make men go in for dramatics, music, political clubs, the college paper and magazines, athletics, and debating. Hence the tendency in elective-system colleges to have activities become academic work: drama workshops, schools of journalism, music departments, super-organized intercollegiate athletics for practically professionalized teams, the concerns of political clubs taken over by the departments of political science and sociology. Lopsided vocational development thus absorbed what should have naturally remained supplementary avocations for the well-rounded development of every student, mere adjuncts of his humanistic education.

The problem for St. John's was then to rescue the legitimately elective activities from the undue emphasis which oriented them toward professionalism, and to restore them to their due place and function in the organic educational scheme of a truly liberal education. This could only be done by making the core curriculum generate extracurricular interests, and the extracurricular activities add reciprocally to the development begun in the classroom.

Learning should contribute to life. College learning should contribute to college life, and college life in turn should further motivate the learning. Since, in an organic whole no part must be developed out of proportion to that whole, semiprofessionalized athletics, for instance, which lead students to enter college that they may be athletes, should be discarded. For the same reason the college should not become a school of music, but be a school in which all those fitted to do so should be able to develop the acquaintance with music required by and consistent with a well-rounded education. The same holds true for publications and the drama. In short, no extracurricular activity should become an end in itself, but all should remain so subordinated to the educational process as a whole that no student may be prevented by extracurricular activities from giving sufficient attention to the curriculum. Moreover, extracurricular activities should be distinguished according to their relation to the total picture of the liberal arts.

There is, therefore, at St. John's a hierarchy of such activities. First come discussion groups of students and faculty "to investigate

the legal and political problems in domestic and world affairs, and to explore the great topics in religion and theology" raised in the course of the readings. Likewise, there is a scientific club for the further study of scientific questions, and a workshop where both faculty and students may practice the manual arts begun in the laboratory.

Besides these activities which grow directly out of the classroom, others spring naturally from the social life of the vital community which a liberal college should be. Here music and athletics come into their legitimate own; there should be plentiful athletic fields and a music center, equipped with records and instruments, in charge of a skilled musical director. This person can also help in the formation of glee clubs, madrigal singer groups, chamber music ensembles, music discussion groups, and can arrange for such programs by visiting artists as will give the students a historical view of the development of music, and lead to its appreciation.

On the same principle the college paper reports and comments on the college life as a whole, as the life of a community schooling itself in the liberal arts; the year book, eschewing the razzle dazzle so common now in such publications, is a magazine summarizing the educational activities carried on and the progress made during the year. The dramatic club enacts plays that may be ranked among the great books.

Finally, semiprofessional athletics are replaced by intramural sports of all kinds, competently directed and participated in voluntarily but almost universally.

The purpose is that this symmetrically enriched life for all should issue in a more responsible and agreeable social intercourse. Liberally educated men should be able to create a community on a higher plane. St. John's, therefore, not only turns over to the students as much as possible of the government of the college, but provides centers for social life in the dormitories and in a complete central social unit with reading rooms, a music room, a coffee shop, and bookshop. It offers, too, the background of its whole colonial past and a gracious setting of architectural dignity and simplicity on the banks of the Severn, with colonial Annapolis near at hand and the capital of the nation not far away.

Facing the problem of a positive religious faith is not so simple. Although St. John's is strictly nondenominational, "it recognizes its intellectual responsibilities to religion." The theological



problems of the Christian faith necessarily come up in its seminars and the purpose is to deal with them objectively. How satisfactory this treatment can possibly be under the circumstances is another question. Further discussions are reserved for Sunday evening lectures at which student attendance is voluntary, and all students are encouraged to practice their religion in the neighboring places of worship in Annapolis. These include Episcopal, Methodist-Episcopal, Baptist, Presbyterian, Evangelical Lutheran, and Roman Catholic churches, and a synagogue.

In such an academic community the instructors naturally retain their cultural and intellectual superiority. The leadership of its liberal life remains with them both inside and outside the classroom. Strangely enough, there may actually be no general cultural intercourse in a university or college. Babbitt was fond of saying that a university faculty was likely to be a collection of mutually repellent particles.

The reason is that the university specialist who has been brought up under the elective system which denied him the general culture of a liberal education, may be comparatively mute for at least three reasons. He may know little outside of his own specialty; he disdains to talk below the level of the special scholarship he has attained; few are able to meet him there at his level, and he is seldom able to meet his colleagues at theirs. It is a common saying that few are the college professors who could pass one another's examinations. A miscellaneous group of specialists, scornful of general ideas, considering the fine art of gracious conversation to be below them, are therefore likely to become and remain silent after some feeble remarks about the weather, unless they mix in college politics or have some common pet peeve at the moment. To the best of them, social intercourse is likely to be a painful interruption of research. The scholar has ceased to be a gentleman.

To have such a corps of teachers would be fatal at St. John's. Faculty members who are at home only in their own specialty are incapable of creating a liberal college for the good and sufficient reason that they were not made to live through the tradition of the liberal arts before they were allowed to specialize. They are shackled by their specialty; they cannot teach liberally.

The elective system not only bred such specialists, but encouraged them to become ever more narrowly such. As each subject became

a separated unit, the professor was asked to become a more and more prominent representative of that subject through research in that field, dissociated from others. A professor of English may have had little French or even little English literature in comparison with English philology. And vice versa in the case of a professor of French. Likewise, a sociologist or a philosopher may know little about the literatures; and in general, the literature professor may know little about philosophy or theology; while a professor of education, busying himself primarily with the machinery of education, may come to forget the little he knew about its subject matter and become wholly uneducated.

All this means that not only do many specialists cripple themselves as specialists by the neglect of other fields; but also that, while university professors need to be specialists, teachers in a liberal college need to be something more. They need to be vitally conversant with the whole range of subjects which make up a liberal education, and with the handling of the liberal arts as instruments of such an education.

It is often said that the college teacher who does not continue to be a researcher must soon become a second-rate professor. That is perfectly true in the sense that the teacher must be a constant learner. But in the elective system of closed specialties the saying has come to mean that one should be called a good teacher only if he continues to make contributions to the existing knowledge in his specialty. The effect of this has often been that university men who teach college classes have considered the teaching of their subject at the lower levels as of secondary importance; and have often come to view this teaching impatiently, as an impediment to research. They grew in this attitude the more as the quality of their teaching in the first two years of college would not be credited to them unless they pursued their specialty at the level of the graduate school.

What is wanted is evidently a realization that the liberal arts college should be an institution absolutely distinct from the graduate schools. For the end of the graduate schools is to give equipment and training for research, while the end of the college should be to insure a liberal education. No progress can be made so long as the graduate school remains scrambled with the college, or the college with the graduate school at one end and with the high school at the other.

The solution is to conceive secondary, or liberal, education as a field distinct from higher education, and to recognize the need of the specific training of teachers for this liberal work. Such teachers must be researchers, but researchers in their own fields; not at the limits of the knowledge within a special field, but within the whole subject matter of a liberal education, both as to its content and the best means of handling it, in terms of the liberal arts.

If, once well grounded in the great books and skilled in their uses for liberal teaching, such teachers choose to leave the college field for the graduate school, they may well be asked to make a distinct contribution to the specialty in which they now elect to concentrate. Their theses will be the more valuable in that they will have visioned them against the broad background of the whole liberal tradition.

There is really nothing new in this point of view. It is taken for granted wherever the tradition of secondary education, as a liberal education, has been maintained. For instance, in France where the *lycée* represents that tradition, candidates fit themselves for lycée teaching by preparing the *licence* and *agrégation*, organized with this sole end. If they are ambitious to pass on to graduate teaching in the *faculté*, they do research work, at their leisure, on a thesis subject which is not supposed to require less than five years of preparation.

Because St. John's recovered the conception of what a liberal college should be, quite aside now from its concept of the books which should be read, it also recaptured the sense of the kind of research a liberal college teacher should be asked to do to prove his competence. He should not only be acquainted with whatever masterpieces he teaches but also with the background of their genesis. This means that he should know many other books besides those on his minimum list, among them scholarly works on the authors read. He should be able to read the texts in their original languages at least well enough to control their translations. He should be prepared to discuss their interrelations and oppositions in thought and form, to generalize on his findings and to connect them with present-day problems. He should be able to write, talk, and lecture like a gentleman. In short, to train others in the liberal arts of thought, expression, measurement, and evaluation through acquaintance with the highest products of these arts, the teacher should first discipline himself in those arts. He must have as-



simulated ever more vitally the basic inheritance which their practice by the best intellects has produced.

Such a training is a matter of years, especially if one's undergraduate work has not been of this nature. It is notable that the teachers retained at St. John's had for the most part wide and varied educational experiences. Oxford, Paris, Ghent, Bruxelles, Göttingen, Petrograd, Würzburg, Leipzig, Berlin, Toronto are among their universities as well as Chicago, Columbia, Virginia, Michigan, California, Johns Hopkins, and others. But, eventually the best St. John's instructors will be graduates of the new St. John's; and the present instructors can fit themselves for their task only by going repeatedly through the program which they ask students to follow. The St. John's instructors, then, must constantly do research in liberal studies which contributes directly to their teaching, as, for instance, translations or editions of the great books. They have actually done so.

With St. John's, something new evidently has sprung up in American education, even if it is the recalling of something very old, a belief in higher mental processes that need to be developed and disciplined through practice on material worthy of them, no less than physical powers do.

This means the recovery of the college as such, as an institution designed to train men to pass from the primary through the secondary stage of development, from an elementary acquisition of the tools of expression and measurement, and of information, to a systematic development of the powers of accurate observation, induction, and deduction, and of the habit of critically examining data. Thus a consciousness of man's nature and a consequent scheme of values, intellectual, aesthetic, and moral, may issue in the character of a free man — a man freed from the impulses of temperament and from primitivistic ignorance as to what constitutes the distinctly human.

This is traditional secondary education as opposed to both the primary-elementary and the professional. How many are incapable of rising above the primary-elementary is one question. But there is no question but that those capable of doing so should do so before they pass on to specialized studies. They should be humanized by an acquaintance with and a discipline through the humanities before they are allowed to become professionalized. On



the other hand, professionalizing, training for specialities, should not be too long delayed. Secondary education belongs to adolescence; it should be over at the latest by the twentieth year.

If the American scheme is now, as all agree, in such a mess, it is because it grew up alongside the original colonial colleges which were soundly humanistic on the European model. As these colleges were for the few, the public schools developed first an eight-year elementary school, then a four-year high school. Such high schools might aim at the development of skills, commercial or trade, and, as such, were needed. However, when they were not technical schools, they really took, at least in part, the place of the traditional humanistic college; and yet they came to be considered to be merely preparatory to college entrance.

The college was thus pushed back into the seventeenth to the twenty-second years of life, and hence educators were bound to be tempted to begin professional training there. It thus became one third high school, one third a higher secondary education school, and one third professional. The result was that the development of human beings as such was lost in the shuffle, the more surely when the naturalistic doctrine of free electivism was introduced and finally blurred the very idea of the need of a distinct, humanistic training.

The advent of the St. John's College program has furnished a precedent and a proving ground for the restoration of a clear-cut scheme of humanistic secondary education.

This does not imply that from other points of view it might not be criticized. The St. John's students read one hundred and twenty-three authors in four years. Forty-seven of these are listed under mathematics and science, thirty under literature, twenty-three under philosophy, and twenty-three under history and social science. This means that at St. John's the students read more of the ancient classics than is done elsewhere; twelve Greek authors and five Latin are listed under literature or philosophy. The genetic study of mathematics and science is begun with Euclid and Hippocrates, and includes forty-seven authors down to Veblen and Young. This also is certainly unique. But as regards the initiation to the modern literatures and history, doubts must arise. Eleven French authors, five English authors, one Italian and one Spanish can hardly constitute an introduction to the modern literatures; the professor of history must gasp on noting that his subject is represented by only

one English historian, and Gibbon at that, the United States Constitution, and the Federalist Papers. It should be noted, however, that Herodotus, Thucydides, and Tacitus are read, and that many books on the list contain much historical information.

As material for training in thinking through representative texts, much may then be said for the St. John's list, but as an adequate introduction to subjects, the program is necessarily unsatisfactory since it does not pretend to furnish such an introduction. Likewise, St. John's makes no provision for the oral mastery of modern languages. But without the mastery of at least one, along with a reading knowledge of others acquired in the adolescent years, the student must remain permanently handicapped, especially in the postwar era.

What, then, may our conclusion be as to the St. John's experiment as a contribution to the American humanist renaissance? Perhaps a fair judgment is that it is purely what it purports to be: an experiment in secondary education, taking the term in the sense of preparation for university as distinct from college work.

As we saw, it does not pretend to teach subjects but to train the mind through the practice of the liberal arts of reading, measurement, and expression. It does not use books even as introductions to the several literatures, or to history, or even to social science, philosophy, or religion, but as apparatus for mental exercise. It seeks to give formation not information. It would be unfair, therefore, to compare it with the upper courses of the average college. It is not an institution of higher learning but of higher training.

The St. John's experiment thus reveals more concretely how difficult it is to solve the problem of organizing secondary education. Shall the ancient language be taught, shall the modern, and how many? Shall the modern be taught merely as tools of research, as means of literary appreciation, or also as means of social intercourse? Should there be only an introduction to the sciences, or conditioning in scientific methods? How can a complete historical background be given, and can it be given except in terms of one of the alternatives of thought?

How shall any of the alternatives of thought be studied? Through the reading of texts, as St. John's attempts to do; or through survey courses, as is done at the University of Chicago? If through texts, can seventeen-year-olds, on first readings, really get to understand

Plato, Aristotle, and St. Thomas, when philosophers still quarrel about their meanings? If through surveys, will these be more than misleading outlines, or more than facts chosen and arranged in the light of the naturalistic alternatives of thought, so prevalent among professors?

Evidently the new humanistic educational program so far devised is not as yet satisfactorily worked out. The American humanists, so far, have relied principally on literature for the study of man. It led to the accusation from the humanitarian naturalists that they were mere "literary humanists." This was unfair since the American humanist revolt is primarily philosophical. Nevertheless, they did seek the law for man chiefly in the literary records of what they called the wisdom of the ages.

This record is invaluable, but the limitations of the purely literary approach to the study of man should also be clear; for, after all, literature is not the study of wisdom. So long as literature does not become philosophical writings, it is the record of what men have felt and of how they have behaved, more than of what they have thought, although their behavior ultimately depends on their philosophy. Hence the need of a philosophical approach to the study of literature.

But even the behavior record is far from accurate. Honest women, it has been said, have no history, so that the novel and the drama, since they must deal with conflicts, are likely to picture only extraordinary cases; while the lyric is essentially an expression of emotional excitement or disturbance. This means that literature presents most frequently, magnified studies of revolt, and only indirectly testifies to God's eternal order. Hence precisely the many condemnations of authors by humanistic critics. But, as we already recalled, even the acclaimed classical and neo-classical writers have their limitations in philosophy and ethics. High moralists such as Bossuet, and even low ones such as Rousseau, have denounced the very loftiest classical literature. Few are those to whom the humanists can refer as undoubted masters of a sound humanism or high religion. Rare are the poets who are both poetical and wise. Conceding to literature its own aesthetic domain, it cannot possibly be hoped that it may replace the systematic study of philosophy and of religion. To ask of literature what it cannot give, or give only in fragments after laborious siftings, is to attempt a task which can easily be discredited.

The battle for the new age must then be fought out on the philosophical field, science not being in question so long as it does not degenerate into scientism by making pronouncements outside its own field. So the issue narrows down to the opposition between dualistic humanism and monistic naturalism. In what books shall we find them best expounded? Such is the final problem if we are to organize a critical humanistic education.

The St. John's list of such books is certainly more inclusive than the readings of most students in standard colleges. How far is it satisfactory?

On the dualistic side it includes Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Augustine, Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, Pico, and Pascal. On the monistic, Lucretius, Epictetus, Plotinus, Scotus-Erigena, Hobbes, Spinoza, Berkeley, and Hegel; and a third group of nonmonistic authors who, in one way or another, historically helped the development of monism: Bacon, Descartes, Locke, Hume, Leibniz, Kant, and James.

It is hard to see how, even from the St. John's viewpoint, this reading plan could adequately introduce the student either to the dualistic or to the monistic outlook, or make him aware of what is at stake in the choice to be made between their contradictory alternatives. Neither is the development of monism since Hegel, nor the dualistic revival of the past sixty years represented.

Moreover, the masters of dualism are studied in the first two years — St. Augustine, for instance, and St. Thomas — and are in danger of being blurred, even if they had been adequately understood, as in the last two years the transitionists and the monists hold the stage.

Finally, there is no indication and even no assurance that the perspective of Western thought will be shown to have been practically dualistic from Socrates to the seventeenth century, and since then to have become a gradual devolution from dualism to monism. This remains the more uncertain because the readings are necessarily fragmentary, and no material is furnished to study the advance of monism in the nineteenth century and in our own, as well as the surging reaction against it today.

But even if all this uncertainty were removed, the question would remain: Has the St. John's student become a humanist? A truly critical comparative study of the history of the alternatives of thought is necessary to develop a critical intelligence, but even



a critical intelligence may remain bogged in dilettantism or skepticism. Naturalism did not become all-influential by remaining detached. Humanism and religion can become or remain living forces only by being living convictions.

In this connection, it is of importance to Catholics and should be of interest to others to know on what principles Catholic authorities would solve this question.\*

1. The title "great books" in so far as it is applied to the whole St. John's list is a misnomer from any religious point of view, since many of the books selected are atheistic, or generally monistic. They can be called great only in so far as they are outstanding expressions of their positions, but as such can only be considered sources of error by the Theistic Humanist and by the Christian.

2. The intellectually immature should not be exposed to such books.

3. The Catholic Church insists on the need of schools which will make the student acquainted with Catholic doctrine and help him to secure a supernatural as well as a soundly natural development. In college, the student should continue his study of humanistic and Christian thought, and of the evidence of its objective truth as revealed by God and as disclosed by a science that does not proceed beyond scientifically established facts. The books representing opposite doctrines may be introduced as the more mature student needs to know the history of secular thought; but he should continue to be instructed on how to distinguish the true from the false.

4. In general, censorship of reading is integral to the discipline of the Catholic Church. This censorship is exercised by means of the Canons on reading and the *Index Librorum Prohibitorum*, and is applied to all books defending heresy or schism or attacking the fundamentals of religion or morals.

5. However, permission may be obtained to read such books whenever justification for such a permission exists.

6. Basically, all the laws of the Catholic Church are founded on the principle that she has been commissioned to teach and safeguard revealed truth.

\* The data for the six points which follow was kindly furnished by the Editor of *The Science and Culture Series*.

The problem of education is then not an easy one. The forever open mind which is satisfied to hear all voices and never to conclude, is in a way a comfortable ideal. It is easier not to take sides. In fact, it is one of the main attractions of the philosophy of total change that it does not denounce any position outright, since we may hold that it was good enough for its time; nor does it ask us to defend our own position as definite, since it, too, may become obsolete. This, however, is but to condemn us to the infantile, romantic thirst for the ever new and so to blind us to the reality of the unavoidable consequences of the eternally true.

For, evidently, if the contrary alternatives of thought have inevitably contradictory consequences, we must choose according to the kind of civilization we wish to see developed.

Obviously, St. John's cannot be said to have answered all the questions involved here, nor has it proved, nor has President Hutchins proved, that all young people in the nation are capable of receiving a liberal education. But the St. John's experiment at least enables us to see more clearly that a secondary education college should graduate its students as early as their eighteenth to twentieth year, if only because St. John's certainly does not give enough of an introduction to the several subjects.

The war has accented the need of earlier graduation from college, and we now hear proposals for a time schedule of six years of elementary school, three years of high school, and three years of college. This proposal should prove satisfactory. If such schools could be integrated we could recover the *lycée* system: secondary education, primarily for formation, could again be sharply distinguished from education for information and from knowledge of specialties.

The war's educational experience also brought out that intensified studies, in languages, for instance, could yield better results than have been usually obtained. It stands to reason that more progress can be made if a language is studied exclusively for a term of some two hundred and twenty-five class hours, than if it is studied forty-five class hours a week along with three other subjects.

Evidently, too, a St. John's student, graduating with good habits of reading, of measurement, and of expression at nineteen or twenty, could give the next two or three years with more profit than

now to the exclusive study of a specialty, and to whatever additional studies he would need for it.

Such a reorganization of secondary education could easily be carried out in colleges having high schools attached and in private college preparatory schools which could add two years to their schedule, reorganize their whole course as a unit of secondary education, and get charters enabling them to grant the A.B. degree. The smaller colleges might add two or three years of high school to their curriculum, and incidentally overcome the competition they now have from the large universities by sending their students there with an A.B. In fact, those universities would have to follow suit, on the model of the universities which already have high schools, and reorganize a six- or seven-year course to graduate their students at nineteen or twenty years of age. They would then be made up of a *lycée*, a graduate school which would give a two- or three-year A.M. for specialized higher study, and institutes for specialized research leading to the Ph.D.

The reorganization of the public school system on a six-three-three scheme would not be essentially difficult, since we already have the junior high school. At the high school level there would no doubt have to be differentiations on the basis of individual capacities. A greater number of technical and trade schools, which would include some work in the humanities, would have to be provided. These could lead to institutes of technology in various directions, for which there are now many precedents in army training.

The need and possibilities of such reorganizations we shall meet again after studying Norman Foerster's critique of the American educational system. We shall then look further into the question of practical stands on alternatives of thought. But there is no doubt that, no matter how many problems still remain to be worked out, St. John's College in Annapolis, Maryland, has made a challenging contribution to American education, and to the American humanist movement.

# 10

## HUMANISTIC EDUCATION II: THE CRITIQUE OF NORMAN FOERSTER

ONE of the most interesting features of the humanist revolt in education is its dual origin. It dates back to the first writings of Babbitt in his *Literature and the American College*, and to the gradual return to the reading of the "great books" begun by Erskine and culminating in a practical organization by Hutchins. We have studied the latter development in the organization of St. John's College. We now need to see what became of the critique of education begun by Babbitt.

In spite of his return to the subject in his article on President Eliot, first published in the *Forum* in 1929, and reprinted in *Spanish Character and Other Essays* in 1940, Babbitt had no time to work out, and no opportunity to carry out, a complete plan of reform. Nevertheless, his ideas in education were to be fully exploited, and in such a way that we may study the effects of the humanist revolt, not only at the college level as with St. John's, but in the reorganization of graduate work in the humanities. To do this we must turn to the life work of Norman Foerster.

Norman Foerster undoubtedly proved to be the most persistent and productive disciple of Irving Babbitt. A specialist in American literature, he was well prepared to apply a humanistic critique to the American scene. Born in Pittsburgh, Pa., 1887, he was graduated in 1910 with an A.B. from Harvard where he had come under the influence of Babbitt, and from its graduate school went as instructor in English to the University of Wisconsin. Four years later he transferred to the University of North Carolina where he was to remain until 1930, when he was called to the University of Iowa to organize the School of Letters, a most original venture which Eastern universities should regret not to have thought of.

In 1928, after publishing several scholarly editions of English and



American authors, Foerster edited American critical writings under the title *American Criticism*. This work closed with an essay, written, he tells us, in 1926-1927, entitled "Criticism in the Twentieth Century." In it he indicated his adherence to the doctrine of Babbitt and More, but without mentioning their names. That year my own *Le Mouvement Humaniste aux Etats-Unis*, finished two years before, was being printed in France, so that I could not utilize Foerster's work. But evidently those years, 1926-1928 (Babbitt's *Democracy and Leadership* had appeared in 1924) were the earliest in which a general view of Babbitt's doctrines could be given. In 1929 Foerster published *The American Scholar*, a critical pamphlet on the literary scholarship ideals of the American universities, and the next year he edited the symposium which made American humanism a topic of national discussion: *Humanism and America*.

The contributors to this symposium by no means formed a homogeneous group. The most Foerster could say for them as a whole was that "none of them could be suspected of a secret attraction to those pseudo-scientific and humanitarian short-cuts to truth and morality that lead in fact to pure skepticism and anarchy." He concluded that they were merely "assembled temporarily for the sole end of offering suggestions toward that new integration of values which may yet justify modernity."

This was a clear, renewed challenge to all forms of naturalism, but it was far from being fully worked out. Of the group there assembled, Paul Elmer More, as we saw, was to write a few months later an essay on the insufficiency of Babbitt's humanism; and Gorham B. Munson at the end of the same year published *The Dilemma of the Liberated* in which, after sketching the national debate which followed upon the publication of *Humanism and America*, he concluded with an Hegelian dialectic that Babbittism should be absorbed by its adversaries to lead to a new synthesis. Bernard Bandler went even further. He found a way of writing an essay in the very volume, *The Critique of Humanism*, which, a few months after the publication of *Humanism and America* used invective and derision to discredit it.

Of all the contributors to *Humanism and America* G. R. Elliott and Robert Shafer remained with Foerster the closest and most articulate of the disciples of Babbitt, Elliott notably publishing in 1938 *Humanism and Imagination*. But Foerster alone developed a systematic and prolonged exploitation of Babbitt's humanism. Before

the end of 1930 appeared his *Toward Standards* which reproduced his basic essay, "Humanism and the XXth Century"; in 1937, his constructively critical study, *The American State University*; the next year, *The Future of the Liberal College*; finally, in 1941, in *Literary Scholarship, Its Aims and Methods*, with his colleagues John C. McGalliard, René Wellek, Austin Warren, and Wilbur L. Schramm, he told in detail what was being done at Iowa toward rescuing the humanities from being treated as mere fact subjects, whereas they are essentially and traditionally value subjects. Since then, in an Iowa University Symposium on *University Studies and the Peace* (1943), and another, *The Humanities After the War*, published by the Princeton Press (1944), he made his humanistic critique bear on the new world crisis the coming of which Babbitt had prophesied. Slowly, patiently, quietly pursued, Norman Foerster's whole work deserves the most serious attention and critical analysis.

As a thorough student of American literature, Foerster was able to show us, first of all, the whole American literary background against which the American humanist movement was developing. In his *Toward Standards* he recalls how Whitman marked the end of the Romantic Age; how from the nineties on, Hamlin Garland, Stephen Crane, Edwin Arlington Robinson, Frank Norris, and Edith Wharton heralded the advent of realism; and how, in the second decade of the century, the realistic reaction in poetry of Amy Lowell, Robert Frost, Vachel Lindsay, Edgar Lee Masters, and Carl Sandburg was continued in prose by Theodore Dreiser, Sherwood Anderson, and Sinclair Lewis, and in criticism by John Macy, Van Wyck Brooks, Randolph Bourne, H. L. Mencken, Carl Van Doren, Henry S. Canby, and Lewis Mumford. John Macy's *The Spirit of American Literature* marked a date because it denounced America as being essentially bourgeois as shown by its acceptance of a third-rate household poet like Longfellow as opposed to the vigorous Walt Whitman. The spirit of the new literature was then a spirit of revolt which claimed to look forward to the picturing of a mode of life distinctly American, or distinctively modern, a viewpoint which meant the immediate and local present.

But, as Foerster points out, there was really nothing original in the new American realist movement, nor, it might be added, in what would presently become the symbolist, and, eventually, the

surrealist experimentation. All these tendencies merely followed, with considerable lag, similar movements fully developed in France. Thus while the new writers proclaimed their antitraditionalism, they were really following a tradition — the tradition of the naturalistic current which triumphed in France with the second half of the nineteenth century, but which really goes back to the French eighteenth century naturalists and to their rationalism which was always threatened by skepticism and tinged with romantic emotionalism.

Here Foerster follows Babbitt in telling us that this trend toward a purely naturalistic view of man, which comes to consider him wholly immersed in nature, begins with the development of science in the seventeenth century, though Bacon, Newton, Descartes, and Locke were still profoundly religious in the traditional sense. By the middle of the eighteenth century, however, the Deists already held that to believe in a supernatural revelation of religious or ethical truth was to be unenlightened; that the physical universe was the only needed revelation of God; and that man, far from having a corrupted nature was naturally good and indefinitely perfectible. Hence the new faith in human nature which Rousseau was to propound, the creed that man would be good if he were not corrupted by social institutions.

This was to usher in the romantic era, later fed, it should be added, by the Hegelian current which made the progress of man the expression of the evolution of the Absolute and led to a pantheistic view of nature. Man was now king over himself as Shelley expressed it in the often quoted line: "free, equal, unclassed, tribeless, nationless, exempt from awe, worship, degree." The ideal of naturalism, man wholly uncircumscribed and his own end, can never be better expressed.

Reality, however, gave this romantic notion of the goodness of man's instinct the lie; and so did the further progress of science, especially after Darwin proposed his explanation of the matter: man's nature was not corrupted by "a fall," but still harbored some of the instincts of the beast from which man was now considered to be descended. Hence the gulf between Wordsworth and Hardy, and even between Tennyson and the naturalistic school which developed out of the materialistic determinism of the new science.

As both romanticism and realism referred man merely to nature, the first optimistically, the second pessimistically, both were opposed



to the Christian and to the humanistic views of life. They were, therefore, bound to combine in various ways to extol the pride of man, his self-sufficiency and his self-reliance, though one said he faced a favorable, and the other a hostile physical nature.

Subservience to a recent movement of the flux was then all that was back of the growing twentieth century American mentality. To this subservience of American writers, the American humanist movement opposed the larger human experience which alone can emancipate from the moods of the moment by recalling the whole tradition of the wisdom of the ages. In exploiting this program Foerster was to go a long way toward giving us a humanistic criticism.

As distinct from such a needed critique, Foerster recognized four schools of criticism stemming from naturalism: the historical, the psychological, the expressionist, and the impressionist. These, if not replaced, were at least to be supplemented.

The historical critic has no concern for values. He is merely interested in knowing how a given book came to be, or to exercise an influence as part of the evolutionary process at a given time. The psychological critic also is interested merely in facts and causes, his concern being with the author's mentality. The expressionist critic, with Croce, looks upon each past product as a unique expression, the intensity or vitality of which is to be measured in terms of the intent of the artist. Finally, the impressionist critic is not even interested in how the work of art came to be, but uses it to tell us about himself. All are content with what they present as facts and abstain from judgments.

Impressionism may be interesting and even instructive if the critic is widely cultured and sensitive, a Lemaître or a France. It is also worth while to know the history of a work of art, to understand the psychology of its author, and to compare what the artist actually achieved with what he set out to do. But if these types of criticism can tell us a good deal about how the work of art came to be, they do not tell us whether it deserves to be. For they are products of the naturalistic philosophy of becoming; they deal quantitatively with the processes which make the work what it is. But they tell us nothing about the amount of being the work may have in relation to man, nothing about its value.

Humanistic criticism, based on a philosophy not of total becoming, but of being, or at least of the abiding in the changing, will want to know more than how the work of art came to be. It will



want to know what permanent human values are emphasized or contradicted as the result of the work's coming into being. It will insist upon passing judgment in terms of what the work is and ought to be.

What distinctions, then, will humanistic criticism make?

It will first recall that all works of art have not equal importance.

Kinds as well as degrees of beauty must be distinguished. A sonnet of de Hérédia may have the perfection of its kind, as much as Racine's *Athalie*, yet they are not equally great; nor are *The Ode to a Nightingale* and *King Lear*.

In evaluation, moreover, the quality of the material selected is to be judged separately from the form. Humanistically speaking there is a hierarchy of experiences, those of the senses, the feelings, the reason, the ethical will. The romantic stresses sense and feeling; the realist, sense and reason; the classicist subordinates sense and feeling to reason and ethical imagination. Because it thus gives the primacy to the more important realms of experience, his art offers the finest conception of beauty. Foerster concludes: "Prizing reason, ethical control, and insight as the height of human power, the humanist critic might view classical art as the nearest approach to the ideal kind. Exalting what is essential, subordinating what is secondary, it approximates an all-comprehensive, duly proportioned kind of art." This, of course, does not imply an approval of all works of classical art, but of its high achievements expressive of "reason, ethical control, and insight."

Nor does he hesitate to put the ancients before Shakespeare as having given to ample materials firmness of inner meaning and of outward form, thus securing both "quality and quantity of beauty." This was a return to tradition. To be a traditionalist, however, is not to be stagnant. On the contrary, it signifies to be alive with the highest experience of the race and ready to incorporate with it the new experiences of our day.

The traditionalist does not deny the value of originality. He merely points out that an ignorant originality will inevitably run to arrogance, artificiality, puerility, and idiosyncrasy. Hence the need of utilizing one's vitality in the light of what has been proved to be objectively true, centrally human, abidingly living, if one does not want to remain perpetually primitive.

Thus to the naturalistic intoxication with the supposed spontaneous and blind *élan vital* which is held to yield the working of

nature in all domains including the human, the humanist opposes in the aesthetic as well as in the field of conduct the control of reason and of the higher will, thus achieving "a human purpose or design."

This ideal, here expressed in Babbittian terms, but translatable into those of Theistic Integral Humanism, is fundamental in the aesthetic of humanism. It does not deny inspiration, which after all must come from experience, though it may be stored in the subconscious. But it calls for the use of the characteristic human power of selection at all stages, from remote preparation to revision. Above all it looks for that higher type of imagination which comes from "a superconscious activity congruous with our humanity," and which is recognized by the ancients and by such a Christian poet as Milton in their invocation to higher powers.

This is "the aesthetic aspect of the humility of humanism." It implies the recognition of vitality and of originality but in due subordination to conscious design, as opposed to the naïve trust in "the turbid flood of nature." It issues in the achievement of a maximum quantity of beauty, not through the identification of art with nature but through labor, strenuousness on the humanistic plane of reason, and higher insight.

All this the humanist critic will keep in mind. He will seek a historical understanding of the genesis of the work, and even a psychological understanding of the author; he will read the work sympathetically to try to understand what were the author's aesthetic experience and intention, but he will pass on to a judgment of the book's value. He will first try to evaluate how far the artist has succeeded in carrying out his aesthetic experience, or failed through technical incompetence, lack of talent or sufficient industry; but he will go on from the evaluation of the sincerity of the author — most authors are sincere — and of the efficiency of the execution, to the soundness of the work. He will grant that the work possesses beauty of form, but he will ask: What does the form enshrine?

Here the criterion can no longer be the artist's intention or technical requirements, but it must be the human objective reality. Naturalistic art exploits its conception of man as merged in nature. Humanistic criticism will judge art from its own conception that man is distinct in nature. As Foerster puts it: "The philosophy of humanism finds its master truth, not in men as they are (realism),

or in men as worse than they are (literary naturalism), or in men as they wish to be (romanticism); but in men as they ought to be — 'ought,' of course, not in the usual restrictedly moral sense, but with reference to the perfection of the human type."

So it must be, Foerster concludes, with American criticism: "to be worthily American we must be worthily human," and that tradition of the human can perhaps be best recovered and reasserted through art since it has now a far larger audience than technical philosophy and similar approaches.

Hence the need of a humanistic critique to point out to the modern, who flaunts tradition, that he is merely shutting himself up in a more recent past, as the American realists did in the case of French realism. Only humanistic criticism can reach "the center of life and art" and judge change in the light of the tradition of abiding truth.

Such a critique, too, is needed to provide an understanding public. Traditionally humanity asked about works of art: What kind of truth do they offer and what is their ethical quality? Criticism today must ask these questions anew and work out the necessary relation between the present and the past, that the future may be integrated.

The reform of criticism is a basic need because upon its quality depends the development of truly critical minds who can pass judgment in the light of the whole experience of the race, and thus have a chance of achieving personal and social integration. But the development of an acquaintance with the whole human inheritance is a matter of education.

Foerster was thus led to pass from his preoccupations with the evaluation of literature to a study of the status of the American university. His call to head a school of letters at the State University of Iowa offered him a unique opportunity to study that status. The result appeared in 1937 in his *The American State University in Its relation to Democracy*.

He begins by recalling that American education and American democracy were at their origin truly humanistic because discriminating as to quality. Jefferson believed that all men were equally endowed by their Creator with inalienable rights, and that all normal men had enough common sense to recognize the better policies when presented to them by truly critical leaders. He did not believe,



however, that all were equally endowed with talents, though superior talent might be found in all social strata. Nor did he believe that critical leadership could be easily secured. Hence his selective educational scheme proposed to the state of Virginia soon after the Declaration of Independence.

But Jeffersonian had to yield before Jacksonian democracy which represented the challenge of the equalitarian Middle West to the more aristocratic Atlantic border. It may be granted that Jacksonian democracy was the more typically American, because pioneers and immigrants, starting life anew on a plane of equality in an era which was to become scientifically industrial, were a unique phenomenon in world history. Their call was for the immediately practical as opposed to leisurely nurtured humanistic culture. Hence, inevitably the rising universities came to consider it their duty to give their students what they immediately needed for material progress and power in their own communities. As one president came to express the fact: "No intellectual service was too undignified for them to perform."

The current philosophical movement was to hasten that tendency both in its materialistic and secularized outlook, replacing the religious concern about one's private character by the desire to be considered a useful, successful, and humanitarian citizen.

Foerster dwells at length on the educational chaos which resulted from this naturalistic conception of education with its call for the amassing of facts as such, its development of an efficiency which altered circumstances might turn into a fixation in maladjustment, its lowering of standards, and finally, its loss of all comparative sense of values.

In spite of an artificial prosperity, disillusion appeared in the twenties, financial collapse in the thirties. The old unquestioning confidence was gone. Educators began to "doubt and drift."

Foerster, who had by then fully developed the educational implications of his humanism, called for "a free and creative reconsideration, conducted in view of the permanent nature of men, as well as the special concerns of the time, of what should be the role of higher education in a constitutional democracy."

What materialistic naturalism had done was to lead us away from democracy and toward collectivism. To aim at social efficiency, as opposed to personal development, is to consider individuals significant only as parts of society, with society their end and master.



A nation so educated is ripe for sympathy with communism and on its way to totalitarianism.

Democracy, on the contrary, stems from the religious and humanistic affirmation that the human individual, however indebted to the State, is both the source and the end of the State. The State exists that men may attain more easily their own end which is a self-development commensurate with their nature of rational and free persons. Education must therefore do more than fit them to be cells in a social organism. It must liberate them from ignorance and the domination of their lower nature, and lead them to become truly men, masters of their lives and qualified members of society, through the possibility of rational choices. Democracy calls for a liberal education.

The founders of the American democracy had such an education. England and France treasured it. Newman defined it. As opposed to the mere building up of specific memories and skills in the nervous system, it calls for the development of the mental power to analyze, compare, discriminate, judge, choose rightly; in short, for the development of all those capacities and qualities possible for man because of his distinct nature.

That kind of education distinguishes between body and mind, it believes in the culture of both for health and vigor, that citizens may be fit to take up whatever specialty they may prefer, and moreover, develop a well-balanced character.

Newman would add: with the help of religion. In the humanistic vocabulary of Newman we find such words as the following to denote adequate ideals: clear-sightedness, sagacity, wisdom, philosophical reach of mind, intellectual self-possession and repose, application, flexibility, method, critical exactness, resource, address, adequate expression, refinement of taste, mental vision, veracity, probity, equity, fairness, gentleness, benevolence, amiableness. The development of all those qualities is to be achieved through the continual use of reason, imagination, and the rational will in touch with the whole experience of the race, including religious experience.

All this was merely Newman's endorsement of the ideal of traditional humanism. The Renaissance Englishman Sir Thomas Elyot and the Renaissance Frenchman Montaigne had this point of view. The Italian Vergerius summed it up superbly: "We call those studies liberal which are worthy of free men . . . that education which calls forth, trains, and develops those highest gifts of body and mind

which ennoble men, and which are rightly judged to rank next in dignity to virtue only."

The end of a liberal education is then the right use of leisure, freedom from excessive work, the free activity of the mind reaching out toward the highest in literature and art, and, beyond, to a religious sense of the permanent values above the flux of change in which our lower self is immersed.

The renaissance of classical letters, "*la renaissance des lettres*" as the sixteenth century Budé called it, might mean merely the quest of a good and gracious life in the purely secular terms the ancients had worked out; or, as it did for Budé himself, the attempt to combine such a life on the natural plane with the retention of Christian supernaturalism. The problem of the Renaissance was then: is there an opposition between the natural and the supernatural, this-worldliness and other-worldliness, or can they be reconciled? Many of the Renaissance men thought that they could.

However, the secular spirit not only won out, but the pursuit of letters was gradually abandoned in favor of science. The distinction between man and nature was lost, and the highest academic ideal became a factual scientific scholarship backed by a naturalistic philosophy.

Humanism and religion, both dualistic in their notion of the nature of man, now found themselves on the same side in opposition to monistic naturalism which claimed that it alone reached the real, because it alone was scientific.

Foerster's acquaintance with American academic circles convinced him that traditional religion could not get a hearing among the naturalists. There remained humanism. With Babbitt he hoped that humanism could get such a hearing because it could challenge the naturalists on their own ground.

The first step, then, was to challenge the naturalist on his claim that he alone was scientific. Science, after all, is knowledge of aspects of the universal attained through the study of the particular; as such, it was fully formulated by the dualistic, humanistic Aristotle. Science belongs to humanism, and the naturalist actually compromises science. He does so because he claims for it more than it can give. Science, reduced to the physical sciences, as the naturalist reduces it, can only give knowledge about the physical. To deny that there can be any other reality than the physical, because the labora-

tory can only study the physical, is to beg the question; in fact, it is to become unscientific because such a statement is a philosophical assumption, the assumption of the philosophy of monistic naturalism.

You may, for instance, in psychology make the hypothesis that man is an assortment of wishes and drives, and you may pin down some wishes. But that does not prove that man is merely such an assortment. To say that it does is not science but scientism: the erection of conclusions larger than the premises into ultimate truths. It is emotional, naturalistic scientism to say that science alone can insure progress, or that it alone follows reason. The two world wars now suffice to refute such an assertion.

Moreover, an examination of much of the so-called science of the day proves that, far from being rational, scientism divorced science from reason. This necessarily happens every time facts are accumulated without a purposive hypothesis; or whenever formulations are made which go beyond the facts. "Science," as Boutroux said, "cannot order us to do anything, not even to cultivate science."

To this the "social scientist" answers: "It is true that science has so far given us only control over physical nature, but we can develop a science of the control of man, by carefully gathering the facts in the economic, political, and sociological domains."

The only trouble with this proposition is that man cannot be studied by the method of the physical sciences. In his case adequately controlled experiments are impossible. Moreover, the social investigator is himself a man living in a given social group; and, as such, cannot be wholly objective and reliable as physical instruments of measurement may be. Furthermore, social facts have no value unless interpreted. But to interpret facts about man, as opposed to facts about physical nature, requires a scheme of values which cannot be set up without philosophical assumptions.

What happens in our current American university practice is that the would-be social scientist borrows those assumptions from naturalism. For it men are only a high species of animals. If he turns to biology or psychology, it will be to an animal psychology or biology wholly in terms of organic reactions. As human behavior is evidently much more complex, the naturalistic social scientist will be driven to assertions, patently contrary to the facts — assertions derived from his naturalistic philosophy.

Humanism remains on its guard against such unscientific procedures. It accepts physical reality and the determined world of



nature, and looks eagerly to the physical sciences for knowledge about it. But experience also apprises us of the reality of conscious purpose. Humanism holds that to deny such an experience is unscientific, and that to propose "to study man as a purposive being by the methods of physics or chemistry is about as inept as to study atoms or elements by the methods of ethics or aesthetics."

On the other hand, experience testifies not only to man's capacity for conscious purpose but to the possibility of studying freely purposive life. There can be knowledge about the distinctly human, as well as about the distinctly physical. The physical sciences are but one kind of knowledge, one set of universals, those attainable through the study of physical particulars. The science of the human does not limit itself by an hypothesis that the reactions and initiatives of the self are explainable purely in terms of stimuli and response. The science of the human is "inescapably personal."

It is, therefore, by a wholly unbiased study of all the immediate data of consciousness that humanism formulates its recognition of a duality in human nature. This duality, as a matter of fact, is recognized in the practice of living even by naturalists. To his own experience, the humanist is ready to add the experience of mankind as recorded in the oriental as well as in the occidental literatures; and in them he finds an overwhelming, even though not statistical, corroboration of his own experience that he is a being capable of purpose, that there are impulses in him, but also the possibility of dominating and canalizing them by the rational will. This is, as we saw, what Cicero summed up some four hundred years after Aristotle.

American humanism would go further with Babbitt, as we also saw, on the basis of oriental thought. Even Plato and Aristotle had hints of the possibility of an ultimate truth beyond the powers of reason to discover, so that, even in the classical tradition, in spite of the development of Stoicism, there is a suspicion that reason should have a sense of its limits, a humble realization that there is something higher than the highest possible human excellence. The Christian found the corroboration of that suspicion in the revelation of the supernatural. The Babbittian humanist would simply regard it as an experience of a higher self.

Here, nine years after his first statement of it in *American Criticism*, Foerster recapitulates his understanding of humanist psy-



chology: the two wills in man, the temperamental and the ethical, the will which endlessly desires and the will which restrains desire within limits. The first, made up of all our expansive instincts and energies, constitutes the material and power at our disposal. It is not to be disparaged, but it needs to be controlled and guided. Nor can these instincts and natural energies be trusted to check each other; sympathy, for instance, will not suffice to check the will to power. But experience reveals that man alone among animals has an inner veto, a power of control over instincts and energies that enables him to reach some end above them.

This, it should be noted, is a practical simplification of Babbitt's psychology, together with a blurring of Babbitt's distinction between the rational will and "the inner veto," or "higher will" which was Babbitt's cardinal doctrine and which made his system super-human by calling for an element above the reason. Foerster's understanding of humanism is, therefore, at least nearer the classical than various other interpretations and is thereby more readily usable in the academic field.

To reason belongs the scrutiny of general terms, the determination of right action or attitude in general and in specific circumstances.

Imagination may work either on the side of the temperamental or of the ethical will. In the former case it may fire the temperamental and make excesses, however perverted — such as the lust for power, wealth, or sex — veritable obsessions and almost irresistible drives which brush reason aside. Imagination so used is therefore unethical.

But the imagination may also service the ethical will. It then images what man ought to be and expresses it in the epic, drama, sculpture. It helps depict in comedy the types of excess, holding up to ridicule all departures from the centrally human. It furnishes even to religion appropriate symbols. So used, it may be called the ethical imagination.

Thus restated, humanistic psychology is reduced to "the control of the temperamental by the ethical will, with reason and imagination as its allies." Once he understands that he may thus school himself to live, man may hope to achieve the good life and to progress, not because indefinite progress is a natural law, as we have been told by the naturalists since the eighteenth century, but because social progress may be achieved by individuals, as humanism

teaches, provided they attend to their own personal progress toward self-control, as opposed to an instinctive behavior which, experience shows, constantly tends to excess.

We should thoroughly realize that, whereas animals can be good animals according to their kind, by following their instincts, this will not suffice for man. According to the humanistic and central Christian tradition men are not hopelessly or totally wicked but they are not naturally good. They have a capacity for goodness together with propensities to excess and evil. Society is not the enemy of the individual, nor is it responsible for his wickedness — the rich as well as the poor can be criminals — but society can be good only through individuals becoming good.

Man, a free being, must work out his own good life. Nor does this entail a loss of individuality. The originality of the uncontrolled, the development of what is supposed to be unique in individuals, leads to idiosyncrasy. Control leads to the originality of great men who are great because they have become deeply human.

Such humanized individuals, truly social men, liberalized from the natural anarchy of their instincts, are alone able to make up and help to achieve a good society; whereas mere social animals, still a prey to their individual lusts, can only beget social conflicts, national and international.

Since social control is achieved through self-control, it can be achieved in liberty. Where there is no self-control, social order must be imposed by authority. Even in the family, if there is no ethical education of the children, there will be anarchy, or there will have to be a harsh exercise of parental authority. Hence self-control and development are not purely selfish but social. Social progress depends upon intellectual and ethical leadership, the great majority of people being necessarily influenced by good or bad leaders. Christianity is essentially the imitation of Christ. Humanism looks for the impersonation of its human ideals in individual men.

What Babbitt meant by giving the title *Democracy and Leadership* to his greatest book was that the central problem of democracy was the problem of developing good and wise leadership. So Foerster concludes, recalling the conviction of Jefferson: "Whether the wise exist, and whether they will be elected as the people's representatives, will depend almost wholly on the kind of education conducted by the nation and the distribution of education according to ability."

Thus, too, with nations. To have a happy influence on international progress, states must first become ethical, internal leadership must "refrain both from commercial and 'idealistic' imperialism." Without such a leadership, the advent of a peaceful internationalism must remain impossible.

With this restatement of the humanist challenge to naturalism and to its offshoot scientism, we are prepared to study what should be "the education of men and women." It is really a question of being truly modern in the sense of being positivistic and critical, through the recognition of the distinctly human.

To be critical, which is the boast of the modern, we must take in the whole of reality. We must study not only the animal part of man which naturalistic psychology considers, not only human society as a form of animal societies as naturalistic sociology does; but we must study man "as known directly in his inner life, and its manifestations in social and political history, in literature and the arts, in philosophy and religion." We must study man as a free, as well as a partly determined, being.

How shall we do so? We should evidently modify naturalistic education, which is exclusively devoted to the study of facts and to the shaping of human tools for vocational efficiency or for the advancement of specialized scientific knowledge.

Naturalism cannot educate the human man because it knows only the natural and economic man. It recognizes as scientific knowledge only the knowledge of the physical, and it looks upon the humanities, upon art, literature, and even religion as recreative dreams which can at most furnish escapes from the business of life. It is true that naturalistic education pretends to teach how to think, but it consists merely of thinking within the assumptions of naturalism.

A humanistic education will not repudiate science, the study of facts, or the acquiring of tools; but it will further concern itself with the relative values of the facts studied, and of the ends for which the tools are to be used.

By the act of teaching to think it will understand not merely to think in terms of the physical sciences, but also to compare, to discriminate, to judge, finally to dominate facts by principles.

Thus it will aim to develop not merely fact-finding techniques but a critical mind "relating the scattered elements of knowledge,"



as Babbitt wrote as early as 1908, "not only to the intellect but to the will and character." It will thus transmute mere knowledge into culture.

This signifies, Babbitt further explained, "assimilating what is best in the past and present and adapting it to one's own use, and the use of others," and this process, "far from lacking in originality is akin to creation." This, incidentally, is what Babbitt did with the authors he read, and what Foerster did with Babbitt's works.

A liberal college education is thus differentiated from the lower schools where elements of knowledge and skills are imparted, and from the graduate schools where one should learn to extend the frontiers of knowledge. The college should be an intermediate step aiming to develop a thoughtful human being, one who assimilates in order to become habitually critical before new facts.

Far from being purely passive, assimilation at the college level should include a personal appropriation. Hence, the possibility of its issuing in a richer originality, and in a not merely more scientific, but in a more aesthetic and ethical outlook; in short, in a more truly human character. As Foerster sums it up: "Humanistic education has for its end 'the development of free human beings, with all that this implies, through thoughtful assimilation.'"

The thoughtful assimilation of what? Evidently, of all that is distinctly and most centrally human. Where is this to be found? No less evidently, in the productions of the greatest human persons, in literature, history, art, science, philosophy, and in religion productions worked out in the light of the human reason and ethical imagination.

Hence, humanistic education as such will not be elective, on the naturalistic terms that one set of facts is as good as another, or that natural aptitudes or tastes are to be exclusively encouraged. It will be selective of what is best from the distinctly human point of view, and will assert that we, far from remaining slaves of our natural bent, must become acquainted with our common humanity.

Naturalistic education has given us students unable to talk on common grounds except those of sports and sex, faculty members so specialized as to be unable to talk at all, and finally, a nation barring classical literatures, including its own, in favor of its primitive tales. Only humanistic education can create an intellectual community through studies pursued in common, and ultimately an intellectual community of nations.



Is it possible to agree on a common curriculum in which at least some of the great books can be included? Foerster asks. At least no one may deny that there are four great areas of intellectual experiences: (1) mathematics and natural science, (2) history, (3) literature, (4) philosophy and religion.

Studied humanistically, that is, not as specialties but as provinces of necessary human knowledge, mathematics will be seen to be the language of science; the sciences will be the key to the knowledge of physical nature applicable to the satisfaction of physical human needs; foreign languages will be utilized not only as tools for wider communication but for the acquisition of wider knowledge concerning man, and a means of knowing one's own language better by comparison; literatures will be welcomed as samples of the fine arts, and the record of what men have thought, felt, and done; history will serve as an explanation of the present through the past; philosophy, as the attempt to speculate upon the ultimate realities behind all subjects; and religion as the understanding so far as possible by us here, of ultimate values.

Once it is agreed that all students should have experience in all these areas, many questions remain, including the problem of what is most humanistically valuable in each. But the first necessity was evidently to restate in terms of the present the necessary program of a humanistic education. This Norman Foerster, all must admit, has challengingly done.

It should be evident that his constructive critique of American education parallels that of St. John's, and that the end of both is first the restoration of a humanistic education at the college level.

How much the Hutchins-St. John's movement owed to Babbitt and Foerster was, therefore, an intriguing historical question. A direct inquiry was made both of President Hutchins and of President Barr.

President Hutchins answered with his usual candor: "I wish I could tell you the genesis of my ideas. Unfortunately I can't. I was simply floundering around with the usual dissatisfaction with American education. I decided to teach the great books of the Western World, and in the process of doing it discovered what was the trouble. I am sorry that I can claim no connection with the Babbitt movement. I have glanced at one or two books of Babbitt's; I have occasionally looked at Foerster's *The American Scholar*, and

I have read his book on *The American State University*. I should doubtless have profited very much by a more thorough and comprehensive knowledge of the works of this group. But I must emphasize again that I was a practical administrator engaged in trying to make head or tail of practical administrative problems. In the effort to solve those problems I have reached the conclusion contained in my books."

President Barr turned over the inquiry to Dean Buchanan who wrote: "Mr. Barr says that he never really read Babbitt or Foerster. As for myself I read Babbitt's *The New Laocoön* and *Rousseau and Romanticism* and Foerster's *The American State University*. I do not think that any of the Chicago or St. John's people recognize any direct influence of these two Humanists."

This, of course, only brings out more clearly and makes the more interesting the fact that what are now two currents of the American humanist movement are practically of independent origin. The dates would suffice to show why. Foerster's *The American State University* was published in January, 1937, the very year that St. John's was reorganized, and the movement toward the reading of the great books of which it was a culmination went back to the Erskine list developed in France in 1918. Dean Buchanan further mentions that Woodberry at Columbia also had much to do with stimulating the reading of representative books, and that his list was supposed to go back to one prepared by Sir John Lubbock. We have here another instance of how in the study of sources there is a constant call to go further back.

It should also be mentioned, as Foerster recalls, that Robert Shafer, a contributor to *Humanism and America*, published in the *Bookman* in 1931 (May-July) three articles which included a list of "great books," while G. R. Elliott, another contributor, also published two articles on "The American College" in *The American Review* in 1933 (Nov.-Dec.), along the same lines. On the other hand, Foerster was acquainted with and mentions the Columbia list.

The least that can be said, therefore, is that there is an undoubted confluence of the two trends toward the reorganization of college education on humanistic lines through the reading of masterpieces, which go back to Babbitt and Foerster on the one hand, and to Hutchins and St. John's, on the other.

Norman Foerster, however, was to pursue his work much further, namely, toward the reorganization of graduate studies, though still according to the indications of Irving Babbitt. Fortunately, as Director of the School of Letters at the University of Iowa, he was fully free to do so.

Babbitt had pointed out in one of his first essays, "Literature and the College Degree," that not only had the college been disorganized by naturalistic doctrine, but that the graduate school had also been affected. Fundamentally, the issue was between training the candidate for the accurate accumulation of facts as is done in the physical sciences, and training in mature thought over wide reading.

The difficulty, as Babbitt recognized, was that wide reading might be done by a dilettante, while a doctorate should at least give evidence of having submitted oneself to the discipline of facts and of some capacity for hard work. Moreover, it is easier to pass judgment on the accumulation of facts by a candidate than on his capacity for mature thought, especially, it might be added, as the question of mature thought brings up the question of the contradictory schools of thought.

Here again Babbitt's ideal was the French rather than the German plan of education. Between the A.B. degree and the special research of the doctorate dissertation, the French introduce a period of assimilation through wide readings in a special field which they reward with the licentiate and *agrégation*; England offers graduate honors for like pursuits. Babbitt therefore proposed a new degree that would "insist above all on wide readings and the power to relate this reading so as to form the foundation for a disciplined judgment."

Foerster took up this idea, and in 1929, as he was about to begin his work at Iowa, he outlined his program in his pamphlet *The American Scholar*. Granting that every ascertainment of facts in the physical world may be useful, when you transfer the ideal of fact-finding to language and literature you may be stopped by researches in language until you forget that language is the tool of literature. If you transfer the method to literary history, you may become so absorbed in finding out how the works came to be that you will never come to evaluate them, or even to read them for what they are. You will even tend to look upon facts as being ends in themselves, although many in literary history are irrelevant; you may even abandon literary history for infantile collecting of data. You



may, in fact, recede one step further from the appreciation of literature through passing from literary to general history.

What, then, would Foerster propose? Essentially a humanistic critique that will "search for those constants in literature and literary theory in which reside the standards that defy the varying provincialisms of the ages of history." In short, literary history should serve merely as a guide to literature, and "literature itself should be studied for its wisdom, its beauty, its civilizing properties, its humanizing effects."

Foerster, then, agrees with St. John's that the college should not be invaded by the methods of the graduate school, but that it should train in the liberal arts and give an initiation to general culture; and he agrees with Babbitt that there must be a reform of the graduate school which would insure a period of wide and thoughtful reading between the baccalaureate and thesis writing for the doctorate.

The A.M. course, following a shorter college course, could then represent at least two years of assimilative liberal study with some initiation to the methods of scholarship.

Here it might be suggested that the degree given at the end of those two years could be either an ordinary A.M. which implied preparation for teaching in secondary school or college, or an Honors A.M., implying recognized ability for continuing to the doctorate. It should be free to aim, as Foerster proposes, either at linguistics, at literary history, or at humanistic criticism. The Honors A.M. (H.A.M.), it would seem, might well require another year of thoughtful resident work; after this the student might teach and, say within five years, write a thesis of recognized importance, as is done in France, for the doctorate, or else study further at some graduate institute of the university.

This would imply that we would turn with Babbitt and Foerster from the German tutelage under which American universities have been suffering, to the example of France. As Foerster puts it: "France is closer than any other nation to the ideal of a well-rounded scholarship: a scholarship at once scientific and critical, close to the facts but dominating them through general ideas, taste, and critical insight, contributing to knowledge in the best sense, and developing rather than warping the scholar himself."

In 1941, after eleven years of work in the School of Letters at Iowa, Foerster gave us the results of his efforts in working along



those lines. His colleagues write on how they tried to train students in language, literary history, and literary criticism, while he sums up further what the study of letters should be.

Not only would he "inculcate the scientific habits of accuracy and thoroughness and the historical sense; assure a general acquaintance with a language and a literature viewed in their historical development and environment; and develop a capacity for research in a limited field of language or literary history," but he would integrate "the discipline of letters with the other humanistic disciplines — history, the fine arts, philosophy, and religion," thus encouraging "a common intellectual life among students of letters."

He would also restore the full ideal of literary scholarship by inculcating not only "accuracy, thoroughness, and the sense of time, but also aesthetic sensitiveness, the ability to write firmly, a concern for general ideas, and an insight into the permanent human values embodied in literature."

Practically, rigorous discipline in the study of language, literary history, the theory and practice of literary criticism, and the art of imaginative writing should issue, he hopes, into the restoration of a vital relationship between scholarship and letters by preparing scholars for careers as teachers, as critics, or as writers.

The same year, 1941, Foerster contributed to a symposium, edited by Donald A. Stauffer: *The Intent of the Critic*, an essay entitled "The Esthetic Judgment and the Ethical Judgment," the key thought of which is that "to estimate the greatness of literary works, which is the main business of literary criticism, what is needed is a rounded estimate, both esthetic and ethical."

This essay is most valuable because in its conclusion Foerster rises to a summing up of the ideal which the American Humanist Movement he has done so much to foster has always held to be its ultimate end:

"If the life of man is indeed as nasty and brutish as the most typical literature of our time represents it, the victory of the organized, mechanized evil which is now loose in the world will only confirm a disaster that has already taken place. As Walter Lippmann declared with unwonted fervor in an address to his Harvard class, what has made possible the victories of this scientized evil is 'the lazy, self-indulgent materialism; the amiable, lackadaisical, footless, confused complacency of the free nations of the world. They have dissipated, like wastrels and drunkards, the inheritance

of freedom and order that came to them from hard-working, thrifty, faithful, believing, and brave men. The disaster in the midst of which we are living is a disaster in the character of men.' ”

Whereupon Foerster concludes: “I think that Mr. Lippmann is right. Vast armaments alone will not save us. We must also rewin our all but lost inheritance of freedom and order, and with freedom and order that on which they depend, belief in the dignity of man.

“This in turn can come only through a religious renewal of belief in man as a spiritual being, or, if that is beyond our attainment, a humanistic renewal of belief in man as a rational and free animal, a belief still richly current in the time of Washington and Jefferson, a belief that comes down to us all the way from ancient Greece.

“We have had our ‘return to nature’; it is time for a great historical return, the ‘return to man.’ ”

It is also with that understanding that Foerster recalled, in a 1943 Baconian lecture at the University of Iowa, that it is of the utmost significance that the two American presidents who did most to make the faith of American civilization clear and moving were Thomas Jefferson, steeped in the ancient classics, and Abraham Lincoln who knew few books but knew the Bible. If they could, as they did, formulate the faith of America, it was because “all that we prize most in life, all that renders man splendid despite the shame of persistent war, oppression, and a general beastliness, goes back in history to the religion, philosophy, art, science, and even the aspiration of democracy of either Judea or Greece, to which we may add the Roman sense of law and order.”

It would be a tragedy, therefore, Foerster again stresses, if American scholarship did not develop methods to bring out and pass on the civilizing values of this wisdom of the ages. The dropping of these humanistic studies or their continued mishandling could not but leave us floundering in our present regression toward barbarism.

Finally, in another symposium, this time edited by himself, on *The Humanities After the War*, published by the Princeton Press in 1944, which includes contributions by Wendell Willkie, Roscoe Pound, and Abraham Flexner, Foerster notes that more belief in the dignity of man has been retained by the common people than by our intellectuals, so that higher education has been used for darkening or destroying this belief instead of using and enlightening it.

As opposed to this betrayal of humanity by naturalistic education,

Foerster gives us a final formulation of a saving program through the teaching of the liberal arts: "In history, let emphasis fall on the interpretation of the best that man has done; in literature and in the arts on the best that man has said and made, and might say and make; in philosophy on the understanding and defining of man's greatness; and in religion upon that which is greater than man."

By his utilization of the legacy of Irving Babbitt, vitalized by a scholarly knowledge of the dualistic humanistic character of original American thought, and a personal experience of how monistic naturalism has well nigh driven it from our educational and literary circles, by his courage in expressing the resulting inadequacy of American education and scholarship, by his patient and painstaking working out of promising plans and methods for lifting us out of the morass of a futile literary criticism, and of inhuman when not purely chaotic educational policies, Norman Foerster has more than well deserved of the American humanist movement.

From Babbitt through Foerster, Hutchins, and Lippmann, the trend of that movement is clear. It leads on from a gloating in our supposedly exclusively animal nature to the return toward a reasoned conviction that man has a nature distinct from that of all other animals; and from this "return to man" it brings us on through philosophy, to a return to God through at least an avowed Theistic Humanism.

What this Theistic Humanism must be to be integral, and the possibility of its passing on to genuine religion, our American neo-humanists have remained short of fully formulating.

We may, however, see further how their thought may be completed by turning to the problem of the co-operation, which they all aspired to, between humanism and religion.

# 11

## THEISTIC HUMANISM AND INTER-FAITH CO-OPERATION

THE study of the St. John's experiment, of the evolution in the thought of Foerster, Lippmann, and Hutchins, and of the inevitableness of the consequences of the contradictory alternatives of thought, must lead us to realize that, finally, education must take a stand. Criticism is of the intellect, action belongs to the will. We must first practice comparative criticism if we would hold any conviction intelligently; but finally, we must make up our mind as to which represents objective truth, or remain helpless in the field of action.

What happened in every country where an attempt was made to have a so-called neutral education officially organized by the state, is that the system became loaded in favor of naturalism. The very fact that this education was also labeled "secular education" shows that a stand was taken from the start against religious education, thus canceling at once the possibility of an initiation to Supernaturalized Humanism and even to Theistic Humanism.

The argument was that religious instruction was left to the churches. But in France, during most of the life of the Third Republic, there was actual war between State and Church. The village schoolmaster stood out against the parish priest, often becoming a socialist and later a communist. In the first decade of the century the religious teaching orders were suppressed, their property confiscated, and though allowed to return as a result of popular protest, they never regained their legal status. In Germany, under the Empire, religion remained part of the public school system according to the wishes of the population, so much so that after the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France the Alsatians revolted against the French government when it tried to impose upon them its secular school system. Later, of course, the German schools were Nazified and religious teachers persecuted. In the United States we



have religious freedom. Still, as state schools were to be neutral, religion could only be taught as an integral part of education in church schools supported privately, a form of double taxation. In Canada the problem was more equitably solved by allotting public money for religious schools according to the wishes of the parents. There seems to be no doubt that a state neutral school system is a first form of state socialism, and that it works for the gradual de-Christianizing of the country.

On the higher level of the state university again the theory of neutrality prevailed; but, as Foerster brought out, actually in many cases it meant state indoctrination in naturalism. As Foerster puts it: "The clear results attainable through the scientific method frequently led the teacher to adopt some kind of naturalistic faith — a view of the universe in which matter or natural forces occupied the central position, a tendency to apply the relativistic and evolutionary doctrines of natural science to human interests and affairs." And again: "In the naturalistic university of today, one way of thinking so overwhelmingly dominates that other possibilities are quite lost to view. To assert that the university of today teaches the young 'to think for themselves' is sheer cant. Within the pattern of scientific and naturalistic thinking, no doubt, the student may be given considerable range, but if his mind wanders outside that pattern he is generally disregarded as hopeless or reproached for his prejudice. Such is the attitude toward the Catholic student, for example, on the part of many professors singularly ignorant of the doctrines of the Church."

So what obtains in general with us is that, while theoretically there is neutrality, practically there is no organized study of the humanistic or religious alternatives of thought, and there is unconscious or deliberate indoctrination in naturalism in the college, and often through textbooks in the high school.

It must be admitted, however, that this is not wholly the State's fault, although State programs have often been elaborated by anti-religious men. If, in particular in the United States, religion was thrown out of the public schools, it was partly because the churches could not agree as to what religion should be kept in.

There are also many arguments for the organization by the State of a tax-supported compulsory education system. Even in predominantly Catholic countries the Church, because of her lack of

resources, was never quite able to organize an adequate system of education from the village school to the university. Hence, wherever no State school system existed, there remained considerable illiteracy, the more surely since some illiteracy is likely to remain in any case. In countries where there are many churches the problem is necessarily even more complicated.

It certainly belongs to the State to see to it that secular knowledge be passed on. The question remains: how can a State school system avoid being more or less antireligious, or even antihumanistic, when it is asked to be neutral and practical?

In any case, before the State could make its education program more religious or humanistic, it certainly needs to know just what a humanistic or religious program should be. Before humanism and religion can co-operate with the State, humanists and Christians must therefore first learn how far they can co-operate with one another.

Here the study of the fundamental alternatives of thought should again be helpful, in particular the comparative analysis we have not yet made of the creeds of the churches who believe in Supernaturalized Humanism.

To study religious history is to learn that even during the Catholic centuries the Church was unable to prevent the development of many abuses, and that there were always controversies within its fold so that many could be scandalized out of it. Those of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries prepared the revolt of the sixteenth. The biographies of reformers generally reveal that they began by attacking some unfortunate practice.

Moreover, allegiance to the various creeds today is largely a matter of birth. Their adherents have for the most part been conditioned by their family inheritance. Nationalistic, racial, social habits make it very difficult to come to accept a creed one was not born in.

Then, too, most creeds have at least some measure of truth or plausibility, so that all churches may, theoretically at least, be made up entirely of men of good will whose sincerity is based on what look to them to be sound arguments.

The Catholic Church recognizes this in her doctrine of the possible salvation of all men of good will, and the Apostolic Delegate at Washington in his book on American saints has testified to the possibility of Protestant saints in the Catholic sense.

One of the best ways to see how the masses of Christians in the Protestant churches, in spite of the inroads of modernism, may still

be united more than is generally thought, and at least stand together in opposition to naturalism, is to study some of the carefully drawn-up statements of beliefs by the principal churches as preliminaries to the study of the possibility of reunion. One of the best of these is *What the Churches Stand For*, published by the Oxford Press in 1922. It will the more surely repay us to study its statements that we shall thus secure a comparative survey of the alternatives of thought within Supernaturalized Humanism.

The representative of the Church of England submits: "We believe that the Church was founded by Christ, a visible organized body, a kingdom *in*, though not *of*, this world. We maintain that as a fact the Church has had a continuous life ever since; that through her succession of bishops she has preserved this continuity." And he adds: "It is not possible for Christ to have founded the Church and not to have founded it. . . . If we are right in believing that Christ founded the Church, there are in this sense no such things as 'the churches.'"

A representative of the Roman Catholic Church would, of course, accept these statements, though he could not agree with the further one made by the representative of the Church of England: "Of this continuous Church that Christ founded, we believe that we are the historical representatives in England," because he holds that it is historically proved that during a certain period the representatives of the English Church certainly did not want to pass on the episcopal powers of the continuous Church and that, therefore, within the English Church, there was a break in the apostolic succession.

In any case, Presbyterianism, which goes back to Calvin, at once answers: "We, too, believe in the Catholic Church. According to the Westminster Confession, we believe 'in the Visible Church, catholic and universal, as consisting of all those throughout the world who profess the true religion, and is the Kingdom of the Lord Jesus Christ, the home and family of God, out of which there is no ordinary possibility of salvation.'" What! *Extra ecclesiam nulla salus*? Yes, in the sense that "any one who accepts and holds the Head comes thereby into relation with other believers."

But how can you be the Catholic Church? it may be asked when, with Luther and Calvin, you broke from it? Because, the Presbyterian answers, "it was the Catholic Church existing in the sixteenth century that had broken from the New Testament." Luther and his



followers broke away from a system of torpor and bondage, and went right back to New Testament truth; from the spiritual rule which oppressed men's consciences they broke away to claim the 'Liberty of a Christian Man' and the priesthood of all believers; finally, from the system of church government which culminated in the papacy, they went back to the simple Church order of the New Testament."

The Jewish Synagogue, the Presbyterian statement goes on to explain, had elders or presbyters. In apostolic times a converted synagogue kept its system of government, introducing only the Christian sacraments. The presbyters came to be called episcopos or bishop. The Apostles, when founding a church simply ordained new elders or overseers, for such is the meaning of episcopos. As Dean Stanley puts it in *Christian Institutions*: "Presbytery was not a later growth out of episcopacy, but episcopacy was a later growth out of presbytery." So the sixteenth century reformed churches dropped the diocesan bishop and retained the minister, ordained by the presbytery and three ordained ministers, to minister the Word and sacraments; and the elder and deacon ordained by only one minister. There were then presbyteries of the ministers of all the churches in a certain area, synods for those of whole provinces, and a general assembly for a whole country.

The Presbyterian Church thus remained highly organized, and considers that it did not leave the Apostolic Church though it separated from Rome, and that it retained the Catholic creeds and the faith expressed in them. "The churches in the Presbyterian Alliance are without exception Evangelical, and absolutely loyal to the Catholic Faith."

What, then, about the sacraments? According to the Presbyterian "Shorter Catechism," they are not only a symbol which represent God's gifts, and seals which confirm His promises, but also means of grace, wherein by faith, Christ and His benefits are truly and indeed received.

So the spokesman for the Presbyterian Church ends by saying that the Presbyterian Church considers itself in an intermediate position between the Anglican Church and the other free churches; since its parochial or congregational system is virtually identical with primitive episcopacy, and since, with the free churches, it stands for a common protest "on behalf of spiritual religion and the freedom of the Spirit."



But the Congregationalist representative in turn presents his case. Congregationalism, dissenting from the Anglican Church toward the end of the sixteenth century, and famed as the church of the Puritans, also believes "that there is only one Church of Christ, and can be one alone." But it bases this belief on its understanding that "Christ is present in the local congregation, and that its deliberations and decisions are guided by His Spirit."

Congregationalism insists therefore on "the freedom of the local congregation under the Spirit." As its representative at the conference we are studying puts it: "What may be called broadly the Catholic view is that continuity must be maintained by organization, the apostolic succession of the historic episcopate. . . . As for us, we are agreed that it is through the presence of Christ and the guidance of His Spirit in each local congregation that it has a claim to be a church."

As to creed, precisely because Congregationalism assumes the constant presence of Christ and continued operation of His Spirit in the church, it refuses to be bound by subscription to a creed, as an authoritative statement of what is believed; though "it has no objection whatever to a declaration of faith as a witness to the world when there is occasion for it."

On the other hand, "the most perfect liberty of conscience is reserved to every one. . . . All a Congregationalist can consistently do is to signify the approval of the Nicene or Apostles' Creed as historical documents, setting forth for the time to which they belong in its proper language the substance of the common Christian Faith which he himself now holds, but would now express differently as the times demand." Yet, "the insistence on personal faith in Jesus Christ as Saviour and Lord keeps Congregationalists united as no common creed has or can."

What, then, about worship and the sacraments? "Each congregation is free to adopt what forms of worship it pleases. . . . Aversion from a liturgy comes from the conviction that, as the Spirit is present and active in the worshipping community, His guidance is to be sought for each occasion, and that the use of forms would be a relapse from the freedom of the Spirit." As to the sacraments, "Baptism and the Lord's Supper are observed, but on their significance, difference of opinion must be admitted. No doctrine of baptismal regeneration is held. . . . To the Lord's Supper great importance is attached. . . . Some hold it to be primarily commemorative

and lay stress on its symbolic character in opposition to what they regard as superstitious sacramentarian views." Others may hold "a high view of the Lord's Own Presence with believers in their remembrance of His death . . . or that the Sacrament may, where human faith responds to Divine Grace in the Presence of the Saviour and Lord, become not only a symbol but a channel of the gifts of Christ. No stress, however, is laid on the Presence of the Body, as is done in the doctrine of transsubstantiation."

As to ordination, once it was objected to. Now it is universally practiced, conferred by the principal of the college where the ordinand was trained, with prayer by the ordinand's pastor or others. Laying on of hands is not unusual, but the ordination may be regarded as not merely to one church or to the Congregational ministry, but to the ministry of the one Church of Jesus Christ. Self-government is still claimed for every local congregation, but in England there are county unions and a national Congregational union. So, though Congregationalists believe that there is only one Church of Christ and can be one alone, "it admits of the widest possible Christian fellowship." They might even admit "an Episcopate constitutional and representative of the Christian people," but not in the sense of "accepting to acquiesce in a theory of *apostolic succession*, which would make the bishop exclusively a channel of any special grace." For the Congregationalist's conviction is that "Christ Himself makes congregational churches manifestations of the Church, and gives these churches a ministry and sacraments He accepts, approves, and blesses."

If we turn to the Baptists we find a church which originated in England about 1600 through a special emphasis on consciousness of the meaning of baptism based on Romans 6:3, 4, interpreted as follows: "When we descend into the baptismal waters, we die with Christ to sin. When the water closes over our heads, we are buried with Him. As Christ was raised from among the dead by a majestic exercise of divine power, so we must henceforth conduct ourselves as men in whom has been implanted a new principle of life." Therefore, "in the rite of Baptism is incased the central truth of Christianity that Christ died for our sins and rose again for our justification."

Hence, the constitution of the Baptist Church is founded not in episcopacy, but "on the universal priesthood of the baptized, who, before they can be admitted to baptism, must exhibit faith and

penitence." So, the Baptist churches are congregational and independent of the State, claiming "the liberty wherewith Christ makes us free as a liberty of conscience and as an indefeasible right to worship God after their own lights."

As for creed, we are told that the Baptists stand for the Gospel of God's grace through Jesus Christ our Lord; for a spiritual interpretation of Christianity and therefore a spiritual membership of the Christian Church; for the freedom of the single soul, the directness of its access to God, the indefeasible rights of independent spiritual manhood, and for "a salvation based on the inward and direct relation of man to God." Nor do Baptists claim that these beliefs are their exclusive property.

The Methodists, too, are congregational. Developed about 1740 as societies by the efforts of John Wesley who found that the English Church did not reach the people as it should, "the Methodist does not believe that the New Testament prescribes any form of Church order, but that any form is legitimate which, at a particular time and place, promises to serve the purposes of the Kingdom of God. For Methodism, a church is primarily a company of people who share a common experience of God in Christ."

As to creed, we are told, "it asks no creed of members, but does ask the consent of its ministers to the Evangelical faith as set forth in the New Testament; and the Methodist people accept the Apostles' Creed and the Nicene Creed without difficulty as epitomes of the New Testament."

As for evangelical succession: "Paul, Luther, Wesley, the minister being one recognized as having personally a divine call." He is a local preacher; he may become a traveling preacher. Wesley ordained a few ministers to administer the sacraments, but it was against the feeling of his people. The question has never been: Shall there be sacraments, but: From whom shall they be received? Today every Methodist minister is ordained by the laying on of the hands of the presbytery, but for some thirty years after Wesley's death it was not so. "So ordination is the Church's recognition of 'the call' of a Minister, and its bestowing of authority upon him."

With the Quakers, or Society of Friends, we reach the extreme of personal individual religion. Founded by John Fox, "a half-educated shepherd lad," about the middle of the seventeenth century, the Quakers antedate the Methodists and derive even more than they from the feeling of personal inspiration of one man.



John Fox tells us in his *Journal* that in the midst of his anguish of soul, he heard a voice saying: "There is one even Christ Jesus, that can speak to thy condition." He thought that help had come to him direct from God and he went out to find "Seekers" like himself and turned them into "Finders." He taught them "that God or Christ comes to teach His people Himself," so that they need not seek to find God through the words of learned divines or man-made preachers; "for He Himself is present with His light and truth in the depths of every human heart, and will reveal Himself to all who will but listen and obey."

So the disciples of Fox believed that this direct revelation to their own souls made them the true successors of prophets and apostles, revelation and inspiration being not of the past alone but of the present also. They believed essentially in a Light potentially at least within the souls of all men, an intuitive perception of spiritual truth, as direct and immediate as the perception of the beauty of a picture. This meant that the bases and seat of authority in religion were transferred from without to within, and that truth was to be believed, not because Church and Bible pronounced it truth, but because it was inwardly "seen" to be true.

"The Light in their soul," their representative goes on to explain, "was, they believed, Christ reliving His own life in the soul of His true followers." Hence the Quakers' "strong sense of the ethical fruits of the Spirit, which led them to be extremely determined 'to walk in line.' They were not to dispute of God and Church but to obey Him." Their hallmark was to be "truthfulness, sincerity, and simplicity."

They did not deny the reality of sin, the need of Atonement and Redemption; but they regarded sin as blinding the eyes of men to the Light within them, so that sin had to be effectively removed before the Light could shine undimmed.

They assumed that, in measure at least, the Light was available for all men, and not for Christians only. Hence their special spirit of brotherliness and philanthropy. Witness the fact that they were the only Protestant colonists to keep peace with the Indians, and their well-known spirit of service during the ravages of the world wars.

From their same conviction that each is personally illumined by the Light of God came their form of organization and worship. They could only be a Society of Friends, friends of God and friends



to one another in Christ, with women on the same plane as men. So no one could preach to others, but all could speak of their inner experience as the Spirit moved them. Their administration could only be meetings for business, local and regional.

Nor could they use outward sacraments, since "they were convinced that the inwardness and spirituality of Christ's religion made it impossible that He had intended to establish outward ceremonies." So they explained away "the words of institution."

They accepted the Bible as inspired, but they would not call it the final word of God, because they believed that He still spoke to them. They would not take the oath of allegiance or any other oath, because all oaths were superfluous. They would not take off their hats in the presence of magistrates, reserving that homage for God alone. They would not take part in wars. For all this they were violently persecuted.

This analysis of the authoritative presentation of the beliefs of the Church of England (to which might be added the kindred beliefs of the Greek Churches), and of the convictions of Presbyterians, Congregationalists, Baptists, Methodists, and Quakers, evidently gives us the picture we needed of the alternatives of thought within Supernaturalized Humanism, as opposed to that of the Roman Catholic Church which historically can claim to have been founded by Christ and to be alone apostolic.

What can the Roman Catholic do with these counterclaims of his separated brethren? He may well grant that the original Protestant Revolt was at least partly a reaction against abuses within the fold; but he knows too that the spread of the Revolt was partly due to political and economic causes. He must also note that all the later Protestant churches represent revolts against the original revolt, on its own principle of private judgment. As to the responsibility of individuals, Catholics or non-Catholics, he realizes that ultimately each will be judged by God alone according to his deserts.

His second thought may well be one of rejoicing that, in spite of radical differences, the dissenters from his faith agree with him in so many ways against the naturalist.

The Greek Church, the English Church, the Presbyterian churches, and even the Congregationalists, Baptists, and Methodists, in so far as they are still true to their own traditions and have not succumbed to modernism, all recognize that there is an Apos-

tolic Church, that Christ founded one Church, that there can be only one Church, that there is only one Church. They all believe that they belong to that one Church. They believe, and the Quakers with them, in the need of an atonement, in the Incarnation, in the Resurrection. They believe in the need of grace through Jesus Christ that man may lead a supernatural life. They all indubitably adhere, with the Roman Catholic Church, to Supernaturalized Humanism.

But, furthermore, when the Roman Catholic examines critically the differences which stand against reunion, he cannot but be struck by the fact that the later developments of Protestantism refute in his favor the original Lutheran and Calvinistic doctrines on the total corruption of human nature, and on salvation due to an arbitrary predestination. This means that there remains of original Protestantism only the doctrine of the direct relation of man with God, or the direct inspiration of every man by God, or what the Protestant so proudly calls "spiritual religion and the freedom of the Spirit."

The Roman Catholic may at once recall that, far from being opposed to his own doctrine, such unitive aspirations represent, on the contrary, its highest reaches, as we saw in our study of Supernaturalized Humanism. He must add, however, that they are to be attained by him within his obedience to the Church Christ founded and to the Holder of its Keys: Peter and his successors through the ages.

For, if he realizes fully the implications of his own religion, he must know that the incorporation into the fold, through Baptism, and the reception of the other sacraments as further sources of grace, are means that should lead him to an ever greater communion with God through faith and charity, till he may hope to reach the unitive way and live in personal intimacy with God in the freedom of the Spirit, which supposes at the same time the most complete obedience to all this same spirit teaches through the Church Christ founded.

However men may regard the aspirations of the warmhearted Wesley, and of the deeply individualistic John Fox, the awful question remains: Were not all those individualistic aspirations, after all, but prideful attempts at short cuts to God, without paying the price of due humility and of the grateful acceptance of the supernatural order as God chose to establish it: one visible Church

founded by Christ, represented by the Apostles and their lineal successors, one fold and one Shepherd?

To the Greek and English churches, therefore, the Roman Catholic may say: We are separated largely because of political developments. To the Greeks, he may add: You must admit that our differences of doctrine are so slight that they should not stand in the way of our reconciliation. And to the English Church: Since you want to believe that your orders have the same validity as ours, and since, historically, there is more than even a grave doubt in the mind of conscientious judges that your predecessors always wished to transmit such orders, you have nothing to lose, and much peace of mind to gain, by accepting ours.

To the Presbyterian and other Evangelical Christians, the Roman Catholic may suggest: In the Roman Catholic Church you may still believe that, in the last analysis, in the great drama of salvation the individual is in direct relation with his God.

And for the Quaker, the Catholic may add: You especially are interesting to me, because you are the fully logical Protestant. You tell the other Protestant churches that, if they believed, as they say, only in the inward authority of the Spirit, then they should not believe in the Bible as the final Word of God. The very essence of your creed is their fundamental principle: the consciousness of personal access to God through faith in Christ, apart from the institution of the Church. Logically, all Protestants should be Quakers.

Well, in the Catholic Church you could continue to believe, as Quakers do, that "God is present with His light and truth in the depths of every human heart, and would reveal Himself to all who would but listen and obey." But have you sufficiently reflected on your own words, "listen and obey"?

You say that you are "in the true succession of prophets and Apostles; and that revelation and inspiration is not of the past alone but of the present also." The Roman Catholic may say that with you. He believes that some may, even now, receive revelations and inspirations; though belief in any such revelations made since the days of the Apostles is never imposed by the Church upon the faithful under any circumstances.

But there is no one who may discredit the authentic revelations set down in Holy Writ. How, then, can we dare to reject what Christ Himself said: "And I say to thee: That thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not

prevail against it. And I will give to thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven. And whatsoever thou shalt bind upon earth, it shall be bound also in heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth, it shall be loosed also in heaven" (Matt. 16:18).

And what about the last lines of the same gospel where again it is Christ who says: "Going therefore, teach ye all nations; baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you: and behold I am with you all days, even unto the consummation of the world" (Ib. 28:19, 20).

What do you make of those sublime words? If they are the words of Christ, then surely you must "listen and obey," and hope that no one will come to distort them, or misunderstand them, for you must take Christ on His own terms. Before you can hope that God will give you revelations and inspirations in turn, you must listen to and obey the revelations He made in the Person of His Son.

Then again, think. You are the creature and He the Creator and Redeemer. Is it not logical that before you can hope for special messages, before you can reach what the Roman Catholic considers the highest possible fruit of the illuminative and unitive ways, you should have traveled the purgative way in all due humility? Your founder, John Fox, the shepherd boy, had much travail. But was there not pride in him, too?

We may grant that the bourgeois-aristocratic Rome of the Renaissance could be a cause of scandal to the folk mind of a Luther; but can Protestants really approve the subsequent life of Luther, or that of Henry VIII? What proofs did these men give that they deserved to be special channels of God? Your John Fox was a different man, and so was John Wesley; but pride is the basic sin, and was it not presumptuous of them to think that their messages might cancel the work of all the prophets of the past, including that long line of holy men and women which the Roman Catholic Church, between the days of the Apostles and those of Luther, undoubtedly numbered?

It is consoling that the members of the Greek, English, and Evangelical churches, as the English Conference we studied reminds us, can still repeat together against all monists and naturalists: "We all stand fast for the Catholic faith, as God enables us to understand it — the faith of Jesus Christ, Very Man and Very God, the one Lord and only Saviour."



However, we may still ask: Do we all use all the means which God gives us to enable us to understand that faith? A divided Protestantism may repeat the solemn words: "We all stand fast for the Catholic faith, as God enables us to understand it — the faith of Jesus Christ Very Man and Very God, the one Lord and only Saviour." But so long as when they say: "as God enables us to understand it," they must add: "and God does not enable us to understand it in the same way," so long too we must realize that since God cannot contradict Himself, and we are a prey to contradictions, somewhere, somehow, God is contradicted.

Then, too, there should be the sobering realization that so long as we have a divided Christendom we cannot answer very convincingly the taunt of the mere Deists, not to speak of the naturalists, that our contradictions and uncertainties make Christianity unreceivable.

This consideration of the impact of Christian division on the non-Christian world, Occidental and Oriental, calls for further analysis. To attach oneself to Christ, to love Christ should mean an eager acceptance of everything that He taught. But even more, the Incarnation of Christ, God become man for us, relinked humanity to God. Christ is truly in all those who individually accept Him and live in His grace. They are attached to Him and partake of His divine life, as branches partake of the life of the vine of which they are but a part: "I am the vine, you are the branches." A Catholic himself within the Church, yet not in the state of grace, is but a dead branch on the vine.

So, there is necessarily the community of Christians, not distinct communities scattered in time and place, but necessarily one community, the community of all those in whose souls flows anew the supernatural life of the triune God through the merits of Christ.

This community is the one catholic (i.e. universal) Church, embracing all those who visibly or invisibly are its members. So, as Christ clearly indicated by His doctrine of the one fold, there can be and there *actually is* only one Christian Church, one human community partaking of the life of God in time and eternity. It is God's kingdom on earth and in heaven, the society of those who have lovingly, humbly, and gratefully accepted God's grace accorded them, whether they belong visibly or invisibly to the one "universal" Church of Christ. There can be only one fold and one

Shepherd, the nourished and the Nourisher; the Christ who through His Passion and Death is the source of the supernatural life, and all those who know its blessing. If faithful to the end they will constitute together, *in saecula saeculorum*, the society of the blessed in heaven.

Apparently, the Protestant world accepts this; since all the churches, as we saw, claim that they belong to the one Church. But does it pay enough attention to the fact that whether handed down through books or tradition, there can be only one consistent obligatory body of truth to which nothing could be added after the days of the Apostles? In the one only Church there can be no contradictory teachings, and yet there must be teaching, since the truths of Revelation are to be taught to the new generations.

Who can guarantee the truth of that teaching? The answer must be: Only God Himself, for written records can be distorted and mistranslated from manuscript to manuscript, oral tradition is even more precarious, and both may be variously interpreted. Whoever is to do the teaching within the Church must then have the assurance from God, and must show proof from God, that they do not misinterpret His revelations; those who listen to the teachers in the Church must be certain that those teachers cannot teach falsely in matters of faith when speaking *ex cathedra* to the Church universal. "Behold I am with you unto the consummation of the world," is the necessary corollary to "Go ye and teach all nations."

So in the one body that is the Church of Christ there must be infallibility in matters of faith and doctrine. In whom that infallibility is vested is a matter of detail, though it is logical that ultimately it should be vested in its head, and so Christ has vested it most clearly and most definitely. Theistic Integral Humanism does not require an authority higher than human reason. But Supernaturalized Humanism, the acceptance of Revelation including the Christian Gospels, demands an authority because its content transcends human reason. Because it is by definition the word of God, it must be guaranteed by God to remain such.

This is precisely what papal infallibility implies. To Peter were given the Keys of Christ's kingdom, the Church, and so the Roman pontiff, the legitimate successor of Peter, when speaking *ex cathedra*, and defining a doctrine of faith or morals to be held by the Universal Church, must be infallible.

Only he to whom God gave authority to transmit His Revelation

can be trusted to transmit it. So soon as this authority is doubted, the whole Christian outlook must be fatally compromised.

Walter Lippmann expressed this very clearly in his *Preface to Morals*: "When Luther succeeded in defying the Holy See by rejecting its claim that it was the exclusive agent of God, he made it impossible for any other element to set up the same claim and sustain it for any length of time."

If the Apostolic Church misled men: taught them that all men could be saved by accepting Christ, when only the arbitrarily chosen could be; taught them that the Eucharist was the body and blood of Christ, when the Eucharist was but a symbol; taught them that marriage was indissoluble, when it could be dissolved; taught them that the sexual act was not to be artificially prevented from being a propagator of life, when it could be made a mere means of irresponsible sensual pleasure; taught them the necessity of good works, when good works were useless; taught them that men needed to co-operate with God's grace, when God's grace was determining; taught them that there could be only one fold and one Shepherd and one doctrine, when there could be many Christian groups with contradictory creeds; then there could be no guarantee whatsoever that those spoke with authority who set themselves up to interpret the Scriptures contrary to what the Apostolic Church had taught for sixteen hundred years, and that they could claim more truly than she to possess the objective truths of the divine order. There could only be a devolution of doctrine till the whole of the Christian creed, which the Apostolic Catholic Church had gradually clarified, would be abandoned in favor of an attempt to keep its ethical values, without any belief in its assertions as to ultimate reality and as to the relations of the supernatural to the natural. Lutheranism was bound to issue eventually in "modernism."

But in turn, Lippmann makes short shrift of the pretensions of modernism, and so do the theistic humanitarian naturalists of the Dewey school, and so did Paul Elmer More. Writes Lippmann, after chiding Fosdick, Whitehead, Kirsopp Lake, and Dean Inge: "It is a nice question whether the use of God's name is not misleading when it is applied by modernists to ideas so remote from the God men have worshiped."

The same holds for what the modernists did with the Christian assurance of immortality: "By immortality modern churchmen mean something which is not only very difficult to understand, but



extremely difficult for most men to enjoy when they have understood it." And no wonder, for all that they mean by immortality is something like this: "the thinker dies, but his thoughts are beyond the reach of destruction. Men are mortal, but ideas are immortal."

Dr. A. Wakefield Slaten of the Dewey school sums it all up adequately: "The modernist has a thought system but it is not the Christian thought system. It is not what Catholic and Protestant Christians have believed these many centuries." And so does Paul Elmer More, even more solemnly, at the end of *The Christ of the New Testament*: "The modernist attempt in the main has taken the form of an Hegelian substitution of ideals for ideas, of what we should like to be true for what we believe actually to be true. . . . Such is the famous philosophy of modernism, the doctrine that we need not believe but must act as if we believed — very ingenious but impracticable, and at heart a lie which the world will not tolerate: men will not long act as if they believed."

If the modernist's position has thus been taxed with intellectual dishonesty, what may be said about the fundamentalist's? Dr. J. Gresham Machen of the Princeton Theological Seminary told the modernists that "the Christian movement at its conception was not first a way of life, not based upon mere feeling or a mere program of work, but an account of facts." But Father Riggs, then Catholic chaplain at Yale, pointed out that Dr. Machen, too, tried to hold an untenable position because he could not "while remaining loyal to the Protestant reformers . . . set limits to destructive criticism of the Bible without making an un-Protestant appeal to tradition."

Mr. Lippmann, who recalls this controversy in his *Preface to Morals*, concludes that Father Riggs was logical; for how can Dr. Machen know the facts on which the Christian religion is founded if not from the Bible, and how can "the Protestant who demands the right of private judgment know with absolute certainty that his reading is the correct one?" It might be added: How especially can he prove to us that his reading is authoritative?

So Lippmann concluded: "From the point of view, then, of the oldest fundamentalism of the Western World the error of the modernists is that they deny the facts on which religious faith reposes; the error of the orthodox Protestants is that although they affirm the facts, they reject all authority which can verify them; the virtue of the Catholic system is that along with a dogmatic affirmation of



the central facts, it provides a living authority in the Church which can ascertain and demonstrate and verify these facts."

This does not mean that Mr. Lippmann was ready to accept the authority of the Catholic Church, since he wrote this in his monistic *Preface to Morals*; but his testimony to the inevitableness of either accepting one authoritative Church or being forced to abandon the whole Christian outlook is no less impressive.

Whether it is Dr. Machen, or Paul Elmer More, who steps up in the twentieth century to tell us just what are the facts back of Christianity and just what are its doctrines, we cannot but ask: What likelihood is there that we had to wait these twenty centuries to learn from you the truth about Christianity? And since you admit that it is a matter of revelation from God, where are your credentials from God to prove to us that your interpretation of the Gospels is at last the true one? Either you must take the position of the Apostolic Church and maintain that you speak with final authority, or you must excuse us if we cannot take your statements to be more than just another private opinion.

So the critical humanist must conclude that if in our study of all the alternatives of thought we are to take into consideration the content of Supernaturalized Humanism, it would at the least be safer to study it first as it is expounded by authorities of the Apostolic Roman Catholic Church. In fact, no Protestant creed can be wholly intelligible except through a comparison with the full creed it modified or rejected.

When Dr. Hough, who himself repudiates many of the private interpretations of Luther and Calvin, including the total depravity of fallen human nature, tells us that there is "a corpus of thought held in common by the Greek and Latin communions, by the great state churches, and by the free churches of the Protestant world . . . which centers in Jesus Christ, whose fundamental assertion has to do with the Incarnation, whose central spiritual message has to do with the cross," he is not, as we have just seen, minimizing the differences of doctrine between the genuinely traditional Protestant churches.

But he is certainly implying that to understand their own interpretations, and to bring out their content, they must compare them with the corpus of thought of the Church which has taught it authoritatively for so long a period that, reckoned back from the birth of Christ, it would carry us far past Plato and Aristotle, far

past Homer and the times of the wise men of India and of China, to the days when, the Bible tells us, Abraham was called by God, four hundred and twenty-seven years after the deluge, to leave his father's house in the land of Haran, and was promised that in his seed all the nations of the earth should be blest.

What does all this mean, so far as the possibility of humanistic and inter-Church co-operation is concerned, if not that though there are many reasons why we should continue to pray and labor hopefully toward reunion, today, as Irving Babbitt often said, there is little likelihood that it may come about within a predictable future. There are too many nationalistic and denominational prides and habits of thought in the way. So we must remain divided, and unable to co-operate wholeheartedly on the basis of our common Supernaturalized Humanism.

How, then, can we co-operate? The answer is that we can do so only by descending from the higher plane of Supernaturalized Humanism to the lower plane of Theistic Integral Humanism.

Supernaturalized Humanism is theology based on Revelation. Theistic Integral Humanism is philosophy. If we must continue to quarrel as to the nature of the authority that alone can guarantee our theology, and save us from taking some error or some aspect of truth for the total truth, we can at least meet on the purely natural level.

That is one of many reasons why it is imperative to keep philosophy strictly distinct from theology. Though philosophy may get some hints or corroborations from theology on some of its problems, it cannot adopt the method of theology: faith in Revelation. Theology can take in philosophy and remain theology, but philosophy cannot take in theology and remain philosophy. Philosophy and Christian theology do not equate "Christian philosophy." They make up the complete Christian outlook. There cannot be a "Christian philosophy." There can be a Christian theology only on the basis of Revelation, and a humanistic, as opposed to a naturalistic, philosophy on the basis of the powers of the human reason. Hence the need of establishing a clear-cut humanistic doctrine proving by reason not only the unique nature of man, but the necessary existence of a personal God, and of the need of God's help to man, if he is to know righteousness.

Babbitt was right in thinking that his conception of humanism,

even though not avowedly theistic, could co-operate with organized religion. It inevitably did from the start, since it took upon itself the criticism of naturalism which all believers must make. It admitted, moreover, that the task of the humanist was so great that he must welcome the support of organized religion. It may, then, remain valuable for all those who, like him, did not see their way to becoming avowedly theistic.

It should be clear, however, that not to do so is to condemn oneself to defend and to utilize dualistic humanism in such elusive terms that it loses a great deal of its effectiveness.

In fact, the record of the past ten years shows us that the direct disciples of Babbitt found it difficult to exploit their doctrines, with the exception of Norman Foerster who, as we saw, reduced Babbitt's formula to practically that of classical humanism, and did not pursue its religious implications. Conversely, it should not be surprising that the dualistic humanism advance came largely from other quarters, and that it gained in power only as it became more explicit, avowedly metaphysical with Hutchins, and avowedly theistic with Lippmann.

It is not strange, therefore, that the greater progress during the past ten years toward a vigorous reassertion of the unique dignity and inviolability of man came especially from the churches. In fact, what characterizes the past ten years is that in spite of the differences which separate them on the plane of Supernaturalized Humanism all the churches have caught the vision that they must learn to work together for social and international justice. Stimulated by the frightful breakdown of Western civilization represented by World War II, this movement finally issued in joint pronouncements that mark an epoch in the history of Christendom.

If the sixteenth century was the century of the effort to rend the seamless robe, and if the subsequent era saw bloody persecutions, with religious differences more and more matters of political allegiances, we are now, on the contrary, in the midst of a general realization that it is of the essence of the Church to be above the State because of its mission to recall to Caesar as to the humblest citizen the eternal moral law.

In the light of the mounting horrors bred by the gradual deification of man, leading to the deification of race and class, with the consequent resolve to liquidate whole races and classes, a deeper sense of the duty to unite, in spite of accidental differences, on



the humanistic basis of a common manhood, has brought together perhaps for the first time in history Jews and Christians for concerted social action.

This movement, developed in the United States, taken up in England, issuing in joint statements of Catholics, Protestants, and Jews, may be said to have culminated recently in the *Pattern For Peace* released in the fall of 1943, under separate preambles, by the most representative leaders of Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish thought in America.

The startling and all-important fact, from the point of view of the humanist discussion, is that to find a common meeting place and common principles, these representative leaders actually and consciously descended from the plane of Supernaturalized Humanism to that of Theistic Integral Humanism.

In their preambles to the *American Inter-Faith Pattern for Peace* both Catholic and Protestants appeal "to all men of good will," while the Jewish preamble uses the words "to all men of faith," adding that "Judaism's highest goal has ever been to amend the world through the kingdom of God."

Necessarily, Jews, Protestants, and Catholics cannot call on all the men of good will to unite on the basis of the peace message of the Holy Night, but they can all go back at least to their common beliefs in the existence of God the Creator, in the distinct nature He gave to man, and in the moral law which binds man to God because of that nature. So the *Inter-Faith Peace Pattern* utilizes fully and exclusively the basic principle of Theistic Humanism when in its first article it states that: "the organization of a just peace depends upon the practical recognition of the fact that not only individuals, but nations, states, and international society are subject to the sovereignty of God, and to the moral law which comes from God."

The *Pattern* further exemplifies how out of Theistic Integral Humanism's conception of the relations of man to God, a whole system of social and international ethics may logically be developed.

Since God created man distinct in nature by endowing him with reason, all men have an equal dignity and consequent rights. The *Pattern*, therefore, can say: "The implications of the dignity of the human person must be set forth in an international declaration of rights . . . and states as well as individuals must repudiate racial,



religious, and other discriminations, in violation of those rights."

This means, too, that "the rights of minorities to life, education, and the vote must be guaranteed," and that, internationally, "the rights of all peoples, whether large or small, must be safeguarded within the framework of collective security, while colonial peoples, instead of being exploited, must be helped toward political responsibility."

Human rights based on the natural law also demand that, instead of economic monopoly and exploitation of natural resources by privileged groups or states, we have an "international economic collaboration to assist all states to provide an adequate standard of living for their citizens."

Finally, within each state, "steps must be taken to provide for the security of the family, the collaboration of all groups and classes in the interest of the common good, a standard of living adequate for self-development and family life, decent conditions of work, and participation by labor in decisions affecting its welfare." For this there must be "some organization of international institutions," but this organization must be based on "a body of international law, itself based on the natural law."

So, according to the *American Inter-Faith Peace Pattern*, there must be an international bill of rights and a bill of rights within each nation. But the right to these bills of rights evidently flows from the God-given nature of man. They rest on the foundation of Theistic Humanism.

Indeed, they have long been defended on that basis, and the framers of the *Peace Pattern* have but utilized the long tradition of theistic philosophers who, on the idea of God the Creator and of the God-given nature of man developed, at least from the days of St. Thomas, a whole system of natural ethics. Witness the doctrines of St. Thomas on property, the legislative power, and the sovereignty of the people:

"Temporal goods are subject to man that he may use them according to his needs and the needs of his neighbor, and not that he may place his end in them."

"The laws of men are just and legitimate only in so far as they partake of the eternal laws . . . and the end of all lawmaking must be the public good.

"The right to decree anything for the public good belongs only to the multitude, or to those who represent it."

This is American doctrine, but it is American doctrine because, as can be shown historically, the thought of the Founding Fathers was in touch not only with the thought of Locke and Montesquieu, but through the Puritans with the Thomistic tradition of Theistic Humanism.

In the light of theistic ethics it can be definitely established that there is a natural moral law stemming from the God-given nature of man and unchangeable like this nature; that civil society is called for directly by this nature, and hence that it is antecedent to all social contracts; in fine, that the necessary civil laws must conform to the natural law and respect all natural rights.

Among those natural rights are: the right to recognize a divine Revelation; the right of property conceived as a social trust; the right of workingmen to a living wage, to trade unions, to the strike without violence for a just cause; the right of the parent to the education of his children; the right of the wife to dignity and a life-long security; the right to life of the unborn babe and of the incapacitated; in short, all the rights to moral, intellectual, and physical integrity which flow from the existence of the autonomous soul of the individual under God. This means, too, that the people do not belong to the government, but that the government belongs to the people; that no government has any right to vote any law against the inalienable rights which belong to all men because of their common nature; and that no people has the right to violate the inalienable rights of another people.

But the crisis of World War II has led to pronouncements on the means of securing a lasting peace on the basis of Theistic as distinct from Supernaturalized Humanism from an even higher source.

Surely, it is His Holiness the Pope, Head of the Roman Catholic Church, who can be the least suspected of being ready to sacrifice religion to mere philosophy. And yet, confronted by the world crises, Pope Pius XII, in his Christmas Allocutions of 1939, 1941, and 1942 actually implies that Theistic Humanism is to be the basis on which co-operation between all men of good will is to be worked out.

As early as 1891, Pope Leo XIII, in his memorable encyclical on *The Condition of Labor*, made clear the position of the Catholic Church on the rights of workers. The now no less famous encyclical of Pope Pius XI, *Quadragesimo Anno*, issued in 1931, made it even clearer.

Both already brought out that these rights are grounded not only on Supernaturalized Humanism, but also on merely Theistic Humanism, since the latter is sufficient to vindicate human rights because of the unique place of man in nature which it is its special province to defend.

"Animality, however perfect," Leo XIII wrote, "is far from being the whole of humanity; it is the mind, or the reason, which is the chief thing in us who are human beings; it is this which makes a human being human, and distinguishes him essentially and completely from the brute." And Pius XI recalled that "the sacred rights of the workingman proceed from his dignity as a man" as well as a Christian.

But Pope Pius XII made even more certain that in the discussion of human rights Theistic Humanism is to be taken as the ground-rock from which to start.

Speaking from the point of view of Supernaturalized Humanism, His Holiness first testifies that grace through Jesus Christ "is diffused in all hearts," which, incidentally, is what the Quakers asserted as if it were a new revelation; but he adds, this time evidently speaking from the point of view of mere Theistic Humanism: "We turn to all those who are united with us at least by the bond of faith in God."

Theism, then, according to what all still recognize the mightiest voice in Christendom, is a sufficient basis to establish human fraternity and a common will for social justice in the light of the natural moral law. As Pius XII puts it: "Such social intercourse and the new order we are hoping for must be founded on that immovable and unshakable rock, the moral law, which the Creator Himself manifested in a natural order."

The tremendous importance of all this in relation to the humanist discussion is that the need and legitimacy of thus speaking in terms of the natural order is actually the basic claim of Theistic as distinct from Supernaturalized Humanism.

As a commentator on these allocutions of Pius XII and of the *American Inter-Faith Peace Pattern* explains: On the one hand, the co-operation of all men of good will "is a spiritual objective, because it involves a return to the principles of justice and charity made mandatory by God's law." On the other hand, it remains strictly within "the temporal or natural order . . . it does not extend into the realm of religious worship, ecclesiastical faith and

order . . . because it conceives the establishment of the principles of the natural law as the basis of man's political, economic, and social life in this world."

In other words, on the natural human plane, the plane of Theistic Humanism, there can be co-operation between all men of good will, irrespective of their attitudes within or without Supernaturalized Humanism.

This does not mean that the Catholic or the Evangelical Christian must, or may, not let his faith in Christ quicken his social conscience and fire his will to justice. It does mean that so soon as it is Theistic, a social program cannot help being in the axis of Christianity, since the natural law is part of the total divine law. Hence the Christian can make to bear upon his common action with all men of good will the zeal inspired by his own personal supernatural faith, so far as this is possessed by him.

Again, this does not imply a recognition of the equal objective soundness of all faiths. But it does imply the common recognition of the basic faith antecedent to all possible acceptances of Christ, the faith in God the Creator, and in the common dignity of all men because of their common God-given nature, which is the central tenet of Theistic Humanism.

There can therefore be no exaggeration of the importance of the *American Inter-Faith Peace Pattern* and of the allocutions of Pope Pius XII, in relation to the American humanist discussion. In fact, they constitute a crowning testimony to the advantage of setting up a clear-cut Theistic Integral Humanism.

In the early days of the American humanist movement, Chesterton could ask Irving Babbitt: "How many of your humanists can there be, and what hope can you have of making an impression upon the world?" An avowedly theistic humanist can answer: We are hundreds of millions; all Roman Catholics, all members of the Greek, English, Evangelical, and Jewish churches who have not succumbed to monistic modernism, and even all Mohammedans; while all the Orientals who believe in the distinction between the permanent and the impermanent can be met sympathetically and shown, on the basis of the arguments which give the theistic humanist his convictions, that their own beliefs point to the existence of a personal God.

In fact, such a belief is so instinctive with man that it has been



called naïve. It is naïve, not in the sense of wishful thinking, which it is often accused of being, for Theistic Humanism on the contrary implies duties that run counter to man's sensual appetites and will to power; but in the sense that it is natural, because obviously sensible, to believe that all beings must have an adequate cause, not only to be but to be what they are in their essential distinctions from one another.

So the millions of theistic humanists stand opposed to the few thousands who reasoned their way, on what can easily be shown to be false premises, to the credulous belief in a self-existing universe and in a becoming unexplained by the existence of an antecedent being.

What these millions of theistic humanists needed was to understand that on the basis of their common Theism they could unite on the natural plane, irrespective of their special understanding of the supernatural. They now have an assurance from the very Head of the Roman Catholic Church that they can do so, and that Catholics may do so with them. They now have, besides, a first example of how easily they may all agree on a political, economic, and social program, national and international. This is made manifest in the concerted effort of religious leaders of all faiths in the United States, which issued in the 1943 *American Inter-Faith Peace Pattern*, and which was endorsed by no less representative religious leaders in England.

Referring to this aspect of the *American Inter-Faith Peace Pattern*, the Catholic commentator already quoted writes: "An immediate fruit of this movement toward a fuller religious consciousness will be the rediscovery by all men of their own essential spiritual unity as human persons, moral and responsible agents, all under the sovereignty of God. Only on such a widely operative sense of human unity can the peace of the world be securely built."

There could be no greater proof that the American humanist movement was on the right road. This widely operative sense of humanity is the very platform of the reassertion of the Theistic Humanism to which it led.

On that platform not only may an answer be found to the problems of literary criticism and of education with which the American humanist movement first busied itself, but, as we may now see, on that platform the social order which alone can insure the peace of the world in the new age can be securely built.

## EPILOGUE

BECAUSE of the lag between completion and publication, the optimistic note on which this study ended might now seem out of place.

Suddenly ushered into the superplane-atomic age, after defeating two nations aiming to dominate between them Europe and Asia, we witness the emergence of a single aggressor so geographically situated that he can throttle both. The geographic center of the world has shifted to Asia. France, Italy, and Spain looked at from India are insignificant peninsulas, and England a scarcely perceptible isle. With communism dominating Eurasia, its tentacles would soon shackle Africa and the Americas.

The Theistic Humanist, however, may see in this a further corroboration of his fundamental thesis: Only the philosophy of an abiding righteousness above all nations, evidenced by the distinct nature of man, and calling for human relations in conformity with natural and divine law, can insure international unity, because such a unity can only be achieved by such a pursuit of justice.

If, therefore, an opposite philosophy arises to assert that there is no abiding natural and divine law, but that truth is constantly in the making and in terms of the likes of the stronger, then there must be conflict to be resolved either through debate or by force of arms.

Expressed in terms of the humanist discussion, the growing opposition between Russia and the remnants of what was the Western world really signifies no less than that the two fundamental contradictory alternatives of thought, analyzed throughout this book, now stand confronted in stark opposition.

It is then even clearer today that the new age will depend upon what the people of the United States have the vision and the courage to make it.

Nor need we abandon all optimism. The progress toward an emancipation from naturalism, described throughout this book, remains real. Moreover, much has actually been done to set up a United Nations Association, and even toward its acceptance of a Bill of Rights on the basis of Theistic Humanism.

More recently, urged on by the ever more pressing needs of the hour, the National Catholic Welfare Conference, elaborating on the Inter-Faith Peace Pattern of 1943, drew up a "Declaration of Rights" which, in its detailed analysis of "The Rights of the Human Person," "The Rights Pertaining to the Family," "The Domestic Rights of States," and "The Rights of States in the International Community," constitutes a final charter of genuine liberalism.

If such a Bill of Rights were incorporated in the constitution of the United Nations Association, and in the constitutions of all states; and if its guardianship were entrusted, within each and every jurisdiction, to a Supreme Court, the function of which would be to declare unconstitutional any law or provision passed in violation of those rights, the problem of how to secure social and international justice would be solved.

How far the United Nations Associations and the several states can be brought to adopt and to work according to such a Bill of Rights is then the crucial question.

Its answer should certainly not be sought by any of us in a spirit of smug self-righteousness. The strength of communism, it must be admitted, has its roots in the abuses of the Czarist regime, and in our own inconsistencies. We may tell Russia that her use of the word democracy is a brazen attempt to hide behind a hope-inspiring slogan the blasting of all freedoms; but she may answer that we too have often applied idealistic words to sordid practices. We may denounce her for interfering with freedom of worship; but she may retort that religious liberty has merely meant for the majority of us the liberty to have no religion, and that most of our nations have also a plentiful record of interference with whatever organized religions managed to survive among us. She may even point out that the philosophy of total change from which sprang her Marxism has also become in large part our philosophy, so that, if we were sufficiently intelligent, we would recognize that her program is really the logical end of what so many of us oppose with her to Christianity.

So in the light of the most recent events it may with even more assurance be repeated that the American humanist movement should be credited with having distinctly helped to bring out that if catastrophe has overwhelmed the Western world it is because it went wrong on first principles.

It should also today be clearer that whether the United States can succeed in repairing the damage done, and in reorienting the world toward the only philosophy which can restore and safeguard human rights, depends on whether their leaders sufficiently regasp that philosophy.

The Christian may add a further note:

A hundred years ago Macauley wrote of the Mother Church of Christendom: "She was great and respected before the Saxon had set foot on Britain, before the Frank had passed the Rhine, when Grecian eloquence still flourished at Antioch, when idols were still worshipped in the temple of Mecca. And she may still exist in undiminished vigor when some traveler from New Zealand shall, in the midst of a vast solitude, take his stand on a broken arch of London Bridge to sketch the ruins of St. Paul's."

When those words were reread even no farther back than thirty-five years ago, they could well seem preposterous. Was it not still the common boast that science would build a secure world of freedom on the ruins of religion? Nineveh and Tyre, ancient Athens and Rome might have become but names to conjure with; but Berlin, Paris, and London would ever be the proud capitals of an emancipated humanity.

Today we know that all the cities of the world may be pulverized in an instant. The gifts of science, without a corresponding progress in wisdom, have brought the threat of annihilation.

Whether we recognize it or not, God's creation here below remains a physical, moral, metaphysical, and supernatural cosmos; and if we persistently violate its order only perpetual miracles can save us. God does not owe us perpetual miracles. The Greeks understood that when they spoke of Nemesis. The Hebrew prophets understood it when they called Israel to repentance. We need new prophets to tell us, with even greater authority than the American Theistic Humanists, that the white race may be fast coming to the end of its allotted chance, now that it has discovered the means of its total destruction.

Nor would this mean the end of mankind. It would only mean



that it would be the turn of our black and yellow brothers, so often ill-treated by us, to make the fateful choice of developing new civilizations according to God's order or against its eternal laws.

Nor yet would this mean that the righteous in the white race would have been defeated. For men, crazed by their rebellion against God, may tyrannize, torture, and liquidate their fellow men. But each and every one of their victims remains free to make his peace with his Maker. Justice prevails even when evil seems to triumph. In the words of the poet Mistral: Even Satan must forever bring stones to the edifice of the Lord.

So even if the Theistic Humanist may come to doubt whether his glimpse of reality is strong enough to become the light of a new age, the consistent Christian can remain serene.

Some day, we now know, a South-African black may sit "in the midst of a vast solitude" on the ruins of St. Paul's or even on those of St. Peter's and of the Vatican. But, as Macauley surmised, somewhere, the Christian rightly can believe, the Church of God will stand ready to teach the new nations. For the promise abides: Even the gates of hell shall not prevail against her.

There may not always be an England or a France, a Russia or the United States, but there will always be God's order.

## REFERENCES AND NOTES

### *Books Cited and Abbreviations Used:*

- Babbitt, Irving, *On Being Creative* (Houghton Mifflin), *O.B.C.*; *Masters of French Criticism* (Houghton Mifflin), *M.F.C.*; *Literature and the American College* (Houghton Mifflin), *L.A.C.*; *The Dhammapada* (New York: Oxford Press), *Dh.*; *Democracy and Leadership* (Houghton Mifflin), *D.L.*
- The Baconian Lectures, 1943* (University of Iowa Press), *B.L.*
- Foerster, Norman, *Humanism and America* (Farrar and Rinehart), *H.A.*; *Toward Standards* (Farrar and Rinehart), *T.S.*; *The American Scholar* (University of North Carolina Press), *A.S.*; *The American State University* (University of North Carolina Press), *A.S.U.*; *Literary Scholarship* (University of North Carolina Press), *L.S.*; *The Future of the Liberal College* (Appleton Century), *F.L.C.*; *The Humanities After the War* (Princeton University Press), *H.W.*
- Gideonse, H. D., *The Higher Learning in a Democracy* (Farrar and Rinehart), *H.L.D.*
- Hough, Lynn Harold, *The Christian Criticism of Life* (Abington-Cokesbury Press), *C.C.L.*
- Hutchins, R. Maynard, *No Friendly Voice* (University of Chicago Press), *N.F.V.*; *Education for Freedom* (Louisiana State University Press), *E.F.*
- Lippmann, Walter, *Preface to Morals* (Macmillan), *P.M.*; *The Good Society* (Little, Brown), *G.S.*
- Manchester, F. A., and O. Shepard (eds.), *Irving Babbitt, Man and Teacher* (Putnam), *I.B.M.T.*
- Mercier, Louis J. A., *The Challenge of Humanism* (New York: Oxford University Press), *C.H.*
- More, Paul Elmer, *The Christ of the New Testament* (Princeton University Press), *C.N.T.*
- Murray, John C., S.J., *The Pattern for Peace and the Papal Peace Program* (Catholic Association for International Peace), *P.P.*
- Ord, *What the Churches Stand for, A Symposium* (London: Oxford University Press), *C.S.*
- Pope Leo XIII, *Great Encyclicals* (Benziger Bros.), *G.E.*
- Pope Pius XI, *Quadragesimo Anno*, Encyclical (America Press), *Q.A.*
- Stauffer, A., *The Intent of the Critic* (Princeton University Press), *I.C.*

Page      Line

### CHAPTER 1

- |   |    |  |
|---|----|--|
| 1 | 12 | Cicero, <i>De Officiis</i> , I. I, c. 28. Quoted in Babbitt, <i>O.B.C.</i> , p. xv.  |
| 5 | 13 | This manifesto was first published in <i>The Christian Register</i> (1933). It is reproduced and discussed enthusiastically in O. L. Reiser, <i>Humanism and New World Ideals</i> (Antioch Press). |

### CHAPTER 2

- |   |    |  |
|---|----|--|
| 9 | 19 | Paul Claudel, <i>Ma Conversion</i> . Reproduced in E. Sainte-Marie Perrin, <i>Introduction à l'Oeuvre de Paul Claudel</i> (Paris: Bloud et Gay). |
|---|----|--|

- | Page  | Line |   |
|-------|------|---|
| 10    | 13   | Since the publication of <i>The Challenge of Humanism</i> (1933), in which Seillière's work to date was studied in detail, Ernest Seillière has published many books of the greatest interest to humanist critics, notably on Baudelaire, Huysmans, Anatole France, Faguet, Lemaître, Carlyle, Montaigne, les Goncourt, Scherer, Bergson, Proust; <i>Le Romantisme et la Politique, Le Romantisme et la Morale, Le Romantisme et la Religion, Sur la Psychologie du Romantisme Français</i> . He also published several studies on the evolution of Hegelian thought which led to Nazism. |
| 10    | 20   | John Dewey, "What I Believe" ( <i>Forum</i> , Mar., 1930).  |
| 11    | 34   | Babbitt, <i>M.F.C.</i> , pp. 334-335.   |
| 11    | 37   | <i>Ibid.</i> , p. 335.  |
| 13    | 11   | More, "Irving Babbitt" ( <i>The American Review</i> , Apr., 1934).  |
| 14    | 2    | Quoted in Babbitt, <i>L.A.C.</i> , p. 23.   |
| 15-16 |      | For quotations on these pages, and Babbitt's most complete discussion of Buddhism, cf. "Buddha and the Occident," in Babbitt's edition of the <i>Dhammapada</i> , especially pp. 78-87 and 94-100. Cf. also the preface of Babbitt's <i>O.B.C.</i>  |
| 17    | 21   | Babbitt, <i>M.F.C.</i> , p. 329.  |
| 17    | 22   | <i>Ibid.</i> , p. 335.  |
| 18    | 10   | Mercier, <i>C.H.</i> , p. 169.  |
| 20    | 2    | Babbitt, <i>Dh.</i> , p. 84.  |
| 20    | 16   | Babbitt, <i>L.A.C.</i> , p. 23.   |
| 20    | 30   | Babbitt, <i>Dh.</i> , p. 84. Cf. also Babbitt's essay in <i>H.A.</i>  |
| 21    | 6    | Babbitt, <i>D.L.</i> , p. 186. Cf. also <i>H.A.</i> , p. 44.  |
| 24    | 20   | Cf. Mercier, <i>C.H.</i> , pp. 282-283.   |
| 25    | 34   | Cf. More's article in <i>The Bookman</i> (Mar., 1930).  |
| 26    | 26   | Mercier, <i>C.H.</i> , p. 194.  |
| 27    | 17   | <i>Ibid.</i> , p. 185.  |
| 27    | 30   | <i>Ibid.</i> , p. 265.  |
| 27    | 39   | <i>Ibid.</i> , inside book cover.   |
| 28    | 22   | Manchester, <i>I.B.M.T.</i> , p. 332.   |
| 28    | 28   | <i>Ibid.</i> , p. 333.  |
| 29    | 12   | Foerster (ed.), <i>H.A.</i> , p. 38.  |
| 29    | 17   | <i>La Revue Anglo-Américaine</i> , 1933, review of Mercier, <i>C.H.</i>   |
| 30    | 30   | <i>The Harvard Teachers Record</i> , Vol. 4, No. 2 (Apr., 1934), pp. 97-98.   |
| 31    | 19   | <i>London Times Literary Supplement</i> (Apr. 5, 1934), review of Mercier, <i>C.H.</i>  |

## CHAPTER 3

- |       |    |   |
|-------|----|---|
| 36    | 12 | Cf. Hutchins, <i>E.F.</i> , Chap. 1.  |
| 38    | 17 | On this whole development, cf. Scott Buchanan, <i>A Crisis in Liberal Arts</i> (St. John's College Publications). A bibliography of articles on St. John's is published in the annual reports of the president. The references to St. John's in this chapter are based on such writings and on the annual catalogues of St. John's. |
| 39    | 15 | Hutchins, <i>E.F.</i> , pp. 17-18.  |
| 40    | 40 | Hutchins, <i>N.F.V.</i> , p. 48.  |
| 41    | 1  | <i>Ibid.</i> , p. 48.   |
| 42    | 20 | <i>Ibid.</i> , p. 56.   |
| 42    | 23 | <i>Ibid.</i> , p. 55.   |
| 42    | 24 | <i>Ibid.</i> , p. 70 ff.  |
| 43    | 6  | <i>Ibid.</i> , p. 188 ff.   |
| 43    | 16 | Foerster, <i>F.L.C.</i> , p. 47 ff.   |
| 44-45 |    | Gideonse, <i>H.L.D.</i> , pp. 25, 29, 30, 31.   |

## Page Line

## CHAPTER 4

- 52 29 Paul Mariett, *Poems* (New York: Mitchell Kennerley), p. 55.  
 54 11 Macmillan adv., *The Forum*, Mar., 1929.  
 54 24 Lippmann, *P.M.*, p. 143.  
 54 29 *Ibid.*, p. 144.  
 55 1 *Ibid.*, p. 152.  
 55 5 *Ibid.*, p. 152.  
 56 1 *Ibid.*, p. 175.  
 56 3 *Ibid.*, p. 175.  
 56 6 *Ibid.*, p. 177.  
 56 30 *Ibid.*, p. 195.  
 56 39 *Ibid.*, p. 199.  
 57 17 *Ibid.*, p. 318.  
 57 17 *Ibid.*, p. 209.  
 59 21 Babbitt, in *H.A.*, p. 39.  
 62-65 Lippmann, *G.S.*, between pp. 374-383.

## CHAPTER 5

- 73 38 Lippmann, *P.M.*, p. 49.  
 74 13 *Summa Theol.*, I of II, q. 63, a. 1.  
 74 28 *Ibid.*, I of I, q. 95, a. 1.  
 74 35 Charles G. Herzog, S.J., *God the Redeemer*, pp. 125-126.  
 77 36 On Hutchins and Metaphysics, cf. further Hutchins, *E.F.*, chap. 2.  
 79 29 Quoted in *New York Times*.  
 80 16-22 Gideonse, *H.L.D.*, pp. 32-33.  
 82 Cf. More's article in *Irving Babbitt, Man and Teacher*.  
 84 7 Babbitt, in *H.A.*, p. 41.  
 84 16-30 Cf. Babbitt, *Dh.*, pp. 78, 80, 82, 84.  
 85 14 On Babbitt's refusal to be considered an atheist or agnostic, cf. Mercier's essay in *I.B.M.T.*, especially p. 196 ff.

## CHAPTER 6

- 88 9 Lynn Harold Hough, *C.C.L.*, p. 276.  
 89 38 *Ibid.*, p. 29.  
 90 12 *Ibid.*, p. 49.  
 91 15 *Ibid.*, p. 60.  
 91 24 *Ibid.*, p. 54.  
 92 22 *Ibid.*, p. 71.  
 92 37 *Ibid.*, p. 75.  
 93 19 *Ibid.*, p. 79.  
 93 24 *Ibid.*, pp. 79-80.  
 93 25 *Ibid.*, p. 81.  
 93 31 *Ibid.*, p. 74.  
 93 40 *Ibid.*, cf. pp. 81-82.  
 94 35 *Ibid.*, p. 86.  
 97 7 *Ibid.*, p. 91.  
 100 5 *Ibid.*, p. 139.  
 102 8 *Ibid.*, p. 164.  
 105 30 *Ibid.*, p. 195.  
 107 12 *Ibid.*, p. 213.  
 107 15 *Ibid.*, p. 213.  
 107 17 *Ibid.*, p. 214.  
 107 20 *Ibid.*, pp. 217-218.  
 107 25 *Ibid.*, p. 218.  
 107 38 *Ibid.*, p. 221.  
 108 31 *Ibid.*, p. 230.  
 109 24 *Ibid.*, p. 269.  
 109 26 *Ibid.*, p. 271.



<i>Page</i>	<i>Line</i>	
-------------	-------------	--

- |     |    |                             |
|-----|----|-----------------------------|
| 109 | 30 | <i>Ibid.</i> , p. 273.      |
| 111 | 20 | <i>Ibid.</i> , pp. 212-213. |

## CHAPTER 7

- |     |    |   |
|-----|----|---|
| 113 | 30 | More, <i>C.N.T.</i> , p. 293.                 |
| 115 | 33 | Cf. Lippmann, <i>P.M.</i> , p. 55.            |
| 118 | 12 | Cf. Babbitt's article in <i>H.A.</i> , p. 47. |
| 118 | 15 | Lippmann, <i>P.M.</i> , p. 41.                |
| 118 | 21 | Jaeger, <i>H.T.</i> , p. 64.                  |
| 118 | 23 | <i>Ibid.</i> , p. 54.                         |
| 122 | 9  | Babbitt, in <i>H.A.</i> , p. 38.              |
| 123 | 29 | Lippmann, <i>P.M.</i> , p. 325.               |
| 123 | 30 | <i>Ibid.</i> , p. 329.                        |
- For a complete study of supernaturalized humanism, cf. A. Tanquerey, *The Spiritual Life* (Desclée, Tournai, Belgium).

## CHAPTER 9

This chapter is based on the publications of St. John's College, and in particular on the annual catalogues, especially those of 1938 and 1939, the reports of the President, Stringfellow Barr's *A College in Secession* (reprint from the *Atlantic Monthly*, July, 1941), and Scott Buchanan's *A Crisis in Liberal Education*.

## CHAPTER 10

- |     |    |  |
|-----|----|--|
| 166 | 19 | Foerster (ed.), <i>H.A.</i> , p. xvii.   |
| 168 | 27 | Shelley, end of <i>Prometheus Unbound</i> .  |
| 170 | 18 | Foerster, <i>T.S.</i> , p. 177.  |
| 170 | 28 | <i>Ibid.</i> , p. 180.   |
| 171 | 12 | <i>Ibid.</i> , p. 174.   |
| 171 | 15 | <i>Ibid.</i> , p. 174.   |
| 171 | 39 | <i>Ibid.</i> , p. 188.   |
| 172 | 5  | <i>Ibid.</i> , p. 190.   |
| 172 | 13 | <i>Ibid.</i> , p. 191.   |
| 173 | 17 | Foerster, <i>The American State University</i> (University of North Carolina Press), p. 85, quoted from L. D. Coffmann, president of the University of Minnesota.  |
| 173 | 32 | <i>Ibid.</i> , p. 158.   |
| 174 | 38 | <i>Ibid.</i> , p. 205.   |
| 175 | 31 | On the extent of the penetration of naturalism in American education, cf. Geoffrey O'Connell, <i>Naturalism in American Education</i> (Benziger Bros., 1938). How naturalism has affected American jurists may be studied in John C. Ford, S.J., "The Fundamentals of Holmes 'Juristic Philosophy'" ( <i>Fordham Law Review</i> , Nov., 1942). |
| 176 | 16 | Foerster, <i>The American State University</i> (University of North Carolina Press), p. 235.   |
| 177 | 4  | <i>Ibid.</i> , p. 217.   |
| 177 | 15 | <i>Ibid.</i> , p. 218.   |
| 178 | 34 | <i>Ibid.</i> , p. 226.   |
| 179 | 37 | <i>Ibid.</i> , p. 231.   |
| 180 | 15 | <i>Ibid.</i> , p. 243.   |
| 180 | 40 | <i>Ibid.</i> , p. 247, quoted from Babbitt, <i>L.A.C.</i> , p. 101.  |
| 181 | 19 | <i>Ibid.</i> , p. 255.   |
| 185 | 4  | Foerster, <i>The American Scholar</i> (University of North Carolina Press), p. 33.   |
| 185 | 7  | <i>Ibid.</i> , p. 48.  |
| 185 | 33 | <i>Ibid.</i> , p. 61.  |
| 186 | 4  | Foerster, McGalliard, Wellek, Warren, Schramm, <i>Literary Scholarship</i> (University of North Carolina Press), p. 19.  |

Page	Line	
186	8	<i>Ibid.</i> , p. 20.
186	13	<i>Ibid.</i> , p. 20.
186	25	D. A. Stauffer (ed.), <i>The Intent of the Critic</i> , p. 76.
186	31	<i>Ibid.</i> , p. 87.
187	4	<i>Ibid.</i> , p. 87.
187	21	<i>The Baconian Lectures</i> , 1943, Iowa University, p. 49.
188	2	Foerster (ed.), <i>The Humanities After the War</i> , p. 31. Since this study was completed, Norman Foerster published <i>The Humanities and the Common Man: The Democratic Role of the State Universities</i> (University of North Carolina Press, 1946).

## CHAPTER 11

190	12	Foerster, <i>The American State University</i> (University of North Carolina Press), p. 119.
190	17	<i>Ibid.</i> , p. 246.
191	35	H. E. Amleto Giovanni Cicognani, <i>Sanctity in America</i> (St. Anthony Press, 1939), the preface.
192-198		All the quotations on the creeds of the churches are taken from Ord, <i>What the Churches Stand for, A Symposium</i> (London: Oxford Press, 1922). They will be readily found in the statement of the different churches.
204	4	Lippmann, <i>P.M.</i> , p. 73.
204	35	<i>Ibid.</i> , p. 27.
204	39	<i>Ibid.</i> , p. 42.
205	3	<i>Ibid.</i> , p. 43.
205	6	In <i>Humanist Sermons</i> , a symposium (Curtis W. Reese, ed.): A. Wakefield Slaten, "Modernism and Humanism," p. 89.
205	10	More, <i>C.N.T.</i> , p. 294.
205	20	Lippmann, <i>P.M.</i> , p. 32.
205	24	<i>Ibid.</i> , p. 34.
205	31	<i>Ibid.</i> , p. 34.
205	35	<i>Ibid.</i> , p. 37.
206	28	Hough, <i>C.C.L.</i> , p. 212.
209	6	John C. Murray, S.J., <i>P.P.</i>
210	36	<i>Summa Theol.</i> , I of II, q. 15, a. 2.
210	39	<i>Ibid.</i> , I of II, q. 90, a. 3.
212	6	<i>Encyclicals of Pope Leo XIII</i> , p. 208.
212	17	Pope Pius XI, <i>Quadragesimo Anno</i> , Encyclical, quoted in J. C. Murray, S.J., <i>P.P.</i> , p. 8.
212	26	<i>Ibid.</i> , pp. 10-11.
212	35	<i>Ibid.</i>
213	30	G. K. Chesterton, <i>The Criterion</i> , April, 1929.

## EPILOGUE

216	7	A Declaration of Rights drafted by a committee appointed by the National Catholic Welfare Conference, Washington, D. C. Republished by <i>The Catholic Mind</i> (America Press, Apr., 1947).
217	13	T. B. Macauley, Review of Rankin's History of the Popes, p. 1.



## INDEX

- Abelard, 90  
 Abraham, 207  
 Adler, 38, 39  
 Anaxagoras, 131  
 Anderson, S., 167  
 Antisthenes, 131  
 Aquinas, St. Thomas, 22, 74, 76, 79,  
     88, 90, 110, 115, 132, 138, 161, 210  
 Archimedes, 150  
 Aristarchus, 150  
 Aristippus, 131, 132  
 Aristotle, 3, 55, 68, 76, 77, 90, 102, 118,  
     121, 122, 131, 132, 134, 135, 137, 138,  
     161, 175, 177, 206  
 Arnold, M., 96  
 Asoka, 16  
 Augustine, St., 22, 74, 88, 90, 110, 132,  
     161  
 Babbitt, Irving, 5, 7, 8, 9-33, 35, 44, 50,  
     52, 54, 55, 58-60, 62, 72, 77, 81-88,  
     89, 96, 97, 99, 102, 103, 106, 108, 110,  
     111, 122, 124, 128, 130, 135, 136, 138,  
     144, 165-166, 168, 175-185, 188, 207,  
     208, 213  
 Bacon, 3, 13, 161, 168  
 Bandler, B., 166  
 Barr, S., 144, 145, 183  
 Bellarmine, 79  
 Berkeley, 4, 161  
 Boethius, 90  
 Bonaventure, 161  
 Bossuet, 94, 160  
 Bourget, 9  
 Bourne, R., 167  
 Boutroux, 176  
 Boyle, 150  
 Brooks, Van W., 167  
 Brunetière, 10, 11, 12, 13, 23, 25, 61,  
     130  
 Buchanan, Scott, 38, 144, 145, 183  
 Buddha, 15-17, 55, 63, 84, 118, 120, 128,  
     134, 136  
 Budé, 175  
 Calvin, 107, 192, 199, 206  
 Canby, H. S., 167  
 Chateaubriand, 3  
 Chesterton, 213  
 Cicero, 2, 7, 68, 72, 161, 177  
 Claudel, 9, 61, 130  
 Collins, S., 60  
 Comte, 4, 9, 10  
 Confucius, 63, 134  
 Corneille, 32  
 Crane, S., 167  
 Croce, 169  
 Dante, 90, 115  
 Darwin, 4, 64, 168  
 Democritus, 131, 132  
 Descartes, 3, 132, 138, 161, 168  
 Dewey, John, 5, 10, 43, 44, 45, 58, 60,  
     69, 204  
 Dreiser, T., 167  
 Einstein, 58  
 Eliot, 52, 58, 145, 165  
 Elliott, G. R., 60, 166, 183  
 Elyot, T., 174  
 Emerson, 31, 96  
 Empedocles, 131  
 Epictetus, 161  
 Epicurus, 132  
 Erskine, 38, 39, 165, 183  
 Euclid, 131, 132, 150, 158  
 Ferenczi, S., 56  
 Fichte, 4  
 Filmer, 79  
 Flexner, A., 187  
 Foerster, Norman, 7, 43, 60, 130, 136,  
     144, 165-188, 189, 190, 208  
 Fosdick, 54, 204  
 Fox, J., 196, 197, 199, 201



- France, A., 169  
 Franklin, 79  
 Freud, 56  
 Frost, R., 167  
 Galen, 42  
 Garland, H., 167  
 Gibbon, 159  
 Gideonse, 43-49, 77, 80, 81  
 Gilson, 60  
 Gorgias, 131  
 Hardy, 168  
 Harvard, J., 79  
 Hegel, 4, 64, 71, 95, 134, 161, 168, 205  
 Heine, 13  
 Henry VIII, 201  
 Heraclitus, 131, 132  
 Hérédia, de, 170  
 Herodotus, 159  
 Hesse, P. of, 93  
 Hippocrates, 158  
 Hitler, 64  
 Hobbes, 3, 95, 161  
 Holmes, H. W., 30  
 Homer, 150, 207  
 Horace, 13, 83, 122  
 Hough, L. H., 60, 87-111, 206  
 Hume, 4, 161  
 Hutchins, 35-51, 60, 62, 77, 78, 80, 81,  
     85, 87, 130, 144, 145, 163, 165, 182,  
     183, 188, 189, 208  
 Inge, 54, 204  
 Jackson, A., 173  
 Jaeger, W., 60, 118  
 James, 52, 53, 161  
 Jefferson, 79, 172, 173, 179, 187  
 JESUS CHRIST, 55, 73, 107, 109, 111, 113,  
     114, 115, 116, 119, 120, 123, 125, 126,  
     179, 192-206, 212, 213  
 Kant, 4  
 King, W. P., 60  
 La Fontaine, 94, 122, 149  
 Lake, K., 54, 204  
 Lanman, 13  
 Leach, H. G., 58  
 Leibniz, 4, 161  
 Lemaître, 169  
 Lenin, 64  
 Leo XIII, 211, 212  
 Leucippus, 131  
 Lewis, S., 167  
 Lincoln, 187  
 Lindsay, V., 167  
 Lippmann, 35, 52-66, 77, 79, 80, 81,  
     85, 87, 103, 111, 115, 116, 118, 123,  
     128, 130, 134, 136, 138, 186-189, 204-  
     208  
 Locke, 3, 138, 161, 168, 211  
 Longfellow, 167  
 Lowell, A., 167  
 Lubbock, J., 183  
 Lucretius, 52, 161  
 Luther, 92, 93, 107, 111, 192, 196, 199,  
     201, 204, 206  
 Macauley, 217, 218  
 Machen, J. S., 205-206  
 Macy, J., 167  
 Mariett, 52, 53  
 Maritain, 60  
 Marx, 64  
 Masters, E. L., 167  
 McGalliard, J. C., 167  
 McKeon, 38  
 Mencken, 60, 167  
 Millikan, 58  
 Milton, 171  
 Molière, 94, 121, 122, 149  
 Montaigne, 2, 32, 35, 122, 174  
 Montesquieu, 211  
 More, Paul, Elmer, 5, 7, 13, 14, 24-30,  
     50, 60, 81, 82, 88, 89, 96, 97, 110, 113,  
     134, 166, 204-205  
 Moses, 72, 116  
 Mumford, L., 167  
 Munson, G. B., 60, 166  
 Mussolini, 64  
 Nansen, 58  
 Newman, 174  
 Newton, 168  
 Nicomachus, 150  
 Nietzsche, 64  
 Norris, F., 167  
 Novalis, 13  
 Parmenides, 131  
 Pascal, 122, 161  
 Paul, St., 55, 113, 119, 196  
 Peter, St., 114, 199, 200, 203  
 Pico, 161  
 Pius XI, 211, 212  
 Pius XII, 211-213  
 Plato, 55, 89, 95, 118, 132, 134, 137, 148,  
     160, 161, 177, 206  
 Plotinus, 55, 161  
 Pound, R., 187  
 Prodicus, 131  
 Protagoras, 131  
 Pythagoras, 131, 146

- Rabelais, 122  
Racine, 94, 121, 149, 170  
Randall, 54  
Renan, 9, 11, 13  
Riggs, 205  
Robinson, E. A., 167  
Ronsard, 83  
Rosenberg, 64  
Rostand, 9  
Rousseau, 13, 95, 138, 160, 168  
Russell, B., 54  
Sainte-Beuve, 11, 96  
Sandburg, C., 167  
Santayana, 52  
Schelling, 4  
Schlegel, 13  
Schramm, W. L., 167  
Scotus, 161  
Seillière, 10, 220  
Shafer, R., 166, 183  
Shakespeare, 121, 170  
Shelley, 168  
Sherman, S., 97  
Slaten, A. W., 205  
Smith, C. P., 38  
Socrates, 55, 68, 131, 148  
Spengler, 64  
Spinoza, 4, 54, 55, 71, 100, 128, 161  
Stalin, 64  
Stanley, Dean, 193  
Stauffer, D. A., 186  
Symonds, 91  
Tacitus, 159  
Taine, 9, 11, 13, 95  
Taylor, H. O., 90  
Tennyson, 168  
Thales, 131  
Thucydides, 159  
Van Doren, C., 167  
Veblen, 158  
Vergerius, 174  
Voltaire, 3, 32, 138  
Warren, A., 167  
Washington, 79, 187  
Wellek, R., 167  
Wells, 58  
Wesley, J., 196, 199, 201  
Wharton, S., 167  
Whitehead, 43, 54, 90, 204  
Whitman, W., 167  
Willkie, W., 187  
Woodberry, 188  
Wordsworth, 168  
Young, 158  
Youtz, P. H., 38  
Zola, 11







# Date Due

~~NEW BOOK~~








B821 .M54

American humanism and the new age.

Princeton Theological Seminary-Speer Library



1 1012 00007 8172